California Appeals Court Upholds Trial Court Order That Cited Hallucinated Cases

In Torres Campos v. Munoz, decided Thursday by the California Court of Appeal (Justice Martin Buchanan, joined by Justices Joan Irion and Truc Do), an ex-husband (Torres) had asked for shared custody and visitation rights to the family dog (Kyra, for the curious). The ex-wife (Munoz) was represented for free by her cousin (Bonar).

Bonar began by writing a letter declining Torres’s request, citing two cases that ultimately proved to be nonexistent. When Torres went to court, Bonar filed an opposition with an attached declaration by Munoz, which cited one of the fictional cases. Torres’s lawyer filed a reply declaration saying nothing about the case being fictional.

“The parties stipulated to have a court commissioner act as a temporary judge to hear the matter.” That commissioner “made no visitation orders and directed Torres’s counsel to submit a formal order after hearing”; that formal order was apparently supposed to be based on what went on at the hearing. (Requiring parties to submit such proposed orders summarizing the court’s decision is pretty common in some trial court proceedings.) Then,

Torres’s counsel submitted a proposed Findings and Order After Hearing, which the court approved as conforming to its oral ruling. The order cited the fictional Twigg and Teegarden cases as follows:

“The Court notes the follow[ing] cases: Marriage of Twigg (1984) 34 Cal.3d 926 and Marriage of Teegarden (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1572 [(Teegarden)], in which the Court has to take the well-being and stability of the parties involved when deciding pet visitation and custody. Based on the testimony of Ms. Munoz and her mental state as it relates to the parties[‘] relationship, the Court finds it is not in the best interests of the parties[‘] mental stability for them to continue to interact with each other, and thus denies pet Custody.

“The Court further finds there is not a substantial relationship between Petitioner and the dog, Kyra, based on the lack of visitation in the past year.”

Torres appealed, and in a motion before the briefs were filed, Bonar again cited the nonexistent cases. Only after that did Torres’s lawyer “point[] out for the first time that the Twigg and Teegarden authorities cited in the court’s order and in Munoz’s opposition to the first motion to reinstate the appeal did not exist and were ‘invented case law.'”

After that,

Bonar filed another opposition on behalf of Munoz. The opposition stated: “Appellant’s Claim of Fabricated Case Law is Baseless.” It asserted: “This is a grave accusation, but it is entirely unfounded and reflects Appellant’s own failure to conduct basic legal research. Both cases are valid, published precedents, and Appellant’s inability to locate them underscores the incompetence that led to his appeal’s dismissal.” Bonar’s opposition purported to provide additional citation information for Twigg and Teegarden and elaborated on these two cases as follows:

“A. Marriage of Twigg (1984) 34 Cal.3d 926: This is a legitimate California Supreme Court case, reported at 34 Cal.3d 926, 195 Cal.Rptr. 718, 670 P.2d 340, decided on July 5, 1984. The ruling addresses custody determinations in dissolution proceedings, emphasizing the importance of the emotional well-being and stability of the parties involved. In Twigg, the Supreme Court held that courts must consider factors like mental health and relational dynamics when making custody decisions, reversing a lower court for failing to adequately weigh these elements. The trial court in this case cited Twigg to support its finding that ongoing interaction between the parties would harm Respondent’s mental stability due to Appellant’s history of harassment. Appellant’s claim that this case does not exist is a misrepresentation, likely stemming from inadequate database searches or unfamiliarity with standard legal reporters. Such an error by Appellant’s counsel does not invalidate the trial court’s reliance on this established precedent.

“B. Marriage of Teegarden (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1572: While the year and volume citation appears erroneous, it is in fact a typographical mistake on counsel’s part. In re Marriage of Teegarden (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 401, 226 Cal.Rptr. 417, decided on May 22, 1986, by the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three. In Teegarden, the court reversed a denial of spousal support, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by denying a continuance due to the husband’s illness (lupus) and failing to properly consider evidence of his disability and need for support. The ruling stressed the importance of stability, emotional well-being, and a fair evidentiary record in family law disputes. The trial court here cited Teegarden (under the mistaken 1995 reference) to reinforce its emphasis on the parties’ mental stability and the need to protect Respondent from further distress. Appellant’s assertion that no such case or parties exist is incorrect; a simple search for ‘Teegarden marriage California’ reveals the 1986 decision involving Anne and Byron Teegarden. This misrepresentation not only fails to prove misconduct but exposes Appellant’s counsel’s deficient preparation, which mirrors the neglect that caused the default.”

The opposition went on to assert: “Appellant’s accusation of professional misconduct is thus not only meritless but borders on frivolous. Respondent’s counsel relied on established precedents, and a minor citation error[ ] does not constitute fabrication or a breach of duty ….”

The new information Bonar provided about Twigg in Munoz’s opposition, i.e., the parallel reporter citations (“195 Cal.Rptr. 718, 670 P.2d 340”) and the date of decision (“decided on July 5, 1984”), was also fictitious. Neither of these parallel citations is to a Twigg case and no California case by that name was decided on July 5, 1984. Moreover, the parallel reporter citations do not correspond to the “34 Cal.3d 926” citation Bonar provided for Twigg….

[W]e … directed Bonar to provide us with a copy of the Twigg decision taken from an official reporter and copies of any brief filed in superior court that cited Twigg or Teegarden.

In response, Bonar admitted for the first time that the Twigg case did not exist. She claimed the Twigg citation “entered the record from two sources”: (1) her client’s declaration in opposition to the RFO petition; and (2) the trial court’s order denying the RFO. Bonar asserted she could “not recall whether the [Twigg or Teegarden] case[s] were ever argued” at the hearing in the family court. She admitted she had failed to verify the Twigg citation before citing it in this court. According to Bonar, she “mistakenly assumed that, because these materials were part of the Superior Court’s official record, the citations had already been vetted and could be relied upon as accurate.”

Bonar did not submit any declaration of her own, but she submitted one from her client Munoz. Munoz explained that the Twigg case was discussed in a Reddit article a paralegal friend had sent her, and Munoz did not realize the case was fictitious. The Reddit article was attached as an exhibit to Munoz’s declaration. It was authored by “Sassafras Patterdale,” who was identified as “a blogger, podcaster, and animal rescuer, who writes about divorce, custody, and the messy, beautiful lives we weave.” The article was about pet custody battles. It cited “Marriage of Twigg (1984) 34 Cal.3d 926” as a “watershed” California Supreme Court case holding “that custody determinations must consider the emotional well, being [sic] and stability of the parties.”

The Reddit article did not include the parallel reporter citations and date of decision for Twigg that were included in Bonar’s opposition to the second motion to reinstate the appeal. Neither Bonar’s response to our order nor Munoz’s declaration explained where this additional fictitious information came from.

We issued an order to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed against Bonar for citing and relying on fictitious authority in her oppositions to the motions to reinstate the appeal and providing additional fictitious citations for the Twigg case from the California Reporter and Pacific Reporter and a fictitious date of decision in her opposition to the second motion to reinstate this appeal.

In her response to the order to show cause, Bonar argued she should not be sanctioned because she did not act with any intent to deceive and the error caused no prejudice. She asserted that “the reference to Marriage of Twigg came from an article shared with me by my cousin, … Munoz, … during a family dinner discussion…. The article was read in front of family members and I genuinely believed it when it was presented.” She asserted that “[t]he same citation later appeared in the [FOAH] drafted by [Torres]’s counsel at the trial court’s direction.” Bonar explained, “I genuinely thought I had to defend the trial court’s order as written, including its citations, and was mistaken in not verifying them independently.” She also asserted that she “did not persist in defending the authority once its nonexistence was confirmed.”

Although our order to show cause explicitly referred to the additional fictitious citations for the Twigg case and the fictitious date of decision contained in Bonar’s opposition …, her response still did not explain where this information came from. At oral argument, Bonar claimed she could not remember where this additional fictitious citation information came from. She acknowledged she did not have a paid subscription to a legal research service at the time, and she was using other online resources including AI for this purpose. She also conceded she may have obtained fictitious information about Twigg and Teegarden using AI tools….

The court sanctioned Bonar $5000, and reported her to the state bar (and also ordered her to self-report). But it affirmed the decision below:

We agree the court erred by citing and relying in material part on fictional cases in its written order. We conclude, however, that Torres forfeited this claim by drafting and submitting the very order containing these fabricated citations and doing so without calling the court’s attention to the error or asserting any objection to its reliance on them….

Although Munoz and Bonar were responsible for improperly citing these fictitious authorities in the first place, Torres’s own counsel affirmatively drafted and submitted the proposed order with these citations that was ultimately signed by the family court. And even though his own counsel drafted the order, Torres failed to object to the court’s reliance on these citations or call the court’s attention to the issue. The forfeiture rule applies to a party’s failure to object to the language of a proposed order when it had an opportunity to do so….

We deem it particularly significant that Torres’s counsel herself had a duty to verify the citations she included in the proposed order. An attorney submitting any document to a court has an obligation to verify the citations contained in it…. It is particularly important for an attorney to verify the citations contained in any proposed order submitted for signature by the court. Notwithstanding Bonar’s own misconduct in citing these nonexistent authorities, which we address later in this opinion, it was Torres’s counsel who ultimately prepared and submitted the proposed order without verifying the citations contained in it or alerting the court….