“Rising Wave of Antisemitism” Doesn’t Justify Letting Jewish Plaintiff Sue Pseudonymolusly

From Doe v. Life Time, Inc., decided today (correctly, I think) by Judge Dora Irizarry (E.D.N.Y.):

The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff attended Life Time Fitness from 2018 to 2024, and in 2023 his local gym hired Defendant Ahmed to “man the front desk in the evenings.” Ahmed is alleged to be a member of the Muslim faith who “flaunts his religion” The Complaint alleges that, as an employee, Ahmed discriminated against Jewish members, such as Plaintiff [in violation of federal and state antidiscrimination law], by prohibiting Plaintiff from entering the gym after 8:00 PM on weekends, while allowing members of the Muslim faith to enter.

Plaintiff recounts a specific encounter on October 26, 2024, in which Plaintiff arrived with a guest wearing a yarmulke (a small round head covering worn by male practitioners of the Orthodox Jewish faith) and requested late entry. Ahmed is alleged to have denied entry and then admitted to selectively enforcing policies when pressed by Plaintiff. The situation escalated and Plaintiff’s membership to the gym was suspended. Plaintiff alleges that his membership was reinstated the next day; however, on December 14, 2024, three Life Time employees, including Ahmed, assaulted him in the gym locker room.

Plaintiff attests that he raised Ahmed’s discriminatory actions to his gym’s general manager, but nothing was ever done. After lodging a number of complaints, Plaintiff alleges that the general manager banned him from the gym. Plaintiff further alleges he never was given a reason from Life Time as to why he was banned….

Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) provides that the “title of [a] complaint must name all the parties.” This requirement serves “the vital purpose of facilitating public scrutiny of judicial proceedings and … cannot be set aside lightly.” … The [Second C]ircuit has cautioned that there are “a limited number of exceptions” to the general rule, which includes the privacy of minors… [Plaintiff] does not fall into one of the previously recognized exceptions and the public’s interest in the litigation is furthered by identification because the public has a presumptive “right to know who is using their courts.” …

[C]ourts [should] consider whether disclosure of a plaintiff’s identity would subject them, or non-parties, to possible harm. Speculative or “generalized harm” is not sufficient to establish a likelihood of harm following identification. Here, Plaintiff argues that he is in “real danger” of physical harm and that the harm is not speculative because he previously was assaulted by Ahmed and that the rising wave of antisemitism across the nation subjects him to harm upon being identified as a member of the Jewish faith.

Plaintiff’s argument is unavailing because his basis for “likely” harm is entirely speculative. Whether Plaintiff was assaulted by Ahmed at the gym in the past does not establish that it will occur again, especially considering that Plaintiff was banned from returning to the gym. Notably, the Complaint is devoid of allegations suggesting that he will be unduly targeted at large because of his Jewish Faith.

[Courts should also consider] whether “the litigation involves matters that are highly sensitive and of a personal nature.” Courts have found birth control, abortion, homosexuality, welfare rights of illegitimate children, abandoned families, and sexual assault and harassment to be highly sensitive matters. While conceding that his “status as a Jewish individual is not inherently sensitive information,” nonetheless, Plaintiff contends that this action involves highly sensitive matters because of the social stigma attendant to his private Jewish beliefs. Plaintiff relies on the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Doe v. Stegall (5th Cir. 1981), which involved religious freedom pursuant to the First Amendment.

However, Stegall is distinguishable from the instant action for three reasons: (1) Stegall involved children; (2) Stegall was brought against the county government; and (3) the plaintiffs in Stegall had evidence indicating a likelihood of “extensive harassment” from the county community. Plaintiff’s reliance on the rise of antisemitism here amounts to nothing more than speculation. Significantly, he does not distinguish the unique characteristics of his case that mandate departure from the preference for public disclosure as in the litany of other religion-based cases on this issue. Therefore, factor one also weighs against Plaintiff….

For a somewhat different approach to such cases (though the facts there are somewhat different as well), see Pseudonymity Allowed (for Now) in Lawsuit Against Palestinian Student Groups.