“There Is Evidence That This Particular Proceeding Before the Beijing Court Was Dominated by the” Chinese Communist Party,

A short excerpt from from today’s long opinion by Judge John Tigar (N.D. Cal.) in Stanford Univ. v. Yuzhen; I am an employee of Hoover and Stanford, but I haven’t been involved in the lawsuit, and wasn’t prompted by anyone to write bout it:

Plaintiff Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University seeks to quiet title in certain materials denominated the Li Materials, which consist of original materials written by Chinese political figure Li Rui [and by people connected to him] …. Stanford and Li’s daughter, Li Nanyang, contend that: (1) during his lifetime, Li Rui gave the Li Materials to Li Nanyang and instructed her to make a permanent gift of the Li Materials to Stanford, to be preserved by and made freely available for scholarly research and public review at the Hoover Institution Library & Archives at Stanford University (“Hoover”); and (2) in accordance with Li Rui’s instructions, the original Li Materials were donated to and delivered to Hoover by Li Nanyang prior to Li Rui’s death.

Defendant and Counterclaimant Zhang Yuzhen, who was Li Rui’s second wife, contends that Li Rui did not transfer ownership of his original manuscripts to Li Nanyang, and that Li Nanyang did not have the legal right to donate any of Li Rui’s original materials to Hoover prior to Li Rui’s death. Zhang Yuzhen further contends that pursuant to the Chinese court’s judgment in a proceeding called the Zhang Action, she is the sole owner of the original manuscripts contained in the Li Materials, and that this Court should recognize and enforce the Chinese judgment and order Stanford to return to Zhang Yuzhen the original manuscripts that were improperly transferred to Stanford by Li Nanyang….

Li Rui held various government positions in the People’s Republic of China during the 1950s. He became Chairman Mao’s personal secretary in 1958, placing him at the center of political activity in China.

Li Rui was a person of strong opinions who spoke out against the CCP during his lifetime and who “ha[d] a lot of guts.” In 1959, Li Rui attended a leadership meeting of the CCP called the Lushan Conference. At the conference, Li made comments critical of Mao Zedong and the CCP. Because of these criticisms, Li Rui was exiled and transferred between jail and work camps for approximately 20 years….

In 1979, two-and-a-half years after Chairman Mao’s death, Li was released from prison, his membership in the Communist Party was restored, and he was reinstated to his prior position as Deputy Minister of the Electric Power Ministry. Also in 1979, Li Rui married Zhang Yuzhen, and they remained married until Li Rui’s death on February 16, 2019.

In 1982, Li became the Deputy Director of the Organization Department of the CCP. During this time, Li also became a member of the Central Committee of the CCP, and then the Advisory Committee.

In February 1989, Li Rui visited the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. He was “amazed” by the collection at Hoover because it contained writings about historical events that were not available in China, including extensive materials about the Cultural Revolution.

Li Rui witnessed the events in Tiananmen Square in June 1989 from the balcony of his apartment. He wrote an open letter critical of the CCP’s decision to send in soldiers to crack down on the protesting students. He also took notes of the event in his diary.

On August 28, 1999, Li Rui executed a “Testament” noting how fortunate he was to marry Zhang Yuzhen and giving the following “instruction” to his children:

1. The copyrights to all my written works (including those already published and those not yet published) shall all belong to Yuzhen after my demise.
2. All my deposits and household items shall belong to Yuzhen after my demise.
3. My collection of calligraphy and painting works shall all be managed and handled by Yuzhen after my demise.
4. All books shall be donated to Pingjiang Library on my behalf by Yuzhen after my demise.

The testament did not address the disposition of the Li Materials….

There are a lot of further factual findings and legal conclusions in the opinion, but here’s an interesting passage on the non-enforceability of a Chinese court judgment:

“There is currently no federal statute governing recognition of foreign judgments in the federal courts.” “Generally, the recognition of foreign judgments is an issue of state law.” “In matters not involving money judgments, California courts “look to general principles of comity followed by the California courts[.]”

“Comity is ‘the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation.'” “Extension of comity to a foreign judgment is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other.” A federal court should generally give preclusive effect to a foreign court’s finding as a matter of comity.” However, “[c]omity is not an inexorable command, and a request for recognition of a foreign judgment may be rebuffed on any number of grounds.” …

Applying [generally recognized comity] principles, the Court concludes that the Zhang Judgment is not enforceable, for the following reasons.

First, the Beijing Court lacked jurisdiction over Stanford because it was not originally named as a party in Zhang Yuzhen’s civil complaint. [Details omitted. -EV] …

Second, even if the Beijing Court had personal jurisdiction over Stanford, Stanford was denied an opportunity to appear and defend itself in the Zhang Action because the Beijing Court would not allow Stanford’s lawyers to appear, despite their substantial efforts to do so. A well-established principle of comity is that “it would be unjust to [a sovereign’s] own citizens to give effect to the judgments of a foreign tribunal against them when they had no opportunity of being heard.” Such was the case here.

DeJoria v. Maghreb Petroleum (W.D. Tex. 2018) is instructive. In that case, Plaintiff DeJoria sought a declaration that a judgment of the court in Morocco was invalid because, among other reasons, DeJoria had not been able to participate in the litigation leading to the judgment. The Court found that DeJoria had a legitimate fear of traveling to Morocco based on threats made against him by persons connected with his litigation opponents, who were also members of the royal family. He also was not able to retain counsel, “due to the fact that he was a defendant in a case that was of great political interest to the King of Morocco, and his interests were adverse to the King’s.” These facts and others compelled the DeJoria court to find that “the specific proceeding in the foreign court leading to the judgment was not compatible with the requirements of due process of law.”

Here, although Stanford was able to retain counsel, that counsel was not able to participate in the litigation and its views were not considered by the court. This meant that Stanford did not receive due process.

Third, the Beijing Court failed to keep the “clear and formal record” of the proceedings that would allow this Court to find that the proceedings were fair…. [And i]n at least one respect, the judgment is at odds with the facts, stating that Hoover, Stanford, and Li Nanyang were “summoned by the court and did not appear, with no justified reason” and “did not present any statements, either.” In actual fact, however, Hoover had attempted to appear through Stanford’s counsel and to present evidence and argument and Li Nanyang had presented jurisdictional objections. Because there is no “clear and formal record,” the Court cannot determine whether the proceedings afforded Stanford the due process to which it was entitled, or satisfied the other Hilton factors.

Fourth, there is evidence that this particular proceeding before the Beijing Court was dominated by the CCP, as summarized by Professor Kellogg. [American law] permit[s] denial of enforcement of a foreign judgment when the foreign judicial system from which the judgment originated did not provide an impartial tribunal or due process of law in a particular case. Evidence “that the judiciary was dominated by the political branches of government or by an opposing litigant, or that a party was unable to obtain counsel, to secure documents or attendance of witnesses, or to have access to appeal or review, would support a conclusion that the legal system was one whose judgments are not entitled to recognition.”

The State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices “ha[ve] been described as the most appropriate and perhaps the best resource for information on political situations in foreign nations.” The U.S. State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices in China for 2019 states:

Although the law states the courts shall exercise judicial power independently, without interference from administrative organs, social organizations, and individuals, the judiciary did not exercise judicial power independently. Judges regularly received political guidance on pending cases, including instructions on how to rule, from both the government and the CCP, particularly in politically sensitive cases.

Professor Kellogg’s expert report notes that “[p]arty control over the judiciary is well-documented …. The State Department’s findings on judicial independence remain unchanged: its reports on China have continued to note the judiciary’s lack of judicial independence on an annual basis each year, including 2023, the most recent report currently available.”

And the court finds “that Li Rui gave the Li Rui materials to Li Nanyang for the purpose of removing them from China and donating them to the Hoover Center at Stanford”:

Thus, when Li Nanyang donated the materials to the Hoover Institute, she was acting in accordance with and pursuant to Li Rui’s expressed wishes. Accordingly, Stanford now holds good title to the Li Rui Materials.

Li Rui knew that Stanford would preserve the Li Materials and make them available to the public. He also believed that the CCP was likely to secrete, censor, redact, or destroy the Li Materials. His desire that his writings be made available to the public in perpetuity and not be censored in any way was the primary motivation for giving the materials to Li Nanyang so she could deposit them at Stanford/Hoover. Li Rui’s fears that his writings would be banned, burned, or otherwise made unavailable were reasonable and consistent with other evidence received in the case as set forth above.

Because Li Rui gave the materials to Li Nanyang for this purpose prior to his death, the materials were not part of his estate at the time of his death and therefore were not subject to the law of inheritance….

Jeffrey David Wexler, Mark Davis Litvack, and Ryan Adelsperger (Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP) represent Stanford.