Outlaw vs. In-Law Outlaw

From Outlaw v. Outlaw, decided in 2019 by Judge Katharine von Ter Stegge (Ore. Cir. Ct.) but just posted on Westlaw; the lawsuit was brought by a woman against her ex-husband and her ex-mother-in-law, all with the last name Outlaw:

In April 2017, [mother-in-law] arrived at [the then-wife-and-husband’s home] in order to provide emotional support to [husband].

In June 2017, [husband] filed Petitions for Dissolution of Marriage and a Temporary Protective Order of Restraint against Plaintiff. Plaintiff then filed a Motion requesting exclusive use of the [home]. On approximately July 14, 2017, Defendant [mother-in-law filed a Petition for Restraining Order to Prevent Abuse of Elderly Person or Person with Disability (“EPPDAPA Petition”) against Plaintiff as the Respondent.

The EPPDAPA Petition included allegations that Plaintiff verbally abused [mother-in-law], stole her property, and antagonized her through late-night use of laundry machines adjacent to her living quarters, including allegations that Plaintiff ran the dryer with sneakers in it during sleeping hours. [Mother-in-law] also alleged that Plaintiff rendered the bathroom she was using non-operational by forcefully removing pipes, the toilet, and the door to the bathroom.

On July 21, the EPPDAPA Petition was granted on a temporary basis pending a contested hearing. The resulting EPPDAPA restraining order (“Restraining Order”) contained various restrictions on Plaintiff. Plaintiff was restricted from being within 150 feet of [mother-in-law] or making any contact with her. Plaintiff was also ordered to move from the Hassalo House and to remain at least 150 feet away from it. Plaintiff was served with the Restraining Order and left the house immediately.

On August 10, 2017, in an attempt to resolve their differences, Plaintiff and [mother-in-law] entered into a Mutual No-Contact Agreement (“MNCA”) and the Restraining Order was dismissed. No contested hearing on Defendant [mother-in-law’s] allegations ever occurred in the EPPDAPA case….

The ex-wife sued for various torts related to alleged wrongful use of civil proceedings, and the court allowed the case to go forward. An excerpt:

[One] element of wrongful use of a civil proceeding is the absence of probable cause to prosecute the action. Plaintiff alleges that [mother-in-law] intentionally misrepresented information on the EPPDAPA petition, most critically her status as a disabled person and that she is a resident of Multnomah County within the meaning of the EPPDAPA statutes. Plaintiff also denies certain factual allegations of abuse in the EPPDAPA Petition….

At her deposition, Defendant [mother-in-law] testified that she maintained a residence in Georgia where her husband continued to reside and where she planned to return, she had a Georgia driver’s license, and paid taxes and received her mail in Georgia. She also testified that she has no ownership or legal claim as a tenant to the house her son and daughter-in-law lived in in Portland.

Plaintiff also alleges that [mother-in-law] was not disabled within the meaning of the EPPDAPA Statute. The EPPDAPA Statute defines a “‘person with a disability’ as a person with a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” “Major life activities” includes but is not limited to caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.

Plaintiff asserts that [mother-in-law’s] stated disability, macular degeneration, does not “substantially limit her from one or more of her major life activities.” In her deposition, [mother-in-law] explained her eye condition as one that could be corrected with reading glasses; she further explained that it made it hard for her to make jewelry, but that she made jewelry more as a hobby and did not support herself by making jewelry. In her deposition, [mother-in-law] conceded that she never called police or DHS about Plaintiff.

At this point in the anti-SLAPP inquiry, Plaintiff must only produce enough evidence to establish a prima facie case. Plaintiff has met this burden because a reasonable trier of fact could find that [mother-in-law] lacked probable cause if she was not a resident of Multnomah County or disabled within the meaning of the EPPDAPA process or if the allegations made in the EPPDAPA Petition were false.

The case went on for several months longer, but then was terminated; I assume from the record that it was as a result of a settlement.