No Religious Exemption from Forum Selection Clause in Employment Agreement

From Luzingu v. Abbott Labs., Inc., decided Friday by Chief Judge Lance Walker (D. Me.):

Plaintiff came to Maine from Angola in 2016, following persecution based on his work as a Christian pastor. He took a position as a Production Group Leader at Defendant’s facilities in Westbrook and Scarborough, Maine, in November 2019. In April 2022, Defendant terminated his employment. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant discriminated against him on the basis of his race in the course of his employment and termination. He also alleges that Defendant retaliated against him after he engaged in protected conduct by making a scheduling decision that accommodated the needs of his Muslim subordinates during Ramadan.

The matter is currently before the Court because Plaintiff electronically signed Defendant’s Employee Agreement as a precondition to his employment, and the Agreement contains a forum-selection clause stating that only the federal and state courts of Illinois will have jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claims….

Plaintiff argues that transfer would be unfair, unjust, and against public policies that favor the free exercise of religion and nondiscrimination. As alleged, Plaintiff is “the sole pastor at his church” and “leads three services per week.” Because of his religious calling and his duties, he maintains, “[t]raveling to Illinois for a deposition or trial would make it far more difficult for him to fulfill his pastoral duties than if the deposition or trial occurred in Maine.”

I am not persuaded that Plaintiff’s religious practices and duties as a pastor justify giving him a special dispensation to avoid application of the Forum-Selection Clause of the Employee Agreement that he acknowledges signing as a precondition to his promotion to a supervisory position. And as for the burden itself, assuming that a special dispensation might be appropriate based on individual needs pertaining to the inconvenience of a particular forum, the Defendant has indicated that Plaintiff’s deposition will take place in Maine.

Moreover, Defendant fairly observes that a trial in Illinois should take only a few days and that telecommunications technology enables Plaintiff to remain connected to his parishioners when court is not in session. I agree with Defendant that the limited time required to conduct a trial of this case in Illinois will not unduly disrupt Plaintiff’s religious observance, even if religious observance is a proper basis to nullify the consequences of a forum-selection clause.

As for Maine law or policy concerning discrimination based on religion, it is unreasonable to suspect that Defendant is enforcing the Forum-Selection Clause against Plaintiff in a selective manner based on the burden that litigation in Illinois would impose on his pastoral duties. Defendant has similarly moved to enforce its forum-selection clause in cases brought by plaintiffs who do not point to their religious practice as cause to avoid the consequences of the Forum-Selection Clause.

In any event, Plaintiff has not identified in Maine law a strong public policy that individuals should be spared the ordinary burdens of contract compliance in matters involving, for example, forum selection or mandatory arbitration because of a temporary interruption in their religious practices….

Plaintiff argues that being forced to litigate this case in Illinois would effectively deprive him of his day in court. In support, he argues that both the emotional and the financial toll of litigating in another state are too much for him. Plaintiff’s protests do not amount to a showing of grave difficulty or inconvenience tantamount to the practical denial of his day in court.

The plaintiffs’ bar in Chicago no doubt includes attorneys who would be enthusiastic to champion Plaintiff’s cause or help Plaintiff’s current counsel to do so. The rules and procedures that will be applied by a federal court in Illinois will be familiar if Plaintiff’s current counsel keeps the case. There is no reason to think that Plaintiff would be subject to any local prejudices in Illinois in terms of the jury pool.

Nor is it apparent that Plaintiff’s case imposes a substantial financial burden that contingent-fee counsel would be unwilling to assist with, particularly as discovery proceedings will look much if not entirely the same in either forum. Plaintiff’s arguments concern the ordinary toll associated with travel in support of litigation, which do not suffice as “grave.”

This leaves individual considerations related to Plaintiff’s religious practice and immigration status. Ultimately, I am unpersuaded that these considerations can fairly be leveraged to favor Plaintiff as compared to any other employee of Defendant who could not claim a special status based on religious practice or ethnicity or immigration status.

The import here is that Plaintiff should be treated like any other employee in his position, not that he should be favored based on his identity….

Hillary Joy Massey, Anthony S. Califano, and Christopher W. Kelleher (Seyfarth Shaw LLP) represent defendant.