Missouri Judge Removed from Bench for In-Court Political Activity

That such conduct is violative of Supreme Court Rule 2-1.2, requiring a judge to promote confidence in the integrity of the judiciary and avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety; Supreme Court Rule 2-2.1, requiring a judge give precedence to the duties of office; Supreme Court Rule 2-2.3, requiring a judge to avoid bias in performing judicial duties; Supreme Court Rule 2-2.4, requiring a judge not allow political relationships to influence judicial conduct; Supreme Court Rule 2-2.8, requiring a judge maintain order and decorum in proceedings before the court and to be dignified and courteous with litigants, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, court officials, and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity; Supreme Court Rule 2-4.1 (D), requiring that a judge not engage in any other political activity except on behalf of measures to improve the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice; and Supreme Court Rule 2-4.2, for failing to maintain dignity appropriate to judicial office while campaigning. Further, such conduct is misconduct and/or incompetency pursuant to [a]rticle V[, s]ection 24 of the Constitution of the State of Missouri.

Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct imposes severe restrictions on the political activities of judges and those who seek that office. Even the activities that are permitted, however, are never permitted in the courtroom. See, e.g., Rule 2-4.2(B) (providing candidates, including incumbent judges, “shall not solicit or accept campaign funds in a courthouse or on courthouse grounds”). The Code of Judicial Conduct makes clear that, other than the activities permitted in Canon 4, a “judge shall not engage in any other political activity except on behalf of measures to improve the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice.” Rule 2-4.1(D).

The restrictions the Code of Judicial Conduct imposes on political activity are essential to preserving the integrity of­­—and the public’s trust and confidence in—the judicial system. The preamble to the Code of Judicial Conduct begins:

An independent, fair and impartial judiciary is indispensable to our system of justice. The United States legal system is based upon the principle that an independent, impartial, and competent judiciary, composed of men and women of integrity, will interpret and apply the law that governs our society. Thus, the judiciary plays a central role in preserving the principles of justice and the rule of law. Inherent in all the rules contained in this code are the precepts that judges, individually and collectively, must respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive to maintain and enhance confidence in the legal system.

Judges should maintain the dignity of judicial office and avoid both impropriety and the appearance of impropriety. They should aspire to conduct that ensures the greatest possible public confidence in their independence, impartiality, integrity, and competence.

Political references and other such statements by judges in the courtroom are the antithesis of these principles and violate numerous provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Any failure to ensure courtrooms and the conduct of judicial business are—and are seen to be—absolutely free of political interests will inexorably erode the public’s confidence in the judicial system and, therefore, the rule of law. It cannot, and will not, be tolerated.

Judge Thornhill has admitted, and this Court finds, he committed numerous violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct by failing to keep his political views and interests out of the courtroom. See Rule 2-1.2 (“A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”); Rule 2-2.1 (The “duties of judicial office … shall take precedence over a judge’s personal and extrajudicial activities.”); Rule 2-2.3 (A “judge shall perform the duties of judicial office without bias.”); Rule 2-2.8 (A “judge shall require order and decorum in proceedings before the court” and shall be dignified in dealing with “litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, court officials, and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity.”); Rule 2-4.1(D) (“A judge shall not engage in any other political activity [other than as permitted in Canon 4] except on behalf of measures to improve the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice.”); Rule 2-4.2 (providing that, when campaigning, a judge “shall maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office”).

In addition to the many rules cited above, Judge Thornhill admits he violated Rule 2-2.4, which provides in pertinent part:

(A) A judge shall not be swayed by partisan interests ….

(B) A judge shall not permit … political … relationships to influence the judge’s judicial conduct ….

(C) A judge shall not convey … the impression that any person or organization is in a special position to influence the judge.

This Court finds Judge Thornhill violated Rule 2-2.4 and each of the other rules listed above, not merely once or inadvertently but repeatedly, consciously, and purposefully. These violations are “misconduct” as that term is used in article V, section 24.3, and the only conceivable sanction for such misconduct is removal from office.

Judge Thornhill admits these violations but seeks to downplay them as merely “humorous” attempts to be relatable and put self-represented litigants at ease. The Court finds no humor in a judge making comments in the courtroom about his party affiliation and which candidates in other races he prefers. Attempts at humor, no matter how tone deaf, cannot justify Judge Thornhill asking those in this courtroom whether they have seen his campaign signs, whether they live in “Thornhill for Judge Country,” or whether a particular lawyer’s client has “warmed up to Thornhill for judge.” Judge Thornhill admits the truth and substantial accuracy of these allegations, and they are sufficient—in fact, more than sufficient—to warrant removal from office.

It does not matter that Judge Thornhill thought such comments were permitted or too innocuous to cause any harm, and it does not matter that he claims his campaign interests and partisan preferences did not influence his decisions. What matters is the impact such conduct can have on the public’s trust and confidence.

Members of the public who heard Judge Thornhill ask—in the courtroom—who had seen his campaign signs or whether they live in “Thornhill for Judge Country” reasonably could have thought their chances for a favorable outcome could or would be enhanced if they had such a sign in their yard. Similarly, members of the public who heard him declare—in the courtroom—his partisan affiliation and identify those candidates he supports in other races reasonably could have thought their chances for a favorable outcome could or would be enhanced if they professed the same affiliation and supported the same candidates.

It does not matter if these thoughts are correct. If even one member of the public had such a thought in response to Judge Thornhill’s misconduct, that is one too many. Maintaining the public’s trust and confidence is difficult enough without members of the judiciary feeding the public’s fears and mistrust by making these kinds of political statements in the courtroom. Judge Thornhill’s statements constitute “misconduct” under article V, section 24.3 of the Missouri Constitution and merit his removal from office….