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Sunday, June 28
Global Free Speech

Access to the global internet is now restricted to loyal servants of the Iranian regime. Photo: Rahadiansyah/Unsplash In wartime Iran, connecting to the internet is now a perilous act, viewed as a crime against the state. Since hostilities erupted between Iran, Israel, and the United States on 28 February 2026, authorities have unleashed one of the most comprehensive internet shutdowns in history, cutting off millions from the rest of the world. Iranian authorities are now warning citizens that sharing photos of bombed locations or even trying to access the global internet could get you prosecuted for “collaborating with the enemy”. Against this backdrop, using a search engine or VPN is no longer innocent – it can be seen as a threat. Following massive airstrikes that killed the Supreme Leader and senior commanders, the state responded not only with anti-aircraft fire, but also activated a “kill switch” – severing international internet infrastructure. According to NetBlocks, connectivity dropped to just 1% of normal levels. For more than 280 hours, 90 million people have endured enforced silence, with over 40% of 2026 so far (up to 10 March) spent under internet shutdown. This calculated effort intends to isolate the population from information, not just a simple malfunction. A text message from an Iranian mobile operator calling on users to report people sharing images or information In a climate of heightened state paranoia, the SMS has become a tool of direct psychological warfare. Most frequently, messages from mobile operators to Iranian users characterise the sharing of images from bombing sites or “anti-government” sentiment as a “security violation”, effectively deputising mobile phones as tracking devices for dissent. More alarming are the rare reports of messages carrying direct judicial weight. These warn that “repeated connection to the international internet” will result in the immediate suspension of the phone line and referral to the judiciary. By criminalising attempts to bypass a firewall, authorities equate digital access with espionage. Notably, while these systems are used to threaten citizens, they have remained silent when issuing air-raid or public safety warnings. The architecture of the “class-based internet” The blackout is not total. Instead, authorities have enforced a “whitelisting” system that grants global web access only to pre-approved, loyal users. This system works because Iran has built its own internal internet, separating local traffic from the rest of the world. When the government turns on the whitelist, most people can only use local sites, while a small, approved group can still access the global internet. Instead of just blocking certain websites, the government now blocks most people entirely, letting only trusted insiders through. On 10 March, government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani – representing an administration that, ironically, had campaigned on a pledge to reduce filtering – confirmed this graded reality. She stated that the government is working to provide limited access specifically for those who can “convey the voice of the system to the world”. This allows the regime to dominate the narrative reaching the outside world, drowning out civilian experiences with state propaganda. The digital underground: Configs and cat-and-mouse Despite threats, the Iranian people have not surrendered their right to speak. An underground network of “configs” now sustains resistance. Software like V2Ray, Xray, or Trojan is essentially an engine that does nothing on its own. To function, they require a specially formatted text file that specifies which server, protocol, and path to use. What users receive as links or files in private Telegram channels are actually encoded versions of these settings. Because the state’s deep packet inspection technology is constantly hunting for these connections, these files often have a very short lifespan. The challenge of keeping connections alive has created a high-risk black market. Short-lived configs are bought at high prices, making communication expensive and risky. For many users, especially those with limited technical knowledge, the situation creates new vulnerabilities. People searching for a way to contact relatives abroad often rely on unknown sellers or unverified software, exposing them to scams, malware, and surveillance risks. Some turn to Starlink, but owning such hardware adds further dangers of arrest and confiscation. Doxing as statecraft: The “spy hunters” The crackdown isn’t just online. Some Telegram channels linked to security forces now encourage people to report on each other, calling it an effort to find spies. These channels employ open-source intelligence tactics to identify citizens. When a video of an airstrike is posted, these groups inspect metadata and visual details to pinpoint the photographer’s location. Their personal information is then exposed, and they are labelled as enemy collaborators. This vigilante-style digital hunting is supported by the highest levels of the judiciary. Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei has publicly warned of “no leniency”, while state television has discussed punishments ranging from property confiscation to the death penalty for media actions that “damage national security”. The humanitarian cost of silence The human rights implications are catastrophic. Human Rights Watch has warned that the shutdown violates international law. When the IDF issues evacuation warnings on social media, those warnings fall into a digital vacuum. Because the general population cannot access the global web, they cannot see the maps or the warnings intended to save their lives. Centuries ago, the Persian Empire pioneered the Chapar-khaneh, a sophisticated postal system that revolutionised communication. Today, the heirs of that civilisation are being forced into a digital dark age. This is not the first time a nation has been stripped of its right to the global digital commons, nor will it be the last. But this crisis must serve as a provocation for the next generation of internet giants. As satellite-to-mobile technology advances, internet providers face the question of whether global access should be guaranteed in places where governments restrict connectivity. Preventing the criminalisation of communication may require new technical solutions. Securing open access remains a challenge for the global community. READ MORE

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Access to the global internet is now restricted to loyal servants of the Iranian regime. Photo: Rahadiansyah/Unsplash In wartime Iran, connecting to the internet is now a perilous act, viewed as a crime against the state. Since hostilities erupted between Iran, Israel, and the United States on 28 February 2026, authorities have unleashed one of the most comprehensive internet shutdowns in history, cutting off millions from the rest of the world. Iranian authorities are now warning citizens that sharing photos of bombed locations or even trying to access the global internet could get you prosecuted for “collaborating with the enemy”. Against this backdrop, using a search engine or VPN is no longer innocent – it can be seen as a threat. Following massive airstrikes that killed the Supreme Leader and senior commanders, the state responded not only with anti-aircraft fire, but also activated a “kill switch” – severing international internet infrastructure. According to NetBlocks, connectivity dropped to just 1% of normal levels. For more than 280 hours, 90 million people have endured enforced silence, with over 40% of 2026 so far (up to 10 March) spent under internet shutdown. This calculated effort intends to isolate the population from information, not just a simple malfunction. A text message from an Iranian mobile operator calling on users to report people sharing images or information In a climate of heightened state paranoia, the SMS has become a tool of direct psychological warfare. Most frequently, messages from mobile operators to Iranian users characterise the sharing of images from bombing sites or “anti-government” sentiment as a “security violation”, effectively deputising mobile phones as tracking devices for dissent. More alarming are the rare reports of messages carrying direct judicial weight. These warn that “repeated connection to the international internet” will result in the immediate suspension of the phone line and referral to the judiciary. By criminalising attempts to bypass a firewall, authorities equate digital access with espionage. Notably, while these systems are used to threaten citizens, they have remained silent when issuing air-raid or public safety warnings. The architecture of the “class-based internet” The blackout is not total. Instead, authorities have enforced a “whitelisting” system that grants global web access only to pre-approved, loyal users. This system works because Iran has built its own internal internet, separating local traffic from the rest of the world. When the government turns on the whitelist, most people can only use local sites, while a small, approved group can still access the global internet. Instead of just blocking certain websites, the government now blocks most people entirely, letting only trusted insiders through. On 10 March, government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani – representing an administration that, ironically, had campaigned on a pledge to reduce filtering – confirmed this graded reality. She stated that the government is working to provide limited access specifically for those who can “convey the voice of the system to the world”. This allows the regime to dominate the narrative reaching the outside world, drowning out civilian experiences with state propaganda. The digital underground: Configs and cat-and-mouse Despite threats, the Iranian people have not surrendered their right to speak. An underground network of “configs” now sustains resistance. Software like V2Ray, Xray, or Trojan is essentially an engine that does nothing on its own. To function, they require a specially formatted text file that specifies which server, protocol, and path to use. What users receive as links or files in private Telegram channels are actually encoded versions of these settings. Because the state’s deep packet inspection technology is constantly hunting for these connections, these files often have a very short lifespan. The challenge of keeping connections alive has created a high-risk black market. Short-lived configs are bought at high prices, making communication expensive and risky. For many users, especially those with limited technical knowledge, the situation creates new vulnerabilities. People searching for a way to contact relatives abroad often rely on unknown sellers or unverified software, exposing them to scams, malware, and surveillance risks. Some turn to Starlink, but owning such hardware adds further dangers of arrest and confiscation. Doxing as statecraft: The “spy hunters” The crackdown isn’t just online. Some Telegram channels linked to security forces now encourage people to report on each other, calling it an effort to find spies. These channels employ open-source intelligence tactics to identify citizens. When a video of an airstrike is posted, these groups inspect metadata and visual details to pinpoint the photographer’s location. Their personal information is then exposed, and they are labelled as enemy collaborators. This vigilante-style digital hunting is supported by the highest levels of the judiciary. Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei has publicly warned of “no leniency”, while state television has discussed punishments ranging from property confiscation to the death penalty for media actions that “damage national security”. The humanitarian cost of silence The human rights implications are catastrophic. Human Rights Watch has warned that the shutdown violates international law. When the IDF issues evacuation warnings on social media, those warnings fall into a digital vacuum. Because the general population cannot access the global web, they cannot see the maps or the warnings intended to save their lives. Centuries ago, the Persian Empire pioneered the Chapar-khaneh, a sophisticated postal system that revolutionised communication. Today, the heirs of that civilisation are being forced into a digital dark age. This is not the first time a nation has been stripped of its right to the global digital commons, nor will it be the last. But this crisis must serve as a provocation for the next generation of internet giants. As satellite-to-mobile technology advances, internet providers face the question of whether global access should be guaranteed in places where governments restrict connectivity. Preventing the criminalisation of communication may require new technical solutions. Securing open access remains a challenge for the global community. READ MORE

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In wartime Iran, connecting to the internet is now a perilous act, viewed as a crime against the state. Since hostilities erupted between Iran, Israel, and the United States on 28 February 2026, authorities have unleashed one of the most comprehensive internet shutdowns in history, cutting off millions from the rest of the world.

Iranian authorities are now warning citizens that sharing photos of bombed locations or even trying to access the global internet could get you prosecuted for “collaborating with the enemy”. Against this backdrop, using a search engine or VPN is no longer innocent – it can be seen as a threat.

Following massive airstrikes that killed the Supreme Leader and senior commanders, the state responded not only with anti-aircraft fire, but also activated a “kill switch” – severing international internet infrastructure. According to NetBlocks, connectivity dropped to just 1% of normal levels. For more than 280 hours, 90 million people have endured enforced silence, with over 40% of 2026 so far (up to 10 March) spent under internet shutdown. This calculated effort intends to isolate the population from information, not just a simple malfunction.

A text message from an Iranian mobile operator calling on users to report people sharing images or information

In a climate of heightened state paranoia, the SMS has become a tool of direct psychological warfare. Most frequently, messages from mobile operators to Iranian users characterise the sharing of images from bombing sites or “anti-government” sentiment as a “security violation”, effectively deputising mobile phones as tracking devices for dissent.

More alarming are the rare reports of messages carrying direct judicial weight. These warn that “repeated connection to the international internet” will result in the immediate suspension of the phone line and referral to the judiciary. By criminalising attempts to bypass a firewall, authorities equate digital access with espionage. Notably, while these systems are used to threaten citizens, they have remained silent when issuing air-raid or public safety warnings.

The architecture of the “class-based internet”

The blackout is not total. Instead, authorities have enforced a “whitelisting” system that grants global web access only to pre-approved, loyal users.

This system works because Iran has built its own internal internet, separating local traffic from the rest of the world. When the government turns on the whitelist, most people can only use local sites, while a small, approved group can still access the global internet. Instead of just blocking certain websites, the government now blocks most people entirely, letting only trusted insiders through.

On 10 March, government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani – representing an administration that, ironically, had campaigned on a pledge to reduce filtering – confirmed this graded reality. She stated that the government is working to provide limited access specifically for those who can “convey the voice of the system to the world”. This allows the regime to dominate the narrative reaching the outside world, drowning out civilian experiences with state propaganda.

The digital underground: Configs and cat-and-mouse

Despite threats, the Iranian people have not surrendered their right to speak. An underground network of “configs” now sustains resistance.

Software like V2Ray, Xray, or Trojan is essentially an engine that does nothing on its own. To function, they require a specially formatted text file that specifies which server, protocol, and path to use. What users receive as links or files in private Telegram channels are actually encoded versions of these settings. Because the state’s deep packet inspection technology is constantly hunting for these connections, these files often have a very short lifespan.

The challenge of keeping connections alive has created a high-risk black market. Short-lived configs are bought at high prices, making communication expensive and risky.

For many users, especially those with limited technical knowledge, the situation creates new vulnerabilities. People searching for a way to contact relatives abroad often rely on unknown sellers or unverified software, exposing them to scams, malware, and surveillance risks.

Some turn to Starlink, but owning such hardware adds further dangers of arrest and confiscation.

Doxing as statecraft: The “spy hunters”

The crackdown isn’t just online. Some Telegram channels linked to security forces now encourage people to report on each other, calling it an effort to find spies.

These channels employ open-source intelligence tactics to identify citizens. When a video of an airstrike is posted, these groups inspect metadata and visual details to pinpoint the photographer’s location. Their personal information is then exposed, and they are labelled as enemy collaborators. This vigilante-style digital hunting is supported by the highest levels of the judiciary. Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei has publicly warned of “no leniency”, while state television has discussed punishments ranging from property confiscation to the death penalty for media actions that “damage national security”.

The humanitarian cost of silence

The human rights implications are catastrophic. Human Rights Watch has warned that the shutdown violates international law. When the IDF issues evacuation warnings on social media, those warnings fall into a digital vacuum. Because the general population cannot access the global web, they cannot see the maps or the warnings intended to save their lives.

Centuries ago, the Persian Empire pioneered the Chapar-khaneh, a sophisticated postal system that revolutionised communication. Today, the heirs of that civilisation are being forced into a digital dark age. This is not the first time a nation has been stripped of its right to the global digital commons, nor will it be the last. But this crisis must serve as a provocation for the next generation of internet giants.

As satellite-to-mobile technology advances, internet providers face the question of whether global access should be guaranteed in places where governments restrict connectivity. Preventing the criminalisation of communication may require new technical solutions. Securing open access remains a challenge for the global community.

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Global Free Speech

Photo by: Stephen Barnes/Medical/Alamy UK news this week is dominated by a damning report led by senior midwife Donna Ockenden that reveals how more than 500 mothers and babies were harmed or died at maternity units in Nottingham. This isn’t the first scandal Ockenden has investigated. A few years back terrible failings were revealed in Shropshire hospitals run by the Shrewsbury and Telford NHS Trust where 201 babies and nine mothers died.  We spoke to Ockenden for the magazine and she repeated this: “women aren’t listened to”. Another common thread was cover-up. Secrecy is not a one-off, it’s a pattern, wrote Martin Bright when he reported on the Shropshire scandal for Index. As Bright said, “this is not a historical story; it is an ongoing crisis”. Maternity scandals happen not only in Britain but all over the world. Last year’s protests in Morocco were ignited after eight women died in a maternity ward in Agadir because of severe medical neglect. In Egypt last week Omnia Sweidan, a former resident physician in obstetrics and gynaecology at Alexandria’s El-Shatby University Hospital, wrote a Facebook post detailing a series of abusive incidents faced by women at Alexandria’s Al-Shatby Hospital. It was read and shared by tens of thousands. Within 24 hours of posting, instead of the government declaring an investigation, security forces arrested Sweidan. While she was apparently later released, she’s been accused of spreading false news and misusing social media. She could end up in jail. Meanwhile, Afghanistan has one of the highest maternal mortality rates in the world – the figures of deaths and injuries are rising, but to what no one really knows. The Taliban won’t publish the data, probably to cover-up the true numbers. I’ve navigated maternity services myself in the UK. I’ve generally had good experiences and I’m very grateful to the NHS. But my experiences have not been uncomplicated – my daughter very nearly died. What saved her, I’ve been told, were a few factors – my race (white), my class (middle), where I live (London) and the fact that I relentlessly badgered those at my local hospital for weeks on end saying things didn’t feel right. Let me be clear here though: one shouldn’t have to be a dogged white Londoner to get good medical care. And a recent health committee report revealed terrible inequalities faced by people who are members of ethnic minorities, stating that “[B]abies that are Black or Black British Asian or Asian British have a more than 50% higher risk of perinatal mortality”. At Index we typically work on stories where dissidents take on the powerful: leaders, oligarchs and tech bros. The victims of maternity care scandals might not appear the same. But there is much that unites them. At the end of the day if the response you get from a doctor or nurse to a basic medical request is a shrug or a sneer, your free speech is being violated. If the systems view calls for accountability as dissent that must be silenced, then they are censoring. We grew up being told we’re lucky, that childbirth was one of the leading causes of death before the advent of modern medicine. For many of us that’s true. Just not all of us. That’s a travesty demanding urgent attention – in Nottingham and beyond. READ MORE

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