Sean Combs (P. Diddy)’s Defamation Suit Can Go Forward (Including Against NewsNation)

From Judge John Cronan (S.D.N.Y.) today in Combs v. Mitchell:

Plaintiff Sean Combs is a well-known musician who uses the stage names Diddy, P. Diddy, and Puff Daddy. In September 2024, he was indicted in this District on charges of racketeering, sex trafficking, and transportation to engage in prostitution, and in July 2025, he was acquitted by a jury of racketeering and sex trafficking but convicted of transportation to engage in prostitution.

This case concerns statements made about Combs in the months between his indictment and his trial. Combs alleges that Defendant Courtney Burgess falsely claimed to possess video recordings of Combs sexually assaulting celebrities and minors. Additionally, Combs claims that Defendant Ariel Mitchell—an attorney who represented Burgess—vouched for Burgess’s accusations and made false statements of her own, including that a police report corroborated an accusation of rape against Combs and that Combs had used drug-laced baby oil to incapacitate his victims. Finally, Combs alleges that Defendant Nexstar Media Inc. (“Nexstar”) amplified these falsehoods by broadcasting them on the cable news channel NewsNation without any investigation and despite reason to doubt their truth….

Burgess hadn’t appeared to defend himself, so this opinion doesn’t discuss the claims against him. But the court threw out most but not all claims against Nexstar:

Combs’s defamation claim against Nexstar is based on four of the seven allegedly defamatory statements—Statements 1, 2, 4, and 5. Each of these statements arises from NewsNation’s broadcasting of statements made by Mitchell or by both Mitchell and Burgess. Statement 1 is Burgess’s assertion on October 31, 2024, that there existed video recordings of Combs sexually assaulting minors and celebrities, Statement 2 is Mitchell’s statement also on October 31 that Combs secretly recorded himself having sex with people who did not know they were being recorded, Statement 4 is Mitchell’s assertion on September 27, 2024, that a police report corroborated her client’s claim that Combs raped her [likely meaning “him,” which is to say Burgess] in 2018, and Statement 5 is Mitchell’s accusation on October 7, 2024, that Combs used drug-laced baby oil to incapacitate people.

As to Statements 1, 2, and 4, Combs has failed to plead plausible grounds to allow an inference of actual malice [i.e., knowing or reckless falsehood -EV] on the part of Nexstar. Where, as here, a publisher broadcasts the allegations of a third party, actual malice exists only “where there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports.” “Even highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers cannot alone establish actual malice.”

To be sure, Combs alleges that NewsNation “conducted no investigation,” did no “fact checking,” and never “reach[ed] out to Mr. Combs’s representatives for comment.” But a failure to investigate, standing alone, “is not sufficient to establish reckless disregard.” Similarly, although Combs alleges that NewsNation “profited” from broadcasting Mitchell’s statements by “drawing viewers,” a publisher’s “motive in publishing a story … cannot provide a sufficient basis for finding actual malice.” Even taking these two factors together is not enough to create a plausible inference of the “purposeful avoidance of the truth” that is required for actual malice at the pleading stage. If it were, then any profit-seeking news organization could face liability for its failure to investigate, contrary to the principle that a publisher is not “required to seek out contrary stories” to insulate itself from a finding of actual malice.

Combs also argues that Mitchell’s and Burgess’s lack of credibility should have been obvious to NewsNation. Combs alleges that Mitchell had a “documented history of making false claims against celebrities,” based in large part on the yet-unproven accusation that Mitchell engaged in witness tampering in an earlier lawsuit where Combs was initially named as a defendant. But the Amended Complaint does not allege that anyone at NewsNation responsible for the broadcasts actually knew of Mitchell’s history, and even if they did, an unproven accusation does not supply “obvious reasons” to believe that everything Mitchell said thereafter was false….

With regard to Statement 5, however, Combs has alleged facts that, in light of the relaxed standard at the pleading stage, allow a plausible inference that NewsNation acted with actual malice. The Amended Complaint alleges that Mitchell’s claims that baby oil may be used as a “conduit” for transmitting drugs “mixed into the oil” and that Combs had doused her client in drug-laced baby oil to “lower[] her defenses,” were so inherently improbable as to make broadcasting those claims reckless absent further investigation.

According to the Amended Complaint, “there is no scientific basis for asserting that baby oil could be infused with drugs to incapacitate anyone,” and in the view of the Court, it is plausible that anyone who heard such a claim would at the very least entertain serious doubts as to its accuracy—even if they might not know it to be false. Cf. Khawar v. Globe Int’l, Inc. (Cal. 1998) (sustaining a finding of actual malice against a tabloid that republished the “highly improbable claim” that a bystander, rather than Sirhan Sirhan, had assassinated Robert F. Kennedy)…. Of course, none of this is to say that Combs ultimately will prevail against Nexstar as to Statement 5, but for purposes of the present motion, his allegation of actual malice suffices to survive Rule 12(b)(6)….

And the court allowed Combs’s claims against Mitchell to proceed more broadly, based not just on Statement 5 but based on all four statements given above and also two others (“That Plaintiff used secretly recorded videos of him having sex with people who did not know they were being recorded in order to threaten or extort sexual partners” and “That Plaintiff sexually assaulted and/or threatened, exploited, or secretly recorded in sex acts ‘hundreds, maybe thousands of people'”). Here’s part of the analysis:

[A.] Mitchell argues that Combs has not alleged that she made statements of fact because her statements about her client’s police report and the “shopping around” of sex tapes are not “capable of being proven true or false,” all her comments “only follow[ed] statements by others,” and any statements that can be attributed solely to her were “pure opinion” or “rhetorical hyperbole.”

Mitchell’s argument misses the mark. Whether a particular police report corroborates an allegation of rape and whether a particular sex tape exists are clearly questions of fact that are “capable of being proven false.” Additionally, even if Mitchell was merely conveying Burgess’s account, it is a “black-letter rule that one who republishes a libel [or slander may be] subject to liability … even though he attributes the [defamatory] statement to the original publisher.”

Finally, Mitchell’s accusations that Combs sexually assaulted celebrities and minors, secretly recorded his sexual partners, used those recordings to extort people, drugged a woman with drug-laced baby oil, and victimized “hundreds, maybe thousands of people” are not inactionable opinion or hyperbole because they carry precise meanings that are readily understood. Nor would anything about the context of interviews on national news programs, in a documentary, and on the courthouse steps, delivered by an attorney professing firsthand familiarity with the evidence, “signal [to] … listeners that what is being … heard is [not] likely to be [a] fact.” …

[B.] Mitchell argues that her statements are shielded by New York’s common-law protections for statements made in the course of judicial proceedings and the fair report privilege codified in Section 74 of the New York Civil Rights Law…. [But, among other things], each of Mitchell’s statements were made to the media, and thus were not “words spoken in a judicial proceeding.” … [And], Mitchell’s statements were not a “fair and true report” of any official proceedings because Combs alleges that her statements “suggest[ed] more serious conduct than that actually suggested in [any] official proceeding.”

[C.] [As to actual malice,] Combs alleges that Mitchell repeatedly professed personal knowledge of evidence that did not exist and that she had no basis to believe existed…. [A]ctual malice may exist “where a story is fabricated by the defendant” or “is the product of his imagination” …. For example, Mitchell confirmed that she could “tell that the video [of Combs] is pornographic in nature,”, even though Combs alleges she “never possessed” any such video. She announced that “[w]e also have a police report,” even though it is alleged that “there is no police report.” She claimed to have done “research” showing that baby oil can transmit incapacitating drugs, even though she allegedly “performed no such research, and even if she had, there is no scientific basis for asserting that baby oil could be infused with drugs to incapacitate anyone.”

In fact, Mitchell herself contends that she “did not even know Burgess” at the time of her September 27, 2024 interview, which suggests that Mitchell lacked any basis whatsoever to believe in the truth of any of her statements during that interview. Assuming the truth of Combs’s allegations, as the Court must at this stage, he has plausibly pleaded actual malice by Mitchell. Simply put, a person cannot engage in this sort of “rootless speculation” and then try to hide behind the shield of actual malice.