Punctuation Matters. At the Heart of This Case Is the Placement of a Comma

From Remus Enterprises 1, LLC v. Breece, decided Thursday by the D.C. Court of Appeals (Judge Shanker, joined by Judges Easterly and Ruiz):

Punctuation matters. At the heart of this case is the placement of a comma. Appellant Remus Enterprises 1, LLC (“Remus 2023”) sued appellee Quinn Breece in Superior Court asserting tort claims arising out of Remus 2023’s alleged ownership of, and desire to sell, a parcel of property located at 3308 16th Street, NE, in Washington, D.C. But a consent judgment in another case established that a different entity with a name containing all the same words and letters but a differently placed comma—Remus Enterprises, 1 LLC (“Remus 2018”)—was the real owner of the property. Because Remus 2023 does not have standing to sue based on a different entity’s property interest, we conclude that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case, and we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Remus 2023’s complaint, although on grounds different from those relied on by the trial court….

The consent judgment in this case intended to conclusively settle the issue of who purchased, owned, and contracted to sell the 16th Street property. First, the text of the consent judgment supports this conclusion. It makes specific “factual findings,” related to that issue: that (1) Remus 2018 purchased the 16th Street property in February 2023; (2) the deed of transfer for that property contained a typographical error such that the name of the transferee mistakenly read “Remus Enterprises 1, LLC” rather than the correct name, “Remus Enterprises, 1 LLC”; (3) Remus 2023 did not purchase and does not own the 16th Street property; and (4) Remus 2018 entered into a contract to sell the 16th Street property. The presence of these findings in the stipulated consent judgment submitted by the parties and issued by the court supports the inference that the parties “specifically agreed” to be bound by the court’s determination of those issues….

Our resolution of the standing issue follows ineluctably from our resolution of the collateral estoppel issue. The consent judgment in the Nasi case found that Remus 2018, and not Remus 2023, purchased, owned, and contracted to sell the 16th Street property. In the case before us, Remus 2023 was the sole plaintiff, and it sought to base its injury on its alleged purchase, ownership of, and contract to sell the 16th Street property. But because we afford the consent judgment in the Nasi case preclusive effect (and also in light of the allegation in the complaint itself that Remus 2018 owned the property), Remus 2023 cannot allege an injury based on its purchase, ownership, or sale of the 16th Street property. And because Remus 2023’s claims derive entirely from an alleged injury to Remus 2018’s property interest, we conclude that Remus 2023 has not suffered an “injury in fact” sufficient to give it standing. Therefore, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case, and dismissal of the complaint is appropriate ….

{We note that Remus 2023’s counsel represented at argument that he was the sole member of both LLCs, and that ownership of the 16th Street property at one point transferred to him. But no allegations regarding these facts appear in the operative complaint, and Remus 2023 did not develop any argument addressing what implications, if any, this state of affairs could have on the resolution of the standing question in this case.}

Jude E. Wikramanayake represents Breece.