Lawsuit by Muslim Group, Over Alleged Public Pressure Campaign That Caused Cancellation of Conference, Dismissed

From S. Fla. Muslim Fed., Inc. v. Atrium Trs I, LP, decided Jan. 27 by Judge Raag Singhal (S.D. Fla.), but only recently posted on Westlaw; an appeal is pending:

Plaintiff, South Florida Muslim Federation, Inc. (“SFMF”) describes itself as “an umbrella organization representing over thirty South Florida entities serving religious and secular Muslims, including Islamic centers, schools, and other similar community organizations, and over 200,000 Muslims in South Florida.” It operates “a resource-sharing hub” that connects the South Florida Muslim community with “both religious and secular businesses, goods and services.” SFMF sponsors an annual conference for the South Florida Muslim community and presents matters of religious, social, and political interest as well as a bazaar of community owned businesses.

“The vast majority of SFMF’s membership identify as and are perceived as being of Middle Eastern, North African, and South Asian (‘MENASA’) ethnic descent and having a shared ancestry associated with majority-Islamic countries in Africa and Asia.” “The overwhelming majority of SFMF’s executive leadership, including its President… are of MENASA ethnic descent.”

SFMF was scheduled to hold its second annual conference at the Coral Springs Hotel & Convention Center (the “Hotel”) on January 12, 2024. It had signed a Group Sales Agreement (the “Contract’) with Atrium TRS I, LP (“Atrium”), the franchisee and operator of the Hotel. The Hotel cancelled the contract at the last minute, citing “significant undesirable interest.”

The undesirable interest arose from a “public pressure campaign” allegedly conducted by Defendants Middle East Forum [and others]. The public pressure campaign began “soon after” October 7, 2023, which the Court notes is the date of the attacks in southern Israel by Hamas and other militant groups.

SFMF accuses Defendants of meeting with the Hotel’s general manager, publishing negative articles, promoting an email campaign to the public, and threatening boycotts of the Hotel if the conference were to take place as scheduled. A week before the conference was scheduled to start, the Hotel cancelled the conference citing “significant undesirable interest.” After the Hotel cancelled the conference, the non-Hotel Defendants variously claimed credit for causing the cancellation.

SFMF rejected plaintiffs’ claims for violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides for injunctions against racial and religious discrimination in certain places of public accommodations, but “does not authorize a cause of action for damages”:

[P]ast exposure to illegal conduct “does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief.” The Amended Complaint cites other instances of cancellations in other cities in November and December 2023, but these instances do not plausibly show a threat of real and immediate future injury. Indeed, the Amended Complaint states that SFMF held its third annual conference in 2025, although the location did not have hotel rooms and SFMF did not publicize the location of the conference until a few days before.

The Amended Complaint fails to allege any facts that plausibly present a real and immediate threat of future injury by Defendant Coral Springs Marriott. (Count I). SFMF plans to not make advance disclosure of the location of its future events, but there are no facts alleged that would tie that decision to any policy or future conduct by the Coral Springs Marriott. SFMF, therefore, fails to allege a plausible threat of future injury that would support standing to pursue its claim against the Coral Springs Marriott….

SFMF alleges that Defendant Eaton was quoted in January 2024 as stating that “if the Marriott Coral Springs reschedules with SFMF, [Defendant Parkland] Chamber of Commerce would cease doing business with the hotel.” SFMF also alleges that when it was able to find another venue to host its 2024 convention, [Defendant] Kaufman “published another article again attempting to incite public outrage and force the conference’s cancellation.” In that article, Kaufman stated that the new venue “has agreed to allow the group to use their premises to further the spread of hatred and incitement.”

{The Court notes that SFMF and Kaufman each accuse the other of incitement. Sadly, such is currently the state of discourse in these United States. And, to paraphrase Samuel Johnson, the First Amendment is the last refuge of the scoundrel.}

As a result, SFMF does not publicize the location of its conferences on its website or notify attendees of the event until days before it is to take place. SFMF argues that these facts show an imminent threat of future harm to establish standing. The Court disagrees.

First, there are no facts alleged beyond conjecture that the Chamber of Commerce, Eaton, and the Kaufman Defendants are likely to engage in similar future conduct or that they would successfully impede SFMF from booking venues in the future.

Second, there is no form of injunction which could remedy the situation. Eaton and the Chamber of Commerce threatened not to do business with the Coral Springs Marriott if SFMF’s event were rescheduled; whatever their motivation, the Court cannot enter an enforceable injunction requiring them to patronize that venue.

Likewise, the Court cannot enter an injunction restraining Kaufman’s future speech, however reprehensible or offensive it may end up being. Nor can the Court order the Defendants (or any party in any case) to adopt a charitable view of their neighbors. There is no showing in the Amended Complaint that a court-ordered injunction would redress SFMF’s injury.

{The Court does not address the merits of SFMF’s allegations that these Defendants exhibited racial, ethnic, or religious animus. At this stage the Court addresses only the standing issues raised by Defendants.}

These are issues that weigh heavily in a pluralistic society such as ours. Conflicts are bound to occur. Sometimes the conflicts are actionable. {For example, if the Chamber of Commerce denied membership to an otherwise qualified organization or individual due to race, religion, or other protected characteristic, the Court could fashion equitable relief.} But sometimes, such as in this case, the conflict does not support standing for injunctive relief under [the Civil Rights Act]. {And of course, such conflicts may occur because of clashing values and power imbalances. When the power imbalance switches to the opposite side as it always does over time, Defendants here will likewise have no standing to seek relief as the Plaintiffs of the future.} SFMF’s Amended Complaint fails to establish standing to pursue injunctive relief.

The court also dismissed the claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which has been read as generally forbidding race discrimination (but not other forms of discrimination, such as religious discrimination) in contracting:

SFMF identifies itself as a Muslim-community group. To accept SFMF’s premise that prejudice against a Muslim community group is akin to racial and ethnic discrimination, the Court would need to equate MENASA ethnicity with the Muslim religion. The two are not the same. Indeed, Pope Leo XIV’s recent trip to Turkiye and Lebanon highlighted the Christian presence that remains in those lands. Clearly, the Jewish religion is practiced in the Middle East, as are other religions and no religion. Similarly, not all Muslims are persons of color or MENASA descent. SFMF’s Amended Complaint does not allege racial discrimination under § 1981.

And the court declined to exercise jurisdiction over state breach of contract and tortious interference with contract claims.