Interesting “Hate Crime” Opinion

Various laws are described as providing higher punishment for hate crimes, but they generally don’t focus on whether the defendant hated people with a particular identity. Rather, they focus on whether the defendant committed the crime at least in part because of the target’s identity. Often that will stem from hatred or other identity-based hostility, but not always. An excerpt from the long U.S. v. Ritter, decided last week by the Fourth Circuit (in an opinion by Judge Julius Richardson, joined by Judges Robert King and Pamela Harris), offers a good illustration:

Defendant Daqua Ritter grew up in rural Allendale, South Carolina. Though he later moved away, he often returned there during summers. During his visits, he maintained a sexual relationship with victim Ernest “Dime” Doe—a “biological male” who “presented as a female.”

While Doe openly referred to Ritter as Doe’s “man” or “boyfriend,” Ritter tried to keep the relationship secret. He often told Doe to delete their messages. And Ritter became angry whenever people brought up his relationship with Doe, stating on several occasions that he would beat Doe when others brought up their sexual relationship. Though Doe feared Ritter, their relationship continued.

When Doe was found shot dead in a car beside a rural road, rumors implicating Ritter quickly surfaced. Just hours earlier, Doe had been pulled over for speeding while Ritter was in the passenger seat. That stop was the last time that Doe was seen alive. Hours later, Doe was dead. And Ritter then showed up at his uncle’s house—blocks away from the crime scene—asking for a ride into town. Before long, Ritter asked friends to dispose of his gun and burned his clothes in a barrel. This initiated a years-long investigation conducted by state and federal law enforcement.

A federal grand jury eventually indicted Ritter for [among other things] willfully causing bodily injury to Doe because of Doe’s gender identity …. A jury convicted Ritter on all counts, and the district court sentenced him to life in prison….

Ritter … argu[es] that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he killed Doe “because of” Doe’s “actual or perceived … gender identity.” … [W]hat does it mean for somebody to act “because of” a given trait? … “[B]ecause of” incorporates “the traditional but-for causation standard.” … So the government had to show that Ritter would not have killed Doe but for Doe’s “actual or perceived … gender identity.” The statute defines “gender identity” as “actual or perceived gender-related characteristics.” …

[T]he evidence—viewed in the light most favorable to the government—was sufficient to lead a rational juror to conclude that Ritter killed Doe because of one of Doe’s perceived gender-related characteristics: Doe’s biological sex.

The evidence showed that the broader Allendale community knew that Doe was a biological male who presented as a woman. Ritter was very sensitive about people finding out that he was in a relationship with Doe, because Ritter didn’t want people questioning his sexuality. So Ritter pressured Doe to keep their relationship secret, including by asking Doe to delete the messages they exchanged.

Despite Ritter’s secrecy, several people eventually found out about their relationship. As a result, one person called Ritter a “faggot,” while another thought that Ritter “must be” gay. When others brought up their relationship, Ritter repeatedly became angry and said that he would “beat” Doe. Thus, Ritter treated his relationship with Doe very differently than his relationships with biological women, which he openly discussed.

The evidence here was sufficient for a rational juror to find that Ritter killed Doe because Doe was a biological male. The evidence suggests that Ritter was motivated in large part by Doe’s desire to publicize their relationship. In other words, one but-for cause of Ritter’s decision to murder Doe was Doe’s indiscretion.

But the evidence also supports a jury finding that Ritter would not have killed a biological female who was similarly public about their relationship. Whereas Ritter was open about his prior relationships with biological females, he was secretive about his relationship with Doe. And Ritter expressed anger with Doe when Doe wasn’t sufficiently discreet. From this evidence, a reasonable juror could conclude that Ritter wouldn’t have killed Doe “but for” the fact that Doe was a biological male. Because biological sex is a “gender-related characteristic,” there was sufficient evidence to find that Ritter killed Doe “because of” Doe’s “gender identity.” …

There was also another twist: One of the jurors, Juror 71, was also trans, and later approached newspapers about the case and was quoted in ways related to the trans issues in the case. Here’s the court’s discussion:

Ritter claims that Juror 71—a transgender woman—was biased against Ritter. The claim turns on what Juror 71 said and did after the verdict.

During jury selection, Juror 71 voluntarily disclosed to the court: “I am trans. And I just didn’t want that to become an issue. I personally don’t think it would affect my decision one way or the other, but I’ll leave that up to you.” See also id. (answering “no” to the question: “would your identity as transgender prevent you from rendering a verdict in this case based solely on the evidence that you see in this courtroom and the law as I give it to you?”). Neither party asked any follow-up questions, and Juror 71 was eventually selected to serve as the jury’s foreperson.

Shortly after returning the verdict, Juror 71 contacted the press about the trial. One newspaper quoted Juror 71 as saying, “In my personal experience, it can be dangerous for transgender women to date,” and that transgender people “are everywhere. If one of us goes down, there’ll be another one of us on the jury.” Juror 71 told another newspaper, “I wish I had this great angle to give you as a reporter, that my gender identity weighed on this heavily and I saw myself in the victim, but honestly, it didn’t. I followed the evidence and law and followed the judge’s instructions and did what was asked of me and came to that conclusion.”

After these articles went live, the district court held an evidentiary hearing. The court asked many questions of Juror 71, who affirmed that no past experience affected Juror 71’s ability to fairly consider the evidence. The court found Juror 71 credible in the jury “questionnaire, during jury selection, at sidebar, and on numerous occasions at the post-trial hearing.” The court found that Juror 71’s statements to the press did not contradict the juror’s oath of impartiality.

On appeal, Ritter argues that Juror 71’s post-trial actions suffice to show actual bias. Actual bias exists only when a juror cannot or will not decide the case solely on the evidence. The district court observed Juror 71’s demeanor, posed probing questions, and found the juror both credible and impartial. We reverse such credibility findings only for “manifest error.” None exists here.

David N. Goldman argued on behalf of the government.