No Pseudonymity for Accountant Challenging Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Disciplinary Proceedings

From yesterday’s D.C. Circuit decision in Doe v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (Judges Karen LeCraft Henderson, Justin Walker, and Bradley Garcia):

Plaintiff John Doe—an accountant facing disciplinary proceedings before the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board—brought suit in district court, raising wide-ranging challenges to the Board’s structure and operations. As part of that action, Doe sought leave to proceed under a pseudonym. The district court denied the motion. We affirm….

Doe asserts a privacy interest in the fact that he is the subject of a Board disciplinary proceeding because disclosure of that fact would harm his professional reputation by “brand[ing] him an outlier—’damaged goods’—among accounting professionals.” Doe’s privacy concerns are different in kind from those that “traditionally warrant pseudonymity,” which typically involve ” ‘intimate issues such as sexual activities, reproductive rights, bodily autonomy, medical concerns, or the identity of abused minors.'” …

[And, a]s the district court explained, Doe relied only on general statements about the potential harms of public charges, and he did not submit any declarations to support those claims. The district court’s approach is consistent with our precedents, which underscore that movants must make a “colorable showing of injury to a privacy interest” by offering something “concrete to establish that revealing [their] identity would cause” some “cognizable harm.” That showing could take the form, for instance, of a declaration explaining the “substantial risk” that a “privacy injury” “would occur.” The district court reasonably concluded that Doe’s motion was insufficient on this front, as Doe “merely asserted” he would suffer a privacy injury without “specifically explain[ing] why harm was likely to result.” …

[Courts should also] “look[] to the identity of the opposing party”—whether the defendant is a private or governmental actor—”as a tool for measuring the public interest in transparent litigation.” Both sides agree that the Board should be considered a governmental actor for purposes of the pseudonymity analysis, and the district court in turn found this factor to cut against Doe because the presence of a governmental defendant “favor[s] pseudonymity only when plaintiffs request individualized relief.” Doe contends that he seeks only “modest, individualized, and self-protective relief” because he requests an injunction preventing the Board from proceeding against him.

The district court correctly explained, however, that Doe’s arguments would clearly apply beyond this case: Doe raises sweeping challenges to the Board’s operations and existence that are “not grounded in his specific circumstances.” … [P]seudonymity is less likely to be appropriate where “the party asking to proceed anonymously seeks to alter the operation of public law both as applied to it and, by virtue of the legal arguments presented, to other parties going forward.” …

{Doe argues that pseudonymity is proper because disclosure of his identity could “chill or discourage people from exercising their core First Amendment rights” to challenge government actions in court. The district court reasonably rejected that argument, as it would “make just about any plaintiff entitled to pseudonym status.” We have similarly not been swayed by suggestions that the fourth factor should favor pseudonymity where disclosure could “chill litigants from suing the government for constitutional violations.”} …

Next, Doe argues that the district court erred in declining to weigh his likelihood of success on the merits in the pseudonymity analysis…. [But o]ur published opinions on the subject have never suggested that merits questions are relevant to the pseudonymity issue. Privacy concerns—not the underlying merits—drive the pseudonymity analysis, and requiring courts to delve into the merits to resolve a pseudonymity motion would be exceedingly burdensome….

Finally, Doe points to provisions of the Board’s organic statute that, in his view, guarantee the confidentiality of Board investigations and disciplinary proceedings. On Doe’s theory, those provisions “weigh heavily in favor” of pseudonymity because they reflect a congressional judgment that the subjects of Board adjudications face “irreparable reputational and career damage” if their identities are publicly disclosed. See Doe v. MIT (1st Cir. 2022) (observing that pseudonymity is “ordinarily” appropriate in “suits that are bound up with a prior proceeding made confidential by law”).

Several provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 7215—which governs Board investigations and adjudications—address confidentiality. Section 7215(c)(2) provides that “[h]earings under this section shall not be public, unless otherwise ordered by the Board for good cause shown, with the consent of the parties to such hearing.” Section 7215(b)(5)(A) further directs that

all documents and information prepared or received by or specifically for the Board, and deliberations of the Board and its employees and agents, in connection with … an investigation under this section, shall be confidential and privileged as an evidentiary matter (and shall not be subject to civil discovery or other legal process) in any proceeding in any Federal or State court or administrative agency, and shall be exempt from disclosure, in the hands of an agency or establishment of the Federal Government, under [FOIA], or otherwise, unless and until presented in connection with a public proceeding or released in accordance with subsection (c).

Last, Section 7215(d)(1) explains that if the Board “imposes a disciplinary sanction,” it “shall report the sanction to” “the public.” {If the target of a Board proceeding seeks SEC review, the sanction is automatically stayed, so there is no public disclosure of the sanction unless and until the SEC affirms the Board’s decision.}

We conclude, however, that these provisions do not cover the identities of subjects of Board proceedings but instead the documents and information generated in the Board’s investigations and the contents of Board hearings. As noted, Section 7215(c)(2) makes Board “[h]earings” presumptively confidential, while Section 7215(b)(5)(A) extends confidentiality protections to certain “documents and information.” It is hardly natural to regard a person’s name and the fact of a Board proceeding against him as “documents and information prepared or received by or specifically for the Board.” And although in the abstract a name might fall within the “dictionary definition” of “information,” “the context”—Section 7215(b)(5)(A)’s focus on information “prepared or received by” the Board “in connection with … an investigation”—”tugs strongly in favor of a narrower reading.”

The title of Section 7215(b)(5)—”Use of documents”—also fits that narrower reading. And our conclusion is reinforced by the contrast between Section 7215(b)(5)(A) and other statutory confidentiality protections—such as those in the SEC whistleblower scheme, which Doe suggests is analogous—that explicitly refer to protecting individual identities. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(2)(A) (providing that “the Commission shall not disclose any information … which could reasonably be expected to reveal the identity of a whistleblower”). The text and context of Section 7215 thus demonstrate that parties like Doe do not enjoy a statutory right to pseudonymity….