Alleged Threats Against Alleged Groomers / Sex Traffickers of Minors Don’t Justify Sealing of Personal Information / Pseudonymity

Defendants say that good cause exists to seal their PII because they have suffered a “relentless campaign of doxing, vandalism,” violent threats, and stalkers. They submit about 55 exhibits purporting to document this harassment. Most of these exhibits show online harassment, though Exhibit 2 shows images that Defendants say show vandalism of their residence in 2020. Defendants also say that an online individual known as “Anonymous Gene” or “Gene” [not me! -EV] has engaged in a campaign of intense, long-running harassment, posting photos of Defendants’ home and revealing its address multiple times. Defendants contend that this harassment “was consistently executed in direct connection with the efforts of [Plaintiff’s counsel] and her clients,” and that “Anonymous Gene” “claims to be funding [Plaintiff’s counsel]” and is “directly cooperating with the allegedly well-funded plaintiff Sarah.” …

Defendants’ first request redacting and sealing of “all past and future personal identifying information (PII)” appearing on the docket and accessible via PACER, including their home address, phone number, email addresses, last names, and household details.” … It is unclear if this means that the entire docket be sealed and then new copies of the documents filed, or if the Court would have to individually replace docket entries with public redacted and sealed unredacted filings….

[W]hile there is “a strong presumption in favor of access to court records,” the right is not absolute…. Cases permitting redaction of the type that Defendants seek here appear to arrive at diverging conclusions. For example, one court in this Circuit permitted redaction of “home and personal email addresses” of a nonparty because this information was “irrelevant to the merits of” that action. See NML Cap. Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina (D. Nev. 2015). But another court denied a request to redact the plaintiff’s residential address absent legal authority requiring it. See Eng v. Hawaii (D. Haw. 2021). In other instances, courts have granted retroactive redaction of addresses when the litigant is enrolled in some program with address confidentiality, which is not present here.

The Court finds that Defendants have not shown good cause to retroactively seal and redact PII from the docket or the exhibits filed in support of the motion.

First, Defendants cite no case in which a court approved the retroactive sealing and redaction of the type of information at issue. Defendants’ request concerns 263 docket entries amounting to hundreds of pages, which would pose significant logistical challenges.

Second, most of the evidence of online harassment predates Plaintiffs’ original complaints, which were filed in 2023. Because this evidence is from several years ago, it does not show that “specific harm will result” if the docket of this case is not retroactively sealed and redacted. Nor does it show that otherwise harm will result. It is also unclear to the Court that any exhibits reveal PII.

Third, the only evidence of harassment since the filing of Plaintiffs’ complaints appears to consist of offensive messages that Defendants attribute to the “Anonymous Gene” persona. Defendants claim, without proof, that this persona is “working with” Plaintiffs’ counsel. But Plaintiffs’ counsel asserts that she has no contact or connection with the Gene persona. Based on this record, at least with respect to the exhibits showing harassment by “Anonymous Gene,” Defendants have not carried their burden to show good cause for the extensive relief that they seek….

Defendants also seek permission to proceed pseudonymously by using only their first names. A “party may preserve his or her anonymity in judicial proceedings in special circumstances when the party’s need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and the public’s interest in knowing the party’s identity.” [In the Ninth Circuit,] “To determine whether to allow a party to proceed anonymously when the opposing party has objected, a district court must balance five factors: ‘(1) the severity of the threatened harm, (2) the reasonableness of the anonymous party’s fears, … (3) the anonymous party’s vulnerability to such retaliation,’ (4) the prejudice to the opposing party, and (5) the public interest.” …

To the first factor, the claimed threats are severe due to their violence and graphic nature, and extensiveness. As to the second factor, “[t]o judge the reasonableness of the plaintiffs’ fears, [the court] must consider the surrounding context….” And a threat is reasonable if “a reasonable person would believe that the threat might actually be carried out.” Considering that context, the Court does not find that the Defendants have shown that the threats they face might be carried out.

First, Defendant points only to anonymous threats online. Courts have noted that anonymous online threats are not likely to result in actual harm. See Doe v. Kamehameha Schools (9th Cir. 2010) (“The magistrate judge correctly recognized that many times people say things anonymously on the internet that they would never say in another context and have no intention of carrying out.”). Second, most of the threats have been occurring for years and significantly predate the filing of the complaint. For example, Defendants point to a 2021 letter from an academic institution, apparently attended by one of the Defendants, stating that it had received reports that Defendants had engaged in “concerning online activities” and would be monitoring Defendants’ online presence. And Defendants cite considerable discussion on social media in 2022 concerning the allegations against Defendant.

The online threats since the suit was filed appear to come from one source, the “Anonymous Gene” persona. Defendants do not allege that any physical threats have come to fruition or increased in intensity since Plaintiffs filed their complaints. In this context, a reasonable person would likely not “believe that the threat might actually be carried out.”

To be sure, at least one court has granted anonymity to plaintiffs facing online threats of physical violence, not unlike that described by Defendants here, sent directly by email to their counsel. See Doe v. GitHub (N.D. Cal. 2023) (emails threatening violence “on the basis of their involvement in this lawsuit” meant that first two Advanced Textile factors weighed in favor of anonymity). This case is different from GitHub because those threats were more imminent and directly connected with the suit, since they were sent just before and after the filing of the complaint and were sent to the plaintiffs’ counsel. Thus, it was reasonable for the plaintiffs to fear that the threats might come to pass.

By contrast, the threats that Defendants point to have been going on for years, apparently without increasing severity. That fact also distinguishes the case from Doe I Through XXIII v. Advanced Textile (9th Cir. 2000), in which the plaintiffs faced an imminent threat of being fired from their jobs and summarily deported. In short, the lack of imminency of the threat makes their fears of harm less reasonable.

As to the third factor, vulnerability requires a closer connection between the Defendants’ circumstances and the harm they seek to avoid. For example, in Advanced Textile, the harm that the plaintiff textile workers sought to avoid was retaliation, including firing by their employers for filing the lawsuit. Their immigrant worker recruitment contracts did not permit them “to quit working for one employer and seek employment at another factory,” which made them particularly vulnerable to that threat of firing. The employer defendants in that case “apparently also ha[d] the power to have foreign workers deported almost instantly.” The connection between the harm threatened and the plaintiffs’ particular circumstances supported the court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs had shown the third factor of the test.

But here, Defendants do not allege the same level of connection. The only harm that they seek to avoid is physical violence (which the Court has concluded, based on the present record, is not likely to occur) and the purported further spreading of their PII, which has already occurred and has been occurring since before the filing of the suit.

The fourth factor favors pseudonymity. Plaintiffs make no specific argument as to why they would be prejudiced by Defendants’ pseudonymity, such as by impairing their ability to “litigate the case [and] investigate the claims.” … Further, courts have generally held that no prejudice results to the nonmoving party where they already know the identity of the moving party. Plaintiffs already know the identities of Defendants and thus would not be prejudiced by their proceeding pseudonymously.

Finally, the fifth factor weighs against pseudonymity. “The normal presumption in litigation is that parties must use their real names,” a presumption “loosely related to the public’s right to open courts and the right of private individuals to confront their accusers.” And this “common law right[ ] of access to the courts and judicial records are not taken lightly.” Id. Further, the Court notes that Defendants appear to have made extensive public statements about the case and the harassment they have faced, including by uploading several YouTube videos.

The Court thus finds that the Advanced Textile factors weigh against granting Defendants’ pseudonymity request….