How European Libertarians Differ From American Ones

On April 24-26, I attended LibertyCon Europe 2026, the major annual gathering of European libertarian students and academics (held this year in Madrid). I was invited to give two talks, and therefore came to this event for the first time since 2014. I spoke to numerous students, academics, and activists who attended the conference and got a better sense of where European libertarians (or “classical liberals,” as some prefer to call themselves) stand at this crucial moment in history. It was interesting to observe similarities and differences with their American counterparts.

Not surprisingly, there is a large overlap between the two groups’ views and priorities. A high proportion of what I saw and heard at LibertyCon Europe differed little from what I would expect to see at a comparable US event. For example, libertarians on both sides of the Atlantic are deeply concerned about excessive government spending and regulation, growing efforts to impose restrictions on access to various websites (often under the pretext of protecting children), protectionist restrictions on international trade, and more. American libertarians have greatly influenced their European counterparts, and vice versa. As the great Austrian libertarian economist F.A. Hayek put it, “[t]he growth of ideas is an international process.”

There are, however, several noteworthy differences. First and foremost, it is notable that European libertarians have an almost unanimously negative view of Donald Trump and his administration. Many, probably most, American libertarians are similarly negative. But there is a significant faction that is “anti-anti Trump” (holding that Trump is flawed, but still preferable to his opponents, or at least no worse than them), and a smaller but vocal group that is actively pro-Trump.

Among European libertarians these latter two camps are almost completely absent. At the conference, several European participants asked me whether I thought Trump was the worst-ever US president. I answered that he is working hard to achieve that “distinction,” but has not so far surpassed Woodrow Wilson and Andrew Johnson, and perhaps 2-3 others. Regardless of the answer, the ubiquity of the question was notable.

Perhaps this is not entirely surprising. Trump promotes an American version of nationalist ideology, and non-Americans are inherently less likely to be sympathetic to American nationalism. True enough. But the European libertarians I met also have very negative views of the right-wing nationalist parties in their own countries, such as the AfD in Germany, the National Rally in France (formerly the National Front), and others. Hungarians at the event were thrilled by the recent crushing electoral defeat of authoritarian nationalist Prime Minister Viktor Orban. Others there were happy to see Orban go, as well. Orban’s regime exemplified many of the evils of nationalism, and was beloved by “national conservatives” and “postliberals” in the US, and around Europe.

European libertarians, at least on average, seem much more attuned to the dangers of nationalism than American ones are. One of the talks I gave at the conference was on how nationalism is now the greatest threat to economic liberty in most of the world, taking the role previously held by socialism. Afterwards, almost everyone who spoke to me about it expressed substantial agreement (with the exception of one Scandinavian academic). The same presentation would have attracted considerably greater dissent among US libertarians.

I don’t fully understand the reasons for this difference between US and European libertarians. But one cause may be Europe’s awful history with nationalism, which makes libertarians there more sensitive to its perils. Those dangers are indeed very great, as Alex Nowrasteh and I explained in our 2024 article, “The Case Against Nationalism.”

Another striking European-American difference I noted at the conference is that European libertarians overwhelmingly support Ukraine against Russia, and generally also support Western aid to Ukraine. By contrast, most (though by no means all) American libertarians oppose such assistance on quasi-isolationist grounds. Some also endorse foreign policy “realism,” which holds there is little or no difference between the foreign policies of difference regime types (e.g. – that liberal democracies’ foreign policies are little different from those of dictatorships). Such views are rare among European libertarians. One European participant at the conference argued to me that American libertarians’ isolationist approach to security policy is not rooted in any general element of libertarian thought, but is rather a product of the America’s unique geography – separated from other powerful nations by two oceans.

As in the case of Trump and nationalism, I largely agree with the Europeans on this one. In previous writings, I have made the case for Western support for Ukraine, and also argued against libertarian neo-isolationism generally.

Some of the European-American divergence over Ukraine is explicable by the particular history of individual nations. Many participants in the LibertyCon Europe conference come from Eastern European countries like Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, which have a history of being occupied and oppressed by the Soviet Union, the Russian Empire, or both. That naturally contributes to their hostility to Russian aggression today. But it is notable that most Western Europeans at the conference held views on this issue that differed little from their eastern counterparts.

A third key difference is a divergence regarding constitutional questions. Many American libertarians (myself included) devote extensive time and effort to constitutional questions, and several American libertarian groups have done much to advance their causes through constitutional litigation; the Institute for Justice and the Pacific Legal Foundation are notable examples. Such possibilities seem largely absent from the radar screen of European libertarians.

Indeed, almost the only presentation at the conference that focused extensively on constitutional litigation was my own talk on the US Supreme Court’s recent ruling striking down Trump’s tariffs in a case I helped litigate. As I noted in the final portion of my talk, I think European libertarians are overlooking potentially valuable opportunities. Both the European Convention on Human Rights and the national constitutions of multiple individual countries contain potentially useful provisions protecting property rights and economic liberties, that libertarians could potentially make better use of. They could also potentially make use of federalism and separation of powers elements of some of the relevant constitutions. Various economic interest groups have sometimes made effective use of pro-market strategic litigation in Europe. But not so libertarians. Rasheed Griffith, A European-based Mercatus Center scholar, made similar points in his talk on a panel on economic regulation, also urging Europeans to make greater use of constitutional litigation.

Obviously, Europeans shouldn’t necessarily use the same types of arguments as those deployed in US litigation. But they should not neglect opportunities to use constitutional litigation to promote liberty.  Litigation usually cannot succeed entirely on its own. Successful reform movements generally combine it with political action. But it is often a valuable tool, nonetheless.While we would do well to learn from the Europeans on the first two points of contrast covered here, the reverse is true on this one.

The above is far from a complete account of what I saw and heard at the conference, nor is it a complete analysis of similarities and differences between American and European libertarians. But the three points of contrast I cover seemed particularly notable.

The last time I spoke at a LibertyCon Europe conference – back in 2014 – I saw a talk by the great Swedish libertarian Johan Norberg (now a colleague of mine at the Cato Institute). He said that Europe is both the greatest continent and the worst one. It’s the greatest because it gave us Enlightenment liberalism, the set of ideas that brought unparalleled freedom and prosperity to so much of the world, including America. It’s the worst because it also gave us socialism and fascism, the causes of unparalleled oppression, poverty, and mass murder. Fascism, of course, is just a particularly egregious variant of nationalism, an ideology that also originated in Europe.

Hopefully, the good that Europe gave the world can ultimately overcome the evil. Libertarians on both sides of the Atlantic should work to help make that happen.