Libel Suit by “King of Vape” Against N.Y. Post, Over Allegations of Misconduct and Anti-Israel Actions, Thrown Out but May Be Refiled

Excerpts from yesterday’s decision by Judge Sheri Polster Chappell (M.D. Fla.) in Shriteh v. NYP Holdings, Inc. (with, as usual, some inevitable oversimplification of some of the legal points):

This is a defamation case. Plaintiff operates seventeen vape (or e-cigarette) retail stores in southwest Florida under the trademark name “the King of Vape.” Christenson, writing for the New York Post, authored and published an article about Plaintiff titled, “Florida’s Israel-hating ‘King of Vape’ Faces Bipartisan Crackdown on Sale of Illicit, Kid-Friendly Chinese E-cigs.” The following is a summary of the article.

Plaintiff, a.k.a. the “King of Vape,” is the co-founder of Safa Goods, one of the largest vape distributors in the United States. Safa Goods sells Chinese-produced vape brands in over a dozen “King of Vape” retail stores in southwest Florida. New York Attorney General Letitia James sued Safa Goods (among others) for illegal and fraudulent business practices that target underage e-cigarette users. United States Senator Ashley Moody also announced plans to protect children from illicit vapes. In Florida, Governor Ron DeSantis has cracked down on illicit vape sales. And the Food and Drug Administration is doing the same. All this government action, according to the article, demonstrates the “hotseat” in which Plaintiff sits “as lawmakers and officials try to throttle his distribution of illicit e-cigarettes manufactured in China.”

According to the article, Plaintiff not only sells illicit vapes, but also has a “history of anti-Israel advocacy,” which shows he is an Israel-hater. In February 1991, an Israeli court found that Plaintiff aided Hamas while working as a freelance reporter in the Gaza Strip. The Israeli judge found that Plaintiff “crossed the line in his work as a journalist” and “became an activist for a terror organization” by reporting information from a Hamas leaflet to readers. Defendants obtained this information from a 1991 New York Times article, which they hyperlinked in their article. Plaintiff also authored a 2003 book Beyond Intifada: Narratives of Freedom Fighters in the Gaza Strip, which covered the uprising of Palestinians against Israel beginning in 1987. And Plaintiff’s relative (and director of Safa Goods) previously worked at United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees. The United States ceased all funding to this organization because some of its employees helped Hamas conduct the October 7, 2023, attack that killed 1,200 people.

After Plaintiff complained about the article, Defendants published a revised version titled, “Florida’s ‘King of Vape’ Faces Bipartisan Crackdown on Family’s Sale of Kid-Friendly Chinese E-cigs.” However, the revised article still [allegedly] includes defamatory statements.

Plaintiff sued for libel, claiming these statements were “materially false” and defamatory:

1. Plaintiff was the cofounder of Safa Goods;
2. Plaintiff is involved in a lawsuit filed by New York Attorney General Letitia James;
3. Plaintiff sells illicit goods to minors;
4. Plaintiff is an “Israel hater” with a history of anti-Israel advocacy; and
5. An Israeli court ruled that Plaintiff was a supporter of the terrorist organization, Hamas.

Relatedly, “Although not alleged to be false, Plaintiff also objects to the article’s statement that Plaintiff’s relative previously worked at an organization with employees who helped Hamas conduct the October 7, 2023, attack. He alleges Defendants included this statement ‘in a transparent attempt to link [Plaintiff] with terrorism and further tarnish his reputation.'”

The court concluded that plaintiff was a public figure:

Plaintiff alleges that before immigrating to the United States in 2000, he was “a respected journalist working in Gaza and reporting for the New York Times, Reuters, and CBS News, whose courageous efforts were recognized in 1993 when he received the John R. Aubuchon International Freedom of the Press Award.” He also alleges that he co-authored a book, Beyond Intifada, with “esteemed Israeli professors” which “has been recognized for its contribution to understanding the human impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.” And he repeatedly alleges that Defendants issued and made the defamatory statements with actual malice. He cannot now dispute his status as a public figure. See Corsi v. Newsmax Media, Inc. (S.D. Fla. 2021) (finding the plaintiff was a public figure where he described himself as a New York Times bestselling author and political commentator and “concedes the point by attempting to plead facts in support of the element of actual malice in his Complaint”)….

The court then concluded that plaintiff hadn’t sufficiently alleged the “actual malice”­—knowing or reckless falsehood­—that is required for a public figure plaintiff to prevail:

Plaintiff offers nothing more than conclusory allegations that Defendants made the defamatory statements “with intent to push a false narrative,” “with utter disregard for their veracity” and impact, “with reckless disregard as to their truth,” “with actual malice,” “with ill-will,” and Defendants “knew or should have known” that the statements were false. Without more, these allegations are insufficient….

The court also concluded that plaintiff hadn’t sufficiently alleged damages, which are required under Florida law for “a plaintiff suing a media defendant for defamation”:

Plaintiff conclusorily alleges Defendants’ false statements harmed his reputation in the community and his lawful business ventures. And he broadly alleges he “has been damaged” as a “proximate result” of Defendants’ statements. With no factual support, these allegations are insufficient.

Plaintiff also alleges his family recently faced traumatic discrimination because of the defamatory statements. Specifically, on May 29, 2025, CBP officers detained Plaintiff’s son at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York. Defendants argue Plaintiff cannot collect damages stemming from this incident because he did not suffer the alleged harm himself. Plaintiff does not respond to this point, and the Court otherwise agrees with Defendants. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 621 (1977) (“One who is liable for a defamatory communication is liable for the proved, actual harm caused to the reputation of the person defamed.”)….

But the court rejected most of defendants’ arguments that the statements weren’t false and defamatory; that will be relevant if plaintiff files an amended complaint that adequately alleges actual malice and damages:

Statement 1: Plaintiff co-founded Safa Goods

The article states that Plaintiff co-founded Safa Goods. Plaintiff asserts this is false. Defendants concede Plaintiff is not a co-founder of Safa Goods, but they argue the statement is nevertheless “substantially true.” Under Florida’s “substantial truth” doctrine, “a statement does not have to be perfectly accurate to avoid being defamatory if the ‘gist’ or the ‘sting’ of the statement is true.” …

Defendants argue that although Plaintiff is not the co-founder of Safa Goods, he is sufficiently connected to Safa Goods such that the “gist” or the “sting” of the statement is true. Plaintiff’s son and nephew are the actual co-founders of Safa Goods, Plaintiff sources products from Safa Goods, Orange Wholesale (a company that Plaintiff owns that was mentioned in the revised article) is an “affiliate” of Safa Goods, and Plaintiff appeared in court with his son and nephew over a trademark dispute regarding their business’ sale of Chinese-manufactured e-cigarettes. The Court does not buy this argument.

The “gist” of the statement is what it says: that Plaintiff co-founded Safa Goods. That statement is false. The fact that Plaintiff’s family members co-founded Safa Goods does not render the statement substantially or even partially true. And Plaintiff’s other purported affiliations with Safa Goods are not the same as being the co-founder or having any sort of ownership in Safa Goods, especially when considered in context.

The article states Plaintiff co-founded Safa Goods, which faces a New York lawsuit and other government action for its sale of illicit e-cigarettes. The insinuation is that through his ownership of Safa Goods, Plaintiff is subject to a “bipartisan crackdown” and “in the hot seat.” But Plaintiff does not own Safa Goods, so Plaintiff is not facing any sort of “crackdown.” Plaintiff is not otherwise named in the New York lawsuit. And there is no reference in the article suggesting Senator Moody, the FDA, or Governor DeSantis specifically targeted Plaintiff in their efforts to curb illicit e-cigarette sales.

Ultimately, the gist of the article is two-fold: (1) Plaintiff is in the hot seat because of Safa Goods’ illicit sales, and (2) Plaintiff hates Israel. The erroneous ownership link between Plaintiff and Safa Goods invalidates half the article. So the statement is not substantially true, and this basis for Plaintiff’s defamation claim survives.

Statement 2: Plaintiff is involved in a lawsuit filed by New York Attorney General Letitia James

 

Plaintiff argues that Defendants erroneously stated in the article that he is a party to the lawsuit filed by the New York Attorney General, as he has not been named in any legal complaint filed against Safa Goods. The article contains no such assertion. Rather, it states that Safa Goods is involved in a lawsuit filed by the New York Attorney General. Although the article’s implication is that Plaintiff is subject to the lawsuit, any defamation arising from this implication is encompassed in statement 1. So the Court dismisses statement 2 as a basis for Plaintiff’s defamation claim.

 

Statement 3: Plaintiff sells illicit e-cigarettes to minors

Plaintiff alleges the article’s claim that he deals in “illicit” goods sold to minors is “entirely baseless and an utter misrepresentation of the facts” because he “follows all applicable state and federal age regulations regarding the sale of vape and tobacco products,” and his stores only sell to customers over the age of twenty-one. Defendants argue their use of the term “illicit” to characterize the e-cigarette sales is protected opinion.

Under Florida law, “[a] statement is pure opinion when it is commentary or opinion based on facts that are set forth in the subject publication or which are otherwise known or available to the reader or listener.” “Statements of pure opinion are generally not actionable as defamation because, unlike a statement of fact, a statement of pure opinion is not readily capable of being proven false.” …

As an initial matter, Plaintiff objects to the article stating that he sells illicit goods to minors. But the Court’s sees no such assertion. The article mentions Plaintiff is in the hot seat because he distributes illicit e-cigarettes manufactured in China. But there is no mention of Plaintiff selling illicit vapes to minors. {The article addresses Safa Goods dealing to minors, which it imputed to Plaintiff through his ownership of Safa Goods. But any defamation arising from this false link is encompassed in statement 1.} Plaintiff must clarify the basis of this alleged defamatory statement.

In any event, the Court is not convinced Defendants’ statement that Plaintiff deals illicit e-cigarettes is opinion. Whether Plaintiff sells illicit substances can be proven false, so it is not a pure opinion.

Statement 4: Plaintiff is an “Israel hater” with a history of anti-Israel advocacy

Plaintiff alleges the article’s claim that he hates Israel and has a history of anti-Israel advocacy is “utterly devoid of factual support.” Defendants argue this accusation is an opinion. The Court does not agree.

Defendants argue that referencing Plaintiff as an Israel hater is non-actionable name-calling. Although accusations of bigotry or bias, such as a person being an Israel hater, generally amount to “mere name calling,” they “may rise to the level of defamation where the accusation relates to specific or concrete acts.” “Where the accusation is vague, nonspecific, or without accompanying explanation or elaboration, however, it does not contain a provably false assertion of fact required to state a claim for defamation.”

Defendants’ accusation that Plaintiff hates Israel is not vague or nonspecific. Rather, the article elaborates with at least one specific act—that Plaintiff aided Hamas. The article teeters on the edge between mere name-calling and accusing Plaintiff of being a Hamas affiliate. Cf. Forte v. Jones (E.D. Cal. 2013) (“[I]t is important to stress that it is the allegation of membership in the Ku Klux Klan that is actionable; the allegation that a person is a ‘racist,’ on the other hand is not actionable because the term ‘racist’ has no factually-verifiable meaning.”); Ward v. Zelikovsky (N.J. 1994) (finding the defendant’s statement that the plaintiff hated Jews was non-actionable name-calling because the defendant “made no factual statements and did not appear to rely on factual statements known to the audience that would transform his claim of anti-Semitism into an actionable statement”).

Defendants’ argument has yet another angle. As mentioned above, “[a] statement is pure opinion when it is commentary or opinion based on facts that are set forth in the subject publication or which are otherwise known or available to the reader or listener.” Defendants argue their accusation that Plaintiff is an Israel hater is supported by facts—that an Israeli judge found Plaintiff was aiding Hamas. This argument is unmoving because (as discussed in the following section), the accuracy of Defendants’ portrayal of the Israeli judge’s statements is contested and unclear at this stage. And “a speaker cannot invoke a ‘pure opinion’ defense, if the facts underlying the opinion are false or inaccurately presented.”

This statement may ultimately be an instance of mere name-calling. But “[c]onstruing the allegations in the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court cannot conclude at this stage that [Defendants’] comments are mere rhetoric and cannot constitute defamatory publications.” At this stage, “the Court is not willing to say, as a matter of law, that [Defendants’] insults are incapable of being interpreted as false facts.” So this basis of Plaintiff’s defamation claim survives.

Statement 5: An Israeli court ruled that Plaintiff was a supporter of the terrorist organization, Hamas

Defendants assert in the article that an Israeli judge found Plaintiff “crossed the line in his work as a journalist” and “became an activist for a terror organization.” Plaintiff alleges this assertion is false because he has never been a member of Hamas, supported Hamas in any capacity, been affiliated with Hamas in any manner, or been convicted of any crime in any country. His response sheds further light on his allegations. He explains the Israeli judge’s quote was made during a bail hearing and, thus, there was no actual finding that Plaintiff aided Hamas….

Here is the relevant line from the article:

In February 1991, however, an Israeli judge found that [Plaintiff] “crossed the line in his work as a journalist” and “became an activist for a terror organization” by reporting out information from a Hamas leaflet to readers, the [New York] Times reported at the time….

Defendants’ reliance on the New York Times article does not defeat the privilege so long as they provided a fair and substantially accurate portrayal of the Israeli proceeding. But without the transcript of the hearing (and an accurate translation from Hebrew), the Court cannot make this determination. Reviewing the underlying New York Times article does nothing because its recount of the proceedings could be inaccurate.

That’s not all. The parties agree the Israeli judge made the subject statement during a bail hearing. They also agree the charges against Plaintiff were eventually dropped. But the article omits this information. Without this additional context, an ordinary reader could reasonably interpret the Israeli judge’s statements as conclusive, incriminating findings, which apparently is not the case. So a question remains whether Defendants’ reporting was “fair and accurate.” See Mahn v. Allegis Grp., Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (explaining the privilege applies despite minor discrepancies if “they do not produce a different effect on a reader than would a report containing the precise truth”); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 611 cmt. f (explaining a newspaper that reports on derogatory parts of a proceeding but “fail[s] to publish the further proceedings that tend to vindicate the person defamed” may suggest the reporting was not fair). The fair-report privilege does not shield Defendants at this stage.

Statement 6: Plaintiff’s relative previously worked at an organization with employees that helped Hamas conduct the October 7, 2023, attack

The relevant line in Defendants’ article states: “Ahmed Shriteh, a relative of [Plaintiff] who serves as a director of Safa, previously worked at the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA)—an organization to which the US halted all funding after it was revealed several of its employees helped Hamas carry out the Oct. 7, 2023, attack that killed 1,200 people.” Plaintiff alleges that Defendants included this line “in a transparent attempt to link [Plaintiff] with terrorism and further tarnish his reputation.”

Defendants argue in a footnote that this statement is not actionable because it is not “of and concerning the plaintiff.” Plaintiff did not respond to this argument. And, notably, Plaintiff does not allege this statement is false. So the Court dismisses this basis of Plaintiff’s defamation claim with prejudice….