No Pseudonymity for Defendant in Computer Fraud and Abuse Act / Trade Secrets Case

From Grow Universe Inc. v. Doe, decided Friday by Judge Gregory Woods (S.D.N.Y.):

Plaintiff filed this action on March 5, 2025, alleging that Defendant accessed Plaintiff’s Google business account without authorization, misappropriated the proprietary information stored within it, and deleted the account. The complaint asserts claims under the Computer Fraud and Abuse and the Defend Trade Secrets Act, as well as conversion and tortious interference under New York law.

The court had earlier refused to quash a subpoena to Spectrum seeking identification information about the defendant, plaintiff therefore identified the person that it thinks is the defendant. That person moved to intervene, asking to remain anonymous, but the court rejected the anonymity request:

Because Movant identifies only the ordinary reputational consequences attendant to civil litigation, and because this fact-intensive dispute between private parties turns on contested conduct and credibility, Movant has not overcome the strong presumption that parties must litigate in their own names….

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant engaged in intentional misconduct by accessing Plaintiff’s account without authorization, misappropriating proprietary information, and deleting the account. Even accepting Movant’s contention that these allegations could be embarrassing or reputationally harmful, they are not the type of intimate, highly personal matters—such as sexual assault or reproductive issues—that courts have found to favor anonymity. Furthermore, being named in a lawsuit, while potentially harmful to Movant’s reputation, is not the same as being found liable. Should Movant be named, she will have the opportunity to defend herself. Accordingly, the first factor weighs against permitting Movant to proceed pseudonymously….

Movant does not allege any threat of physical retaliation, nor does she submit a sworn statement attesting to likely psychological or emotional harm. Instead, she relies on generalized assertions of “embarrassment and reputational harm.” These generalized concerns do not establish the kind of harm contemplated by these factors. See, e.g., Doe v. Smith (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (favoring anonymity where a psychiatric specialist’s affidavit “predict[ed] that revelation of [plaintiff’s] identity will likely cause psychological and emotional pain so intense that it would threaten her stability, her safety, and even her life”). Because Movant does not allege any harm beyond the generalized statements related to embarrassment and reputational injury—and she has provided no factual support even for those—the second and third factors likewise weigh against anonymity.

Movant argues that the risk of harm is heightened because she is only identified by an IP address, creating a risk of misidentification. But the cases she cites arose in a materially different context—efforts to link subscribers identified only by IP addresses to the alleged downloading of pornographic films—which some courts have treated as uniquely sensitive and stigmatizing, and the misidentification analysis was framed against that backdrop. Here, by contrast, the basis for Plaintiff’s anticipated complaint against Movant is not limited to her association with an IP address. Plaintiff submitted a sworn declaration explaining that Spectrum’s subpoena response confirmed Plaintiff’s suspicion as to Defendant’s identity and tying her alleged access to a prior relationship. And, as already described, if she is misidentified in the complaint, Movant will be able to argue that point in her defense….

Permitting a party to litigate under a pseudonym presents an inherent risk of prejudice, as “concealing the name of a party could deprive a litigant and the court of the chance that a yet unknown witness would, upon learning that fact about the case, know to step forward with valuable information about the events or the credibility of witnesses.” That “asymmetry” between the parties can also “hinder ‘the judicial interest in accurate fact-finding and fair adjudication.'”

Movant contends that because Plaintiff already knows her name, Plaintiff can “proceed with the case just as any other, only without publishing Movant’s name on the public docket.” While Plaintiff’s knowledge of Movant’s identity does reduce the risk of prejudice, it does not eliminate it. Even where a plaintiff knows the defendant’s identity, litigating against an anonymous defendant frequently requires the plaintiff to “‘make redactions’ and take other ‘measures not to disclose [the defendant]’s identity,'” increasing “both the work required and the cost” of litigation.

Here, although Plaintiff’s knowledge lessens the risk of prejudice, anonymity would still constrain Plaintiff’s ability to conduct discovery in the ordinary course, including by preventing Plaintiff from identifying Movant openly when seeking information from third parties. Those constraints impose a real burden that outweighs the mitigating effect of Plaintiff’s knowledge….

In cases concerning the legal consequences of an undisputed event, the identity of the parties is “relatively immaterial.” By contrast, where a case “turns on the credibility of parties,” “the public has a significant interest in open judicial proceedings and the public’s interest in the litigation is furthered by transparency, including exposure of the parties’ identities.”

This case is not about the legal consequences of an undisputed event. It turns on disputed factual allegations that Movant—who allegedly had a prior business relationship with Plaintiff—engaged in intentional misconduct related to Plaintiff’s account.. In a fact-intensive dispute of this kind, where credibility and intent are likely to be central, disclosure of Movant’s name would “enhance the public’s understanding of the proceedings and the nature of the dispute.” …

Where a suit is against the government and raises an abstract legal question affecting many similarly situated individuals, the identities of the parties bringing the suit “may be largely irrelevant to the public concern with the nature of the process” and have “little bearing on the nature of the dispute or the merits of the case.” On the other hand, “where individual defendants are sued based not on abstract challenges to public policies but rather with regard to particular actions and incidents, open proceedings nevertheless benefit the public as well as the parties and also serve the judicial interest in accurate fact-finding and fair adjudication.” …

Andrea T. Timpone (Garson, Ségal, Steinmetz, Fladgate LLP) represents plaintiff.