Court Issues Preliminary Injunction Requiring CNN, MS NOW, and Politico to Be Readmitted to White House

From Judge Timothy Kelly (D.D.C.) today in CNN, Inc. v. Trump:

On September 18, 2026, President Trump posted on social media that he was “proud to announce that, effective immediately,” he was “banning” CNN, MS NOW, and POLITICO “from the White House.” And sure enough, when reporters from those news organizations who hold “hard passes” allowing them to work there showed up the next day, they were denied entry. So Plaintiffs—these three news outlets and three individual hard pass holders who work for them—promptly sued the President and several Executive Branch officials, alleging that Defendants were violating their rights under the Fifth and First Amendments. They also moved for a temporary restraining order restoring their hard passes, which the Court granted. The Court found, under Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 130–31 (D.C. Cir. 1977) and subsequent precedent, that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claims that their hard passes were revoked without due process required under the Fifth Amendment, were likely to suffer irreparable harm without interim relief, and that the balance of the equities and the public interest tilted in their favor.

Now before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The Court will grant that motion as well, finding that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed not only on their due process claim, but also on their two First Amendment claims. Still, no one should interpret the Court’s decision to suggest that President Trump’s concerns about accuracy and fairness in the media’s reporting are unfounded, or that the government is powerless when its true aim is to protect national security when classified information is unlawfully disclosed. That said, for the reasons explained below, the Court will extend the relief it already ordered, which will continue to preserve the status quo while this case proceeds.

Unlike the decision granting the temporary restraining order, which was based only on plaintiffs’ Due Process Clause rights, this decision also rules in favor of plaintiffs on First Amendment grounds. An excerpt from the court’s conclusion that the Administration likely unconstitutionally retaliated against plaintiffs based on their speech:

“[T]he First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting individuals to retaliatory actions after the fact for having engaged in protected speech.” The government “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest in freedom of speech.” And even “ordinarily permissible exercise[s] of discretion may become a constitutional deprivation if performed in retaliation for the exercise of a First Amendment right.” …

[I]t is likely that President Trump’s revocation of Plaintiffs’ hard passes is the sort of action that would deter a reasonable reporter or news organization from publishing stories to which he objects. The revocation of Plaintiffs’ hard passes matters a lot as to how, whether, and to what extent they can do their jobs. As Plaintiffs attest, a hard pass is crucial to covering the White House because it allows reporters “immediate, unescorted access to the areas of the White House complex designated for the press.” Without hard passes, Plaintiffs would miss the newsworthy events that often happen at the White House with “little or no notice.” Indeed, the effect on Plaintiffs’ ability to do their jobs is so significant that in Sherrill and Karem [the key D.C. Circuit precedents as to hard passes and the Due Process Clause] the D.C. Circuit characterized the loss of a hard pass without adequate process as implicating a separate constitutional interest. And if a one-month suspension from the White House grounds is “an eon in today’s news business,” then it is likely that the open-ended ban here would chill a reporter’s work.

President Trump’s own comments suggest that he intended the revocation of Plaintiffs’ hard passes to alter their reporting on him, bolstering the case that his action here is sufficient to deter a reporter of ordinary firmness from reporting in the same way she had before. After explaining that he excluded Plaintiffs from the White House because they “purposely write negative news … to try and diminish the Republicans and a Republican administration,” President Trump remarked that he is prepared to take “the ban … as far as you can,” but that he would “love it” if they “could straighten themselves out.” …

Defendants also rely on an out-of-circuit case to argue that President Trump’s decision to revoke Plaintiffs’ hard passes and ban them from the White House grounds is insufficiently chilling to meet the second element of retaliation. In Baltimore Sun Co. v. Ehrlich (4th Cir. 2006), Maryland’s governor prohibited anyone in that state’s executive branch from speaking to a reporter and a columnist at a specific newspaper because his press office felt “that currently both are failing to objectively report on any issue dealing with [his] Administration.” The Fourth Circuit found the directive at issue—which “select[ed] among reporters when granting interviews or providing access to nonpublic information”—”a pervasive feature of journalism” and “so commonplace” that to allow a retaliation claim to proceed would “plant the seed of a constitutional case in virtually every interchange.” …

When President Trump first declared that he was “banning” Plaintiffs from the White House, he said he was doing so “as a result of their constant ‘reporting’ of ‘FAKE NEWS.'” He wrote that Plaintiffs “shouldn’t be able to constantly write or report FICTION and LIES when they’re covering the President of the United States, the Trump Administration, or the United States of America.” The next day, when asked about whether there was any “particular reason” for the ban, he responded: “No … it’s really just cumulative stories over the last two years…. [T]hey purposely write negative news. And they do that because they want to try and diminish the Republicans and a Republican administration. And honestly, we’ve done a fantastic job. Look at the numbers, look at the economic numbers. We have more money coming into our country today than ever before.” His posts on September 21 also focused on “Fake News,” and how Plaintiffs had “trivialize[d]” and “demean[ed]” his accomplishments, including that he had won re-election in a “LANDSLIDE.” His subsequent comments about the ban, including his interview with Time Magazine, again focused on his view that Plaintiffs had failed to give him proper credit for his achievements, including winning re-election in 2024. “If I do the finest thing, if I found the cure to cancer, they would say, ‘Why didn’t he move quicker?” …

Defendants respond by arguing that, notwithstanding President Trump’s other grievances with them, Plaintiffs have failed to show causation because President Trump or some other official “would have reached the same decision … even in the absence of the protected conduct.” Defendants argue that their “alternative ground” for revoking Plaintiffs hard passes is Plaintiffs’ failure to “maintain minimum professional journalistic standards by publishing classified and national security information.” …

[But f]irst, there is no evidence in the record that President Trump made the decision to revoke Plaintiffs’ hard passes on national security grounds from the get-go, nor at any time has he directly stated that national security was the reason for his decision. When he announced the ban with his post on September 18, he did not mention national security. When he was asked later that day about the “particular reason” for his action, he did not mention national security. And while it is true, days later, that he used the phrase “national security” in subsequent social media posts about the ban, that expression appears to have been simply another way for him to describe Plaintiffs’ alleged inaccuracies and unfairness in their reporting about topics like his achievements or electoral success. All this suggests that “national security” was merely a post-hoc justification for the decision, which greatly undermines the idea that President Trump “would have”—not “could have”—taken the same action in the absence of Plaintiffs’ protected speech, even if it is not dispositive on that point.

Second, Defendants point to the September 22 letters sent to Plaintiffs as evidence that President Trump or another official would have taken the same action for national security reasons, even apart from Plaintiffs’ protected speech. Those letters, sent four days after the ban was announced, lay out a case for revoking Plaintiffs’ hard passes based on alleged violations of “the standards of professionalism and decorum expected of those given access to the White House Complex,” including “trafficking in verifiable falsehoods about national security and other issues,” and “publishing sensitive or classified information.” But the letters hardly move the needle on this point. The letters appear to conflate concerns about otherwise protected speech (“trafficking in verifiable falsehoods about … other issues”) with national security concerns….

Third, Defendants try to make their case with each of the September 22 letters’ “non-exhaustive list of reporting incidents,” associated with each news organization, “including those that have threatened national security and/or spread falsehoods.” They also rely on the Declaration of Kingsley Wilson, Press Secretary for the Department of Defense, now also known as the Department of War. These too come up short for Defendants’ purposes.

In the Declaration, Wilson lays out how the publication of classified and sensitive information can undermine national security. She describes how the Department of War decided to make a change in how reporters access the Pentagon to try to combat the publication of such information. She also describes how, in her view, that policy—whatever its details (they are never spelled out)—has been successful. The problem is that Wilson’s declaration says little to nothing about President Trump’s decision to revoke Plaintiffs’ hard passes, or anything about White House press practices or operations. Wilson states that “it is reasonable” to expect similar results from the White House’s implementation of a similar policy, but she does not purport to know much about the White House or the President’s decision here. Thus, it matters little that even if, after discussions with people who work there, she thinks that the decision “would be effective in reducing the amount of information that is published that undermines national security.” She also attests—in conclusory fashion—that based on three reporting incidents memorialized in the September 22 letters, the three media organizations here have demonstrated a “willingness” to publish sensitive information relating to national security—and more specifically, the security of the White House, the President, and other senior officials. But she offers no further specifics.

Viewed in light of the whole record, neither the September 22 letters nor the Wilson Declaration suggest that President Trump would have revoked Plaintiffs’ hard passes and banned them from the White House even in the absence of the sort of reporting about him that he criticized when he announced the ban. They do not suggest that a ban based on national security concerns was in the works before President Trump made his announcement.

The “reporting incidents” described in the letters stretch as far back as a year and a half. And to repeat, one of the reporters here had her hard pass renewed six months after publishing a story in January 2026 titled “Inside Plans to Rebuild the ‘Top-Secret’ Bunker Beneath the White House East Wing.” Moreover, even accepting Defendants’ claims that these incidents damaged national security in some way—a proposition that, as discussed below, they have not really tried to support with evidence here—such reporting is commonplace, for better or worse. Finally, it seems likely that if President Trump or another official would have banned Plaintiffs from the White House even in the absence of their protected speech, Defendants would not have had to scramble to make their case with unsigned letters and a declarant who does not even work there.

As the Supreme Court explained in considering the government’s explanation in a different context, the Court is “not required to exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary citizens are free.” Freed from such a naiveté, it is not hard to conclude that President Trump likely banned Plaintiffs from the White House because he believes that their reporting is generally inaccurate and biased against him. For that reason, all told, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their First Amendment retaliation claim.

And for similar reasons, the court also concluded that the Administration’s actions were likely unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination in a nonpublic forum (a conclusion that is consistent, I think, with the D.C. Circuit’s precedents on the matter):

For all the reasons explained elsewhere, it is likely that Plaintiffs were selected by President Trump for revocation of their access to the White House press area because he believes their coverage of him and his administration is generally inaccurate and biased—in other words, it was “an effort to suppress the speaker’s activity due to disagreement with the speaker’s view”—rather than to vindicate any other purportedly “compelling governmental interest,” including maintaining professional standards for journalists or protecting national security.

Ted Boutrous, Katie Townsend, Patrick J. Fuster, Connor S. Sullivan, and Connor P. Mui  (Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP) represent the media.