Magistrate Judge Declines to Recuse Herself in Trump v. BBC Libel Lawsuit

From today’s opinion by Magistrate Judge Enjoliqué A. Lett (S.D. Fla.) in Trump v. BBC:

On December 15, 2025, Plaintiff initiated this action, and the Clerk of Court assigned the matter to Judge Roy K. Altman stating, “U.S. Magistrate Judge Enjolique A. Lett is available to handle any or all proceedings in this case.” Shortly thereafter, on January 12, 2026, the parties voluntarily elected to have the Undersigned preside over discovery matters in this action. On February 11, 2026, Judge Altman referred this case to the Undersigned for all pretrial non-dispositive and discovery matters….

Plaintiff now seeks—over 160 days after the Undersigned’s involvement in this case—the Undersigned’s recusal, on the eve of the Undersigned setting a discovery hearing. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts the Undersigned’s prior representation of Orbis Business Intelligence, Ltd. in Trump v Clinton (S.D. Fla. filed March 24, 2022), warrants recusal and a stay of discovery….

Under the catch-all provision of the federal recusal statute on which Plaintiff relies, “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” “[W]hat matters under § 455(a) ‘is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance.'” “This inquiry is an objective one, made from the perspective of a reasonable observer who is informed of all the surrounding facts and circumstances.” …

As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s failure to raise the issue of recusal at the first available opportunity constitutes a waiver. Plaintiff failed to move for recusal from the outset of this action and has only done so when a disputed discovery issue arose. Plaintiff’s counsel suggests that this delay was because “[he] was not Plaintiff’s counsel in the Adverse Matter, and was not immediately aware of Magistrate Judge Lett’s participation in that litigation.” However, Plaintiff’s counsel did appear on behalf of President Trump, the plaintiff/appellant in the “Adverse Matter,” during the appellate phase of the “Adverse Matter.” The Undersigned represented Orbis Business Intelligence Ltd. in those proceedings…. Since, as appellate counsel, Plaintiff’s counsel would have been familiar with the underlying proceeding and the appellate docket, counsel knew or should have known of the Undersigned’s prior representation of Orbis Business Intelligence,

Even assuming there was not a waiver, the Motion nonetheless fails. The Undersigned’s past representation of an unrelated, non-party in this action does not, without more, constitute a circumstance where, objectively, the Undersigned’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. See Rice v. Chief Exam’r of Ala. Dept. of Exam’rs of Pub. Accts. (11th Cir. 2025) (affirming district court’s denial of recusal motion because a judge’s “former representation of [the defendant] had nothing to do with th[e] [current] action”); see also U.S. v. Page (11th Cir. 2025) (affirming district court’s denial of recusal motion because the judge’s prior representation of a party related to the current action was unrelated to the current case); Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana v. Harry L. Law Co., Inc. (5th Cir. 1982) (stating “the fact that [the judge] once represented [a defendant] in unrelated matters does not forever prevent him from sitting in a case in which [the former client] is a party”)….

Plaintiff fails to cite a single case where recusal was required pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) where the jurist, while in private practice, represented an adverse party….

Trump v. Clinton—an alleged RICO action—was dismissed at the pleadings stage, and the dismissal was upheld. And since Trump v. Clinton never progressed to discovery, any discovery issues raised by the parties in this case—a defamation action—would not have been issues argued by the Undersigned in the “Adverse Matter.”

In short, simply representing a party who was once adverse to a party currently before the court does not “objectively speaking, [make] ‘the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker [] too high to be constitutionally tolerable.'”