Suspension of Couple’s Gun Rights Because Their College Student Daughter Drew Allegedly Threatening Images Violated Second Amendment

Some short excerpts from the long Ganz v. Nassau County, decided Monday by Magistrate Judge James Wicks (E.D.N.Y.):

The Plaintiffs are residents of Nassau County, New York and have held New York State pistol licenses since 2020. The licenses were issued to Plaintiffs by the NCPD PLS [Pistol License Section]….

In February of 2024, the Plaintiffs’ daughter, who was enrolled in the SUNY Old Westbury College …, was admitted to a Massachusetts hospital for mental health treatment. In September 2024, a patient at the Massachusetts hospital contacted the SUNY school to report that Plaintiffs’ daughter had drawn threatening images. Plaintiffs’ daughter was then transported by the NCPD to Nassau University Medical Center. Plaintiffs’ daughter informed the police that the picture was not depicting any type of shooting or threat.

The SUNY college and its police force, after having been informed of the accusation, handled the school-threat investigation. However, NCPD officers responded to Plaintiffs’ home to ascertain the daughter’s condition….

Plaintiffs came to [Nassau County Police Investigator] Cafarella’s attention on September 18, 2024, after beginning his review of a police incident report concerning the Plaintiffs’ daughter. This was a result of Nassau County being notified by SUNY Old Westbury Administration that Plaintiffs’ daughter was accused of drawing disturbing pictures of mass shootings….

Cafarella reviewed a written report indicating that a supervisor from the 1st Precinct verified that Plaintiffs’ weapons were secured in a safe and that their daughter did not have access to them. The report also indicated that Plaintiffs were pistol license holders, and that they “refused to surrender” their weapons. A lieutenant in the NCPD Homeland Security Unit, who was part of the daughter’s investigation, advised the PLS that since there was “no direct message threatening a shooting,” he saw no issue with Plaintiffs remaining in possession of their secured firearms.

Despite that, Cafarella considered Plaintiffs’ daughter to be a member of Plaintiffs’ household, suspended Plaintiffs’ pistol licenses under the direction of then-Sgt. Russell of the PLS. This suspension was due to a “volatile mental situation” in Plaintiffs’ house where a household member was hospitalized for mental health treatment, and because the Plaintiffs failed to notify the PLS of the hospitalization. Defendants dispute the last sentence to the extent that it suggests [there] were no further reasons for suspension, “which also arose from the totality of circumstances under administrative review, including Plaintiffs’ decision to place their daughter in an inpatient program and safeguard their weapons outside Nassau County.”

At no time during Cafarella’s investigation between September 2024 and present date was it ever alleged that Plaintiffs’ firearms were accessible by anyone other than themselves. After Plaintiffs provided Cafarella with photos of the biometric safes that contained their weapons, Cafarella was satisfied that Plaintiffs’ weapons were properly stored. Cafarella did not speak with Plaintiffs’ daughter or the girl who made the accusation as a part of his investigation….

Cafarella required Plaintiffs to obtain a “letter of no objection” from their daughter’s treating psychologist which stated their daughter’s actual diagnosis. It had to also state that the doctor was aware that Plaintiffs hold pistol licenses and that the doctor had “no objection to firearms being in the house.” Cafarella testified that the daughter’s mental state was relevant to the PLS review. Cafarella also testified that the school-threat incident and public safety concerns were issues that the PLS sought to address as a part of its review….

On October 16, 2024, and October 19, 2024, Plaintiffs surrendered their firearms to federal firearms licensee (“FFL”), Dark Storm Industries …. Plaintiffs were unable to possess their handguns or purchase new handguns until the PLS lifted the suspension of their pistol licenses.

Cafarella testified that even if Plaintiffs’ daughter is only at the house a couple of times a month, there was still a concern as to whether she can gain access to Plaintiffs’ weapons. However, Cafarella also testified that he did not consider Plaintiffs to be “dangerous” people or “… threats to public safety.” Cafarella continued Plaintiffs’ suspension because the PLS was “waiting to see what comes of [the daughter’s] treatment and if there [were] any further incidents.”

In March of 2025, Mr. Ganz informed Cafarella that he was unable to obtain a letter from their daughter’s treating physician as requested. Cafarella then updated then-Sgt. Russell and together, they reviewed the original documents and decided to wait a number of months before reinstating the license. Cafarella explained that there is not a concrete timeline for reinstating licenses. (Id. at Rather, the duration of the suspension is based on what both the investigator and supervisor feel comfortable with and is viewed on the totality of the circumstances….

In April of 2025, Cafarella recommended to then-Sgt. Russell that Plaintiffs sign an acknowledgement of wrongdoing as a condition of having their licenses reinstated. Through counsel, Plaintiffs informed Cafarella that they would not sign any such form. Seven months later, on November 20th and 21st of 2025, Plaintiffs were issued a “verbal admonishment” for failing to notify PLS of police contact within 3 business days. Only after that, Ms. Ganz’s pistol license was reinstated on November 20, 2025, and Mr. Ganz’s license was reinstated on November 21, 2025….

[T]he PLS maintained Plaintiffs’ suspensions on the grounds that they failed to submit a letter from their daughter’s mental-health specialist, failed to provide information about their daughter’s mental health history, and concerns surrounding Plaintiffs’ prior application responses…. Notably, the suspension of a pistol license stemming from a similar case-by-case review was at issue in Wysocki v. Nassau County (E.D.N.Y. 2026). In Wysocki, the plaintiffs’ firearm licenses were suspended after they failed to provide letters from their daughter’s mental health specialists and purchase particular kinds of safes to store their weapons. The court held that the criteria for reinstating the plaintiffs’ licenses did not stem from any law or policy, but from the defendants’ own determination which was unsupported by any historical analogue…

Here, Defendants likewise fail to identify a single historical analogue to support this case-by-case review. Their opposition is devoid of any justification that stems back to other consistent historical traditions or case law to draw from. In short, Defendants have failed to carry their burden under Bruen….

Defendants cannot automatically suspend a license when it is based on a cohabitant’s existence of a volatile situation and not that of the licensee. There is no historical analogue. Cafarella himself testified that he did not believe that Plaintiffs were dangerous people, nor did he find that they were threats to public safety. Furthermore, Cafarella found that Plaintiffs’ weapons were securely stored….[T]he reasonable inquiry that a licensee is of good moral character is not connected to a cohabitant’s mental health circumstances….

Defendants failed to overcome the constitutionally protected presumption of the Second Amendment ….

The court therefore allowed plaintiffs’ damages claim to go forward against defendants in their official capacity.

Amy L. Bellantoni (The Bellantoni Law Firm, PLLC) represents plaintiffs.

UPDATE 8/26/2026 1:45 pm: I originally wrote in the headline, “Suspension of Couple’s Gun Rights Because Their College Student Daughter Allegedly Made Threats Violated Second Amendment.” I think that’s accurate, but I changed “allegedly made threats” to “drew allegedly threatening images” to provide more detail.

UPDATE 8/26/2026 9:50 pm: Jonathan Goldstein has a forthcoming article on this subject, Guilty by Association: The Second Amendment and the Limits of Derivative Disarmament; the abstract:

Four recent cases—two in New York, one in New Jersey, and one in Wisconsin-share a single theory: that the government may disarm a law-abiding citizen not for anything he has done, but because of the status, dangerousness, or vulnerability of someone with whom he lives. This Article calls that theory derivative disarmament and argues that it is categorically unconstitutional.

After Bruen and Rahimi, the government must match any disarmament to a historical tradition, and the only tradition the Supreme Court has found reaches the dangerous individual himself-found dangerous, by a court, for a limited time. No founding-era regime disarmed a man for his household’s condition; the closest analogue, the frankpledge, imposed a duty to produce the wrongdoer, never a forfeiture of the innocent’s arms. Two decisions from the Court’s most recent Term supply the measure. Wolford v. Lopez fixes the three inquiries a proffered analogue must survive, and the tradition these states invoke-disarming the dangerous-survives the first two and fails the third: it burdens a different person, on a different showing, for a different reason. United States v. Hemani warns that a power to “designate any group as dangerous” would “risk allowing it to” “quickly swallow” the Amendment. The

Article confronts the hardest version of the state’s case—that a cohabitant’s circumstances may be folded into a storage or character inquiry about the applicant himself—and shows it to be an associational penalty under a nominally neutral label. It then meets the authority against it: United States v. Huet, the scholarship of Blocher and Wilson, a 2025 Massachusetts decision keyed to a household under a statutory clause since repealed, and In re Clark, the one decision squarely sustaining derivative disarmament. Most are cases about the applicant’s own conduct or about an order already entered against someone dangerous; the two that do reach status reached it only through statutory text since narrowed (Dwiggins) or by a methodology Bruen displaced (Clark).

The Article proposes a bright line: the state may disarm the dangerous actor directly, but it may never disarm Person A for Person B’s status—and an access finding must rest on the applicant’s own act or stated intention, never on a shared address. The rights of the Bill of Rights are personal, and they are lost, if at all, only for what their holder has himself done.