Megan Thee Stallion’s Request for Anti-“Cyberstalking” Injunction Against Online Defamer Denied as Prior Restraint

Some excerpts from Judge Cecilia Altonaga (S.D. Fla.) long opinion today in Pete v. Cooper (for more on the earlier phases of the case, see this post):

This case arises out of defamation per se and related state-law claims, brought by Plaintiff, a Grammy-winning hip-hop artist known professionally as Megan Thee Stallion, against Defendant, an online personality who goes by Milagro Gramz or Mobz World. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant orchestrated a retaliatory smear campaign against her because of her role in the 2022 conviction of Daystar Peterson, a Canadian rapper and singer known as Tory Lanez, who, after a widely publicized trial, was found guilty of assaulting Plaintiff with a firearm…

A jury awarded plaintiff $75K for defamation, “promotion of an altered sexual depiction” in violation of a Florida statute, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. But plaintiff also asked the judge for a permanent injunction based on defendant’s alleged “cyberstalking”

(1) barring Defendant from any direct, indirect, or third-party contact with Plaintiff; (2) requiring Defendant to remain at least 500 feet from Plaintiff, her home, and any location she is expected to be, and 1,000 feet from her musical performances; (3) prohibiting disclosure of Plaintiff’s private personal identifying information; (4) forbidding the promotion, distribution, or transmission of the Deepfake Video or any other altered sexual depictions of Plaintiff; (5) barring defamatory statements regarding Plaintiff’s testimony at Daystar Peterson’s criminal trial, her mental and emotional state, alcohol use, or family; (6) prohibiting communications intended to incite third parties to threaten or harm Plaintiff, her team, or her family; (7) enjoining harassment, threats, assault, stalking, cyberstalking, impersonation, or other disturbing conduct; and (8) requiring removal of all statements and postings about the jury’s Verdict.

No, the court said, partly on the grounds that the requested injunction would be an impermissible prior restraint:

Courts are divided on whether prior restraints of defamatory statements violate the First Amendment. Some courts suggest the remedy is “‘per se unconstitutional,'” while others “leave open the possibility that under some circumstances an injunction following trial could be permissible.” Although the Eleventh Circuit has not yet weighed in on the issue, six federal circuit courts “have concluded that a narrowly tailored permanent injunction is constitutionally permissible after an adjudication on the merits.” Still, courts in this “modern” camp recognize that “[a]n injunction against defamatory statements, if permissible at all, must not through careless drafting forbid statements not yet determined to be defamatory[.]”

Even if the Court were inclined to adopt the modern approach, doing so would not assist Plaintiff here…. Plaintiff has not shown Defendant is an “impecunious defamer” who requires additional incentives to remove her defamatory statements …. Plaintiff’s proposed permanent injunction would forbid Defendant from “mak[ing] further defamatory statements” about Plaintiff’s (1) testimony at the Peterson trial, “including the circumstances and causes” giving rise to Plaintiff’s injuries; (2) mental and emotional state; (3) alcohol use; and (4) extended family, among other proscriptions. This request is not tied to any statements uttered since the November 2025 trial and impermissibly “forbid[s] statements not yet determined to be defamatory.” …

The Court’s conclusion is bolstered by Florida law. Florida appellate courts have consistently found that “injunctions are not available to stop someone from uttering insults or falsehoods.” … Plaintiff has certainly accused Defendant of creating “offensive[,] vulgar[,] and insulting posts[;]” but such conduct alone does not justify imposing an overbroad injunction directed at Defendant’s future speech.

Plaintiff also asks this Court to restrain Defendant from “mak[ing] any communications about Plaintiff that are intended to incite third parties to engage in threats or violence against Plaintiff, her professional team, and/or her family.” According to the Petition, Defendant’s online posts “caused vast swaths of her followers to attack [Plaintiff] online.” And because of Defendant’s “lies and misinformation,” Plaintiff is allegedly “the target of hurtful, angry, offensive, humiliating, racial[,] and gender[-]based hate made in online posts” by Defendant’s followers.

“As tempting as it might be to force some civility into the matter by staunching [Defendant’s] speech against [Plaintiff]” through an injunction, doing so would “ignore the protections of the First Amendment[.]” Aside from Defendant’s posted insults and falsehoods, Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant has incited action by urging her followers to threaten harm to Plaintiff, her professional team, or her family; or that Defendant’s followers would reasonably perceive that intent.

At bottom, Plaintiff’s proposed permanent injunction directed at Defendant’s future speech is overbroad and a classic example of a prior restraint on speech that triggers First Amendment concerns. On this record, Plaintiff has not demonstrated why her need for a permanent injunction outweighs Defendant’s future exercise of her First Amendment rights….

And the court also reasoned:

Several of these restrictions fall outside the scope of the harassment described in the [anti-stalking] Petition. For example, Plaintiff requests an injunction barring Defendant from direct, indirect, or third-party contact; requiring her to remain at specified distances from Plaintiff and locations where Plaintiff may be; and prohibiting disclosure of private personal identifying information. There is no evidence that Defendant has ever attended Plaintiff’s performances or attempted to contact or seek out Plaintiff. It is unclear how Defendant could govern her conduct to be at least 500 feet from any location Plaintiff is expected to be, nor how the claimed cyberstalking is associated with any physical proximity to Plaintiff.

Regarding personal identifying information, the only PII at issue appears to be Plaintiff’s Florida residential address. Defendant testified she obtained the address from public voter registration records after the lawsuit was filed to brief a venue challenge. Plaintiff does not contend that Defendant has threatened to disclose it or any other private information. And Plaintiff’s request that Defendant be required to remove all statements and postings addressing the jury’s Verdict is far removed from any redress for the claimed harassment and is far too broad a restriction on speech.

The Court thus limits consideration of the Motion to the requested restrictions that are connected to the cyberstalking events described in the Petition [more on the details below, and in the full opinion -EV]….

Florida Statute section 784.0485(1) creates a civil cause of action for injunctive relief against stalking, including cyberstalking. Stalking occurs when a person “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person[.]” To commit “cyberstalking” is

[t]o engage in a course of conduct to communicate, or to cause to be communicated, … words, images, or language by or through the use of electronic mail or electronic communication, directed at or pertaining to a specific person … causing substantial emotional distress to that person and serving no legitimate purpose.

To prevail on a section 784.0485 claim of cyberstalking, a plaintiff must prove:

the defendant [1] willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly [2] engaged in a course of conduct [3] that involved[—]directly or indirectly[—]communicating or causing to be communicated words or images [4] using electronic communications [5] directed at or pertaining to a specific person that [6] caused substantial emotional distress to that person and [7] served no legitimate purpose….

Plaintiff argues she “has already established the requisite element of success on the merits” because a jury considered the evidence and found Defendant liable for defamation per se, IIED, and promotion of an altered sexual depiction. The Court is not so convinced.

First, and by way of example, to prevail on a claim of cyberstalking, Plaintiff must prove that Defendant acted “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly[,]” [which means] … “knowingly, intentionally, and purposely” and “wrongfully, intentionally, and without legal justification or excuse.” The jury found that Defendant acted “intentionally or recklessly.” Because the Verdict is disjunctive, it is unclear whether the jury found intentional conduct or only recklessness.

Second, the statute requires that Defendant’s communications serve no legitimate purpose. “A communication serves a ‘legitimate purpose’ when ‘there is a reason for the contact other than to harass the victim—even if the victim may find the communication disturbing.'” Florida courts construe this element broadly, finding the inquiry into “legitimate purpose” covers a “wide variety of conduct[,]” [including by] …. finding an email threatening the recipient that he “would be ‘sorry’ if he didn’t settle” legitimate for the purpose of encouraging the recipient to drop a lawsuit[,] … finding graphic gun violence emails had the legitimate purpose of intending to dissuade the recipient from continuing to support the continued availability of assault rifles[,] … finding text messages demanding money and threatening disclosure of the recipient’s affair to his wife had the legitimate purpose of seeking repayment of a loan[, and] … finding a hostile phone call from a parent to a dance team coach had the legitimate purpose of addressing his daughter’s participation in the dance team competition ….

Plaintiff contends that the jury determined Defendant’s intentional and malicious online harassment served no legitimate purpose, pointing to the jury’s findings that Defendant did not provide disinterested and neutral commentary rather than advocacy for a particular client or personal interest, and did not impartially disseminate information. But Plaintiff’s argument overlooks other findings: the jury concluded that Defendant regularly disseminated news or information to the public; “operated for the purpose of informing the public about matters of public concern through news reporting, analysis, or commentary”; and functioned in a similar manner to traditional news media….

[Moreover,] Plaintiff’s Petition concerns conduct that forms the basis of the three claims for which Plaintiff sought and obtained compensatory damages. In other words, the Petition is premised on allegations that predate the trial and that the jury factored into its damages award…. The Verdict represents an adequate remedy at law for Defendant’s past conduct….

Plaintiff … argues that Defendant’s post-Verdict harassment is continuing and her wrongful conduct could resume through new accounts and platforms. Neither argument is persuasive. Plaintiff does not assert that Defendant’s “post-Verdict harassment” consists of cyberstalking. Instead, Defendant’s alleged post-Verdict harassment consists of Defendant: saying she is “gonna start working on [her] mixtape[;]” responding to a social media user that she does not “get on the Internet and cry about what” social media users say; posting images with a promotional photograph of CBS news reporter Gayle King; sharing her perspective of the action during a CBS News Miami interview; posting about the contents of the Verdict form; accusing a witness who testified for Plaintiff of perjury; saying Plaintiff made herself out to be the “the black Regina George”; and allegedly downplaying her defamatory statements.

This described post-Verdict conduct, for which no cyberstalking Petition was filed, does not satisfy the definition of cyberstalking. It does not consist of “a course of conduct to communicate, or to cause to be communicated, … words, images, or language by or through the use of electronic mail or electronic communication, directed at or pertaining to a specific person … causing substantial emotional distress to that person and serving no legitimate purpose.”

“Whether a communication causes substantial emotional distress should be narrowly construed and is governed by the reasonable person standard.” And as noted, “whether a communication serves a legitimate purpose is broadly construed” and covers “wide variety of conduct.” Even accepting that Defendant’s post-Verdict posts and words pertain to Plaintiff, Plaintiff does not explain how a reasonable person would experience substantial emotional distress from these posts and words alone. Nor does she show that Defendant’s posts and words serve no legitimate purpose….