The Senate’s Failure To Rein in Trump on Iran Is Part of a Long History of Congress Abdicating Its War Powers

On Tuesday, the Senate briefly asserted its constitutional prerogative over war and peace. In a 50–48 vote, with four Republicans joining the majority, it passed a resolution directing President Donald Trump to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities against Iran.

Politico called it a “surprise blow to Trump.” The New York Times described it as “the most significant bipartisan rebuke yet of the conflict.” 

But the moment didn’t last. The next day, after Trump—”mad as a murder hornet”—berated the Republican defectors at lunch, he got a do-over. Late Wednesday night, Senate Republicans forced a vote on a parallel War Powers Resolution introduced by Sen. Tim Kaine (D–Va.). With Sen. Bill Cassidy (R–La.) switching sides and Sen. Rand Paul (R–Ky.) voting “present,” it failed 47–50–1.

The episode underscored Trump’s continued dominance over the GOP caucus. More importantly, it was a reminder of how little practical power Congress retains over the most important decision the Constitution entrusts to it. 

It’s been nearly four months since Trump launched Operation Epic Fury, demanding “UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER” from Iran while denying that the United States was at war. Along the way, Trump has admitted he was “shocked“ Iran launched missiles at other Gulf states—”nobody expected that,” he said—and seemed caught off guard by how easily the Strait of Hormuz could be closed, though that scenario has long been a staple of Pentagon war games. 

Now the administration is trying to preserve a face-saving settlement that leaves things worse than they were before the first Tomahawk flew. Whatever the multidimensional chess theory was supposed to be, the record looks more like improvisation followed by damage control. 

Despite the precarious “deal” the administration is struggling to preserve, there is every chance Trump will lose patience and the U.S. will stumble back into open war. Or maybe the president will prefer to hold his next foreign adventure closer to home. It’s his choice, after all. 

In May, Trump’s CIA director visited Havana to warn Cuban intelligence officials that they should “take a lesson” from January’s regime-change strike in Venezuela. And in an interview last week, the president mused that Iran is “a very long trip,” while “Cuba is a hopscotch.” Plus, he noted, Cuba has “nice property” with a “nice shoreline.”

For the Framers, the point of lodging the war power in Congress was to avoid leaving the body politic vulnerable to one man’s supply of prudence and self-restraint. This was not part of the original plan. “This system will not hurry us into war,” James Wilson assured delegates at Pennsylvania’s ratifying convention in 1787. “It will not be in the power of a single man…to involve us in such distress.”

After decades of drifting away from the original design, Congress tried to reclaim some ground in 1973. In the aftermath of Vietnam, over President Richard Nixon’s veto, it passed the War Powers Resolution. The law’s stated purpose was to “fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities.”

It was a noble effort, but it did not work. That has been evident almost from the start of the law’s five-decade history, but the War Powers Resolution’s failure has never been more obvious than it is right now. 

One of the law’s key provisions was designed to end unauthorized wars automatically, even if Congress could not bring itself to vote. Section 5(b) of the law orders the president to “terminate” military operations after 60 days absent congressional authorization or an attack on the United States that prevents Congress from convening. Over the decades, multiple presidents have treated that limit as a 60-day “free pass” for military adventures, but most tried to wrap things up before hitting the deadline. President Bill Clinton crossed the line during the 1999 Kosovo campaign. President Barack Obama blew past it during the 2011 Libya war, arguing that, technically, it was not “hostilities” if U.S. forces were bombing foreigners who could not hit back. On May 1 of this year, Trump also shrugged off that deadline without consequence. 

Another key provision assumed that a congressional majority should be enough to call a halt to unauthorized war making. Under Section 5(c), Congress could reassert its constitutional authority at any time: U.S. forces “shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.”

Then, a decade after the War Powers Resolution passed, the Supreme Court struck down the “legislative veto,” effectively neutering that check. A mere congressional majority is no longer enough; reversing presidential action now requires presenting a law to the president for his signature or veto. 

The war powers measure that passed on Tuesday was a concurrent resolution under Section 5(c). But concurrent resolutions, as the Senate’s own website notes, “do not have the force of law.” So Trump had a point when he called the vote “meaningless” in a Truth Social rant on Tuesday; it had roughly the same legal effect as Congress declaring “National Nurses’ Week.” 

Even if Congress passed its rebuke in a form that could stick, Trump would veto it, just as he vetoed war powers measures on Iran and Yemen during his first term.

That’s where we are now: with a legal regime for war making that turns the original design on its head. This system hurries us into war on one man’s whim, then puts every constitutional barrier intended to prevent reckless action in the path of undoing the damage.  

And yet, this is a problem we know how to fix. Reformers have learned a lot from the War Powers Resolution’s half-century of failure, and there’s no shortage of serious legislative proposals for giving the statute teeth. In theory, at least, the goal of ending unauthorized wars automatically, without a vote, is achievable by tying funding to authorization. 

In practice, however, no reform is achievable without at least one hard vote at the outset. The Senate’s inability to stick to its guns this week shows how far Congress still has to go.