Iran, Pseudonymity, and Risk of Harm

From Chief Judge James Boasberg (D.D.C.) today in John “Farshid Do” v. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps:

Plaintiff is a naturalized citizen who has resided in the United States for over four decades since fleeing Iran. He, along with his family, was allegedly targeted by the Islamic Republic of Iran because of his father’s role as a high-ranking official in the previous regime. He brings this action [under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act] against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Ministry of Intelligence and Security of the Islamic Republic of Iran (MOIS), and officials and agents of both groups, alleging that Defendants tortured him during his imprisonment in Iran and have continued to subject him to “an ongoing campaign of harassment, surveillance, and physical attacks.” …

Fearful that disclosure of his identity would subject him and his family to “physical harm, retaliation, and threats to personal safety,” he moved to proceed pseudonymously. The Court denied Plaintiff’s initial Motion as it did not explain why pseudonymity was warranted where the risk of retaliatory harm stemmed only from Defendants, who would have access to his identity. Plaintiff has now renewed his Motion, elaborating on the harm from others that could arise if his identity were publicly disclosed in connection with this lawsuit. The Court will grant the Motion, subject to any further consideration by the United States District Judge to whom this case is randomly assigned….

Generally, a complaint must identify the plaintiffs. This identification requirement reflects the “presumption in favor of disclosure [of litigants’ identities], which stems from the ‘general public interest in the openness of governmental processes,’ and, more specifically, from the tradition of open judicial proceedings.” …

At this initial stage, Plaintiff has met his burden to show that his privacy and safety interests outweigh the public’s presumptive and substantial interest in learning his identity.

First, as the Complaint makes clear, Plaintiff does not seek to proceed under a pseudonym “merely to avoid the annoyance and criticism that may attend any litigation,” but rather to “preserve privacy in a matter of [a] sensitive and highly personal nature.” Relevant here, privacy can include “maintaining [his] and [his] family members’ safety.” In his Complaint, Plaintiff describes the violence and harassment he and his family have faced over the past few decades and could continue to face if his identity were made public. Plaintiff also alleges that his siblings were arrested and tortured, and that his father was targeted for extrajudicial killing.

He further explains that this risk of harm is not just from Defendants, but also from third-party proxies, who have a history of attempting to carry out Defendants’ aims on American soil. To be fair, many instances Plaintiff highlights concern third parties’ acting at the specific direction of Defendants, who will know Plaintiff’s identity through this litigation. That same pattern could play out here.

Plaintiff, however, also demonstrates that there is a potential risk from sleeper cells, lone wolves, or other third-party criminal proxies, who might seek to harm Plaintiff on their own accord. The pleadings thus demonstrate—at this initial stage—that Plaintiff’s interest is not in merely avoiding annoyance or criticism, but rather in preserving privacy to protect his and his family’s safety from third-party proxies….

“[A]nonymous litigation is [also] more acceptable when the defendant is a governmental body because government defendants do not share the concerns about reputation that private individuals have when they are publicly charged with wrongdoing.” Here, Plaintiff has sued foreign governmental actors, not private litigants. Furthermore, Plaintiff has filed this case “seek[ing] to vindicate [his] rights[,] … and anonymity appears to be necessary to provide [him] the opportunity to do so.” Finally, “there is nothing about the nature of these proceedings that creates any need for transparency with respect to the plaintiff[‘s] identit[y] or address[].” …

{Defendants [also] do not face a risk of unfairness.} Plaintiff has offered to disclose “[his] identity through counsel and discovery, subject to appropriate protective orders,” if Defendants show up to litigate. In addition, Defendants remain free to request any further information they deem necessary to the full and fair defense of this case or ask the Court to reconsider this decision.

Finally, the Court highlights that this an initial decision to permit Plaintiff to proceed pseudonymously. In the (unlikely) scenario where Defendants appear to defend this suit, the balance of factors might tip the other way. See John Doe I, John Doe II, & John Doe III v. Sabeti (M.D. Fla. 2025) (reconsidering initial grant to proceed pseudonymously in Torture Victim Protection Act case upon defendant appearance)….

Note that the “Do” in the caption of the case appears to be a typo for “Doe,” but I expect that the citation for the opinion will indeed be Do v. … rather than Doe v. ….