Google Missed Key Deadline in Suit Alleging Google’s AI Libeled Business, Court Holds

From the decision Friday in LTL LED, LLC v. Google LLC.

The Constitution gives federal courts jurisdiction over lawsuits “between Citizens of different States,” in order to diminish the risk that state courts will favor their own citizens. But the Constitution also lets Congress limit this so-called “diversity jurisdiction.” Congress has indeed done so, by providing that the jurisdiction extends only to cases in which more than $75,000 is at stake. And Congress has set certain procedural rules, including as to the timing of when a suit filed in state court can be removed to federal court.

Last year, Google was sued in Minnesota state court by a local solar panel installation company that claimed Google’s AI Overviews hallucinated false and defamatory statements about the company (see more here). The Complaint claims that none of the sites linked to by the report actually reported that Wolf River had ever faced a Minnesota AG lawsuit, or was otherwise sued for the alleged misconduct. According to the Complaint,

Google cited numerous sources in support of its false assertions; however, none of the referenced materials in fact contained the information Google claimed they did.

The Complaint also alleges specific lost business, to the tune of many hundreds of thousands of dollars, e.g.,

On March 5, 2025, a customer of Wolf River, identified by contract number YKUFU-AH78H-PMNDF-K3C7V, contacted Wolf River and expressed concerns because of the publications on Google alleging Wolf River was being sued for misleading customers about cost savings, using high-pressure tactics, and tricking homeowners into signing binding contracts with hidden fees…. Despite the CEO of Wolf River reassuring this customer that the publications by Google are false, this customer chose to terminate the relationship with Wolf River because of Google….. The total contract price was $150,000.00.

Unlike some past cases of this sort (which I call Large Libel Models cases), the plaintiff appears not to be a public figure, and appears to have evidence of tangible economic losses. That makes its case considerably stronger.

Unsurprisingly, Google wanted to remove the case to federal court: It’s conventionally thought that many large corporate defendants prefer to have their cases litigated in federal court, partly to diminish the risk of home-town bias in state courts, and partly because “federal judges are known for being more likely than state court judges to dismiss an action, particularly on procedural grounds.” And because of the amount at stake and diversity of citizenship, Google was entitled to such removal.

But only if it was asked for in time, and Friday’s decision by Judge Jeffrey Bryan in LTL LED, LLC [Wolf River Electric] v. Google LLC (D. Minn.), said Google had filed the notice of removal too late:

On March 14, 2025, Plaintiffs served the Complaint and Summons on Google. Included with the Complaint and Summons was a letter stating that Plaintiffs had “suffered $24.7 million in damages in 2024 due to Google’s defamation.” On June 3, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their initial disclosures, which stated that their damages were estimated to range from approximately $110 million to $210 million. On June 9, 2025, Google filed a Notice of Removal….

The relevant deadline for removal is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3):

[I]f the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.

“Settlement demands and other documents that include information from which the defendant should have ascertained that removability was possible constitute ‘other paper’ under § 1446(b)(3).” Repco Inc. v. Flexan, LLC (D. Minn. 2019)….

In this case, Plaintiffs’ March 2025 letter … constitutes “other paper” from which Google should have ascertained that removability was possible. Google was therefore on notice as of March 14, 2025, that the amount in controversy exceeded the jurisdictional requirement. However, Google did not remove the case until June 9, 2025, long after the thirty-day removal period had expired.

To support its argument that removal was timely, Google cites Gibson v. Clean Harbors Environmental Services, Inc. (8th Cir. 2016), but Gibson is distinguishable. Gibson involved the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), which requires an amount in controversy of $5,000,000. In Gibson, the plaintiffs sent a letter that “recommend[ed] a total payment of $6,500,000 to resolve the case.” The Eighth Circuit determined that this letter “did not specifically and unambiguously state … that respondents were now seeking to recover that amount in damages or that they would definitively and finally settle the matter for the recommended sum.”

Here, by contrast, Plaintiffs’ settlement letter states explicitly that they “suffered $24.7 million in damages in 2024 due to Google’s defamation” and that they “suffered a clear, quantifiable financial loss directly attributable to Google’s defamation, totaling $24.7 million.” The letter further states that Plaintiffs are “entitled to not only the actual damages discussed above but also [are] entitled to presumed general damages without requiring proof of specific financial harm.” Because Plaintiffs’ letter specifically and unambiguously stated that it was seeking at least $24.7 million in damages—far above the $75,000 requirement—Google was on notice that the case was removable when it received the letter on March 14, 2025. Google’s Notice of Removal was therefore untimely, and this matter must be remanded.

In addition, Google argues its Notice of Removal was timely because the Complaint failed to allege LTL LED, LLC’s citizenship. However, the parties do not dispute that diversity of citizenship has always existed. Neither Google’s original nor its amended Notice of Removal changes the fact that diversity of citizenship has always existed. Furthermore, Google’s original Notice of Removal made no assertions that it had only recently ascertained Plaintiffs’ citizenship. Google’s original Notice of Removal simply assumed—correctly—that complete diversity existed. More substantively, Google does not explain how the incomplete citizenship allegation in the Complaint affected the timing of filing its Notice of Removal. Google’s Motion to Amend is therefore denied.

Ruh-roh, as the philosopher said.

Benjamin Hamborg and Court Anderson (Henson & Efron, PA) represent plaintiffs.