Salman Rushdie Attempted Murder Case: Court Upholds Jury Verdict …

Considering all the evidence presented at trial, a properly-instructed jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Matar attempted to provide himself, as “personnel,” and his conduct, as a “service,” to Hizballah…. [T]he jury, considering the evidence presented at trial, reasonably determined such evidence to be sufficient to establish: (1) that Matar, in repeatedly stabbing and attempting to murder Rushdie, provided personnel and services to Hizballah; and (2) that at the time he committed such acts, Matar was acting at the direction Hizballah, by attempting to fulfill the fatwa—which was originally issued by the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini, and was subsequently endorsed, in 2006, by Hassan Nasrallah, then-Secretary General of Hizballah, and again, in 2017, by the Ayatollah Khomeini’s successor, Ayatollah Khamenei—calling for Rushdie’s murder. This Court sees no reason to disturb that conclusion.

{At trial, the Government introduced expert testimony from Dr. Matthew Levitt, which established, [among other things], that Hizballah functions as a proxy organization for the Iranian government. Levitt further testified that Nasrallah’s 2006 speech endorsing the Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa involving Rushdie, which was broadcast over Al Manar, Hizballah’s satellite television network, was a “call to action.” As described previously, Matar included the videotape broadcast of Nasrallah’s 2006 speech in a couple of videos that he produced prior to attacking Rushdie.}  …

To prove that Matar attempted to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization by providing himself as “personnel,” the Government must prove that Matar “attempted … to work under [the] foreign terrorist organization’s direction or control or to organize, manage, supervise, or otherwise direct the operation of that organization.” Put differently, “[i]ndividuals who act entirely independently of the foreign terrorist organization to advance its goals or objectives shall not be considered to be working under the foreign terrorist organization’s direction and control.” …

The Government’s trial evidence reasonably established that in attacking Rushdie as he did, Matar was attempting to execute a very specific directive issued by the Ayatollah Khomeini and endorsed by Hizballah. Unlike the ISIS video watched by Ullah which “urged supporters to commit attacks against America,” Defendant endeavored to do precisely that which was commanded by the [Khomeini] fatwa [against Rushdie] and sought to kill a specific individual for a specific reason. Cf. Ullah (“The videos that [Ullah] watched that were issued by ISIS did not ‘order’ or ‘command’ him to do anything under any common understanding of those terms. Nor did they provide ‘guidance or supervision of action, conduct, or operation’—since they were silent on specifics.”).

Indeed, to the extent that Matar himself created what may fairly be characterized as promotional videos which included Hizballah Secretary General Nasrallah’s endorsement and affirmation of the very specific fatwa calling for Rushdie’s death, a reasonable jury could find that Matar’s subsequent actions in stabbing and attempting to kill Rushdie were undertaken at Nasrallah’s direction and command and Matar’s conduct represented his effort to fulfill such directive, command, and order.

The Court in Ullah also explained that to work “under” an FTO’s “direction” means that the FTO’s “direction” or “control” must cause a defendant to “‘suffer[ ] restriction, constraint, or control.'” Here, the jury could reasonably have found that the existence of Hizballah’s fatwa against Rushdie was the only reason Matar did what he did.

Indeed, at trial, the government introduced evidence that Matar rejected a suggestion put forth to him by Kaymar in Iran [someone with whom Matar had been chatting online -EV] that consideration be given to killing another prominent American, because “Rushdie has fatwa longer” and “[The other prominent individual] doesn’t have fatwa.” In other words, the jury could reasonably have found that Matar’s behavior was, in fact, dictated, directed and controlled exclusively by the existence of the FTO-endorsed fatwa. Matar’s own words and actions suggest that the only reason he did what he did was because he was attempting to do what he believed the Nasrallah-endorsed fatwa directed and commanded him to do it.

Furthermore, a rational jury could also have found that Nasrallah’s speech provided “direction” because it ended by endorsing the concept of martyrdom. Dr. Levitt explained that martyrdom is a central part of Hizballah’s ability to recruit and retain its followers. And the jury was presented with overwhelming evidence establishing Matar’s expectation that in fulfilling the fatwa he would become a Hizballah martyr. In that regard, the evidence at trial established that: (1) Matar, at the time he committed the attack, possessed a fake driver’s license that contained references to several Hizballah martyrs, including Imad Mughniyah, who led Hizballah’s terrorist arm for many years; (2) Matar, on the morning of the attack in August, visited a website run by Hizballah and took screenshots of two martyrs who had died in the month of August; (3) Matar had a lockscreen on his phone which depicted another Hizballah martyr, Samir Kuntar; (4) Matar had a photo of Ahmed Kassir—Hizballah’s first martyr—on his bedroom wall; and (5) Matar sent his will to the Imam of his religious center several weeks before the attack, and he sent his will to another Imam two days before the attack.

For all of these reasons, this Court concludes that the evidence presented by the Government at trial was sufficient to allow a rational jury to find that Nasrallah’s 2006 speech guided or directed Hizballah’s supporters to carry out Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa on Rushdie, and that Matar, in attempting to carry out that fatwa on Hizballah’s behalf, was doing so “under” Hizballah’s “direction.” “‘[R]estrict[ed], constrain[ed], or control[ed],'” by the fatwa, Matar targeted Rushdie alone.

The fatwa and directive Matar received, and he was acting in furtherance of, was not a “hortatory, open-ended message.” Unlike the ISIS video the defendant watched in Ullah—which merely “urged” supporters to commit unspecified attacks against the fatwa endorsed by Nasrallah that Matar attempted to fulfill directed that a specific person be killed for a specific reason. Such directive “constrain[ed]” Matar in the precise manner required under Ullah….

The Court rejects Matar’s suggestion that the evidence was insufficient because the government failed to present any evidence: that Hizballah knew of Matar or his plan before the attack; that Hizballah communicated with Matar about the attack (or that the people with whom Matar did communicate were, in fact, members of Hizballah); that Matar reported to or sought approval from Hizballah; or that Hizballah exercised any constraint over whether, where, or how Matar acted. The law does not require such proof.

As the Court in Ullah observed, “[w]e do not hold that the ‘personnel'” prong only applies to ‘foreign fighters’ who travel abroad or submit to operational command structures.” Further the Court acknowledged, “[w]e do not hold that the statute specifically excludes certain types of directions, or directions disseminated through certain means like YouTube …. Instead, with an eye toward their content, we merely hold that the online videos at issue here [in Ullah] are not ‘directions’ at all, or at least do not demonstrate that Defendant acted ‘under” ISIS’s direction.'” Here, by contrast, Defendant attempted to do precisely that which the Hizballah-endorsed fatwa directed be done, to the person against whom it was directed, for the very reason directed….