Louisiana Act of Terror Claim Can Go Forward Based on Alleged Violent Attack on Pro-Israel Demonstration

From Judge Jane Triche Milazzo’s decision yesterday in Mann v. Quraan (E.D. La.); recall that the factual assertions are just those alleged in the Complaint—there hasn’t yet been factfinding as to whose side of the factual story is correct:

Plaintiff Dylan Mann, an undergraduate student at Tulane University, alleges that on October 26, 2023, he participated in a demonstration in support of Israel in uptown New Orleans in response to a pre-planned anti-Israel protest. He alleges that the anti-Israel protest was organized by non-Tulane students and specifically targeted Tulane due to the significant number of Jewish students enrolled there.

Plaintiff alleges that during the protest Defendant Abraham Quraan drove back and forth in his vehicle between the two protests in order to cause a disturbance or provoke the Tulane students. At some point, Defendant Quraan exited his vehicle, violently assaulted Plaintiff, and ripped an Israeli flag off of Plaintiff’s body. Defendant Alaa Salam allegedly joined in the attack and struck Plaintiff with a bullhorn. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants verbally expressed hate for Jewish people during the incident. After assaulting Plaintiff, Defendants allegedly continued to aggressively approach other Tulane students and Quraan removed his belt with the intent to use it as a weapon.

Plaintiff also alleges that, after the incident, Defendants utilized social media to “espouse implied threats of violence” toward Jewish people and Plaintiff personally….

Plaintiff brings an act of terror claim pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.9, which provides that:

In addition to general and special damages, a prevailing plaintiff shall also be awarded court costs and reasonable attorney fees in the appropriate district or appellate court upon proof that the injuries on which the action is based were caused by an act of terror or terrorism resulting in injury to the person or damage to the person’s property, regardless of whether the defendant was prosecuted for his acts.

The article goes on to define “act of terror” or “terrorism” as, relevant here, the “[i]ntentional infliction of serious bodily injury upon a human being” occurring “when the offender has the intent to intimidate or coerce the civilian population, influence the policy of a unit of government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a unit of government by intimidation or coercion.” …

“A complaint may allege knowledge and intent generally, though it must still contain factual support making the plaintiff’s claims plausible.” While this Court agrees with Defendants that the Complaint is lacking in detail, it must view the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and finds that he has alleged sufficient facts for his act of terror claim to survive this stage of litigation.

Plaintiff generally alleges that Defendants’ actions were intended to intimidate or coerce Plaintiff and the other Tulane students at the protest. He alleges that Defendants’ presence at the pro-Israel demonstration was for the purpose of inciting or provoking the Tulane students. According to the Complaint, Defendants violently attacked Plaintiff without warning and acted aggressively toward other students while spewing hatred toward Jewish people.

These acts could reasonably be seen as intending to intimidate or threaten the students, prevent them from protesting or supporting Israel, and chill their freedom of speech and assembly. The Court notes that article 2315.9 is broadly worded, and there is no case law interpreting its meaning. However, the facts as pleaded sufficiently allege that Defendants acted with intent to intimidate the civilian population….

Paul Sterbcow (Lewis, Kullman, Sterbcow & Abramson, LLC) represents plaintiff.