Merely Correctly Advising … Daughter of Her Constitutional Rights Did Not Constitute … [Criminal O]bstruction … of a Governmental Function

From today’s decision in Keeton v. State, written by Arkansas Court of Appeals Judge Cindy Grace Thyer, joined by Judges Brandon Harrison and Casey Tucker:

Appellant Doralee Keeton was found guilty by a Dallas County jury of one count of obstructing governmental operations, a Class C misdemeanor, and sentenced to pay a $500 fine….

Police had come to the home of Doralee’s daughter, Madeline, to arrest her for possession of methamphetamine, but Keeton had apparently talked to Madeline on the phone and “told her don’t answer the door. They don’t have a no-knock [warrant].” (It may be that she just meant that they didn’t have a warrant.) This led to Keeton being prosecuted, but the court reversed the conviction:

A person commits the offense of obstructing governmental operations if the person knowingly obstructs, impairs, or hinders the performance of any governmental function. “Governmental function” means any activity that a public servant is legally authorized to undertake on behalf of any governmental unit he or she serves.

Arkansas case law appears to require actual interference with law enforcement officers or government activities in order to sustain a conviction for obstruction of governmental operations. For example, in Kelley v. State (Ark. App. 2001), this court affirmed an obstruction conviction when the defendant caused a physical disruption to officers who were attempting to administer a field-sobriety test to another individual by shouting, physically approaching the officers, and fleeing back into his home. The officers testified that Kelley’s actions hindered their ability to administer the field-sobriety test and interfered with the officers’ ability to provide backup for each other. This court held that Kelley’s actions “obstructed, impaired, and hindered the officers’ ability to perform their governmental functions as law enforcement officers during the investigation of a DWI traffic stop.”

In RB v. State (Ark. App. 2013), the appellant, a juvenile, was convicted of obstructing governmental operations after he repeatedly refused orders from a law enforcement officer to return to his room in a detention facility. The officer testified that RB resisted her orders for at least two hours and that she eventually had to call for back-up officers from the adult detention facility to assist her. This court held that RB’s refusal “obstructed [the officer’s] ability to secure the [juvenile detention] facility for the evening and impaired the orderly function of the detention center.”

The State relies on Gordin v. State (Ark. App. 2021) as holding that the defendant’s attempt to alert her brother that officers were outside his residence to serve a warrant constituted substantial evidence to support a conviction for obstructing governmental operations. The defendant in Gordin, however, actively engaged with the law enforcement officers, blocking her brother’s driveway and honking her car horn repeatedly to alert her brother that officers were approaching and give him time to escape. This supports the conclusion that actual interference with law enforcement or governmental operations on the part of the defendant is required under our obstruction statute.

Here, by way of contrast, by the officers’ own testimony, there was absolutely no contact between them and Keeton. The governmental function that the State alleged was obstructed was the service of the arrest warrant on Madeline. Keeton did not take any action to obstruct, impair, or hinder the officers from approaching the house and attempting to make contact with Madeline in order to serve that warrant….

Keeton spoke to Madeline—not the officers––and told her that she did not have to open the door if the officers did not have a search warrant. Merely correctly advising her daughter of her constitutional rights did not constitute the knowing obstruction, impairment, or hindrance of a governmental function required by section 5-54-102. Providing such advice is not physically interfering with police activities, or preventing officers from performing lawful duties. See RB, supra….

Because we reverse on Keeton’s first argument, it is unnecessary to reach Keeton’s First Amendment argument ….

S.L. Smith (The Firm, PLLC) represents Keeton.