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Wednesday, February 11
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CPJ: Cuba’s detention of content producers stifles access to information 

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CPJ: Cuba’s detention of content producers stifles access to information 

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Miami, February 10, 2026 — The Committee to Protect Journalists condemns the detention of two content producers with El 4tico, a social media outlet in eastern Cuba, and calls on authorities to immediately release them and allow the free flow of information on the island.

Ernesto Ricardo Medina and Kamil Zayas Pérez were detained by police in the city of Holguín on February 6, according to their friends, a video recording of the incident, and an El4tico report. During the arrest, agents took computers, phones, cameras, and equipment that Medina and Pérez used to “record and document their work,” which included documentation of local life as well as activism.

Friends of Medina and Pérez said that their whereabouts are unknown and that they are not aware of any charges filed against the pair.

The two men built a popular following on social media by recording short satirical videos about daily life and their frustration with the government, according to Yoani Sanchez, founder of 14y Medio. She noted that El 4tico has gained thousands of followers in eastern Cuba, where news is scarce.

“In a country where independent media is scarce and frequently suppressed, content creators like Ernesto Ricardo Medina and Kamil Zayas Pérez play an important role in informing the public,” said CPJ U.S., Canada, and Caribbean Program Coordinator Katherine Jacobsen. “Cuban authorities should release them without delay and allow the free flow of information in the country.”

“[Authorities] are not arresting me for theft, assault, drug trafficking, or any common crime,” Zayas wrote in a message written before his arrest and released on Saturday. “They are arresting me for the only ‘crime’ that a dictatorship cannot tolerate: daring to look them in the eye and say aloud what we all notice: their egregious failures, their chronic inefficiencies, their systematic injustices, and the oppression that crushes the dignity of an entire people,” he said. 

Cuban authorities did not respond to CPJ’s request for information about Medina and Pérez’s whereabouts via WhatsApp.



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