Defendant’s Refusal to Identify Herself Leads to Recommended Default Judgment Against Her

From today’s Report and Recommendations by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Staffordt (E.D. Mich.) in yesterday’s Evans v. Robertson:

Plaintiff Sybrena Evans, proceeding pro se, sues Defendant Danielle Robertson … for copyright infringement, defamation, fraud, and harassment. {Robertson made a special appearance as a Jane Doe stating that “Danielle Robertson” is an online alias and not her legal name. For the sake of clarity, the Court will nevertheless refer to this individual as Robertson.}

Evans moved for an order requiring Robertson to show cause why she should not be held in contempt and sanctioned for disobeying two of Judge Levy’s orders to disclose her identity. The Court granted the motion and Robertson was ordered to show cause why she should not be sanctioned. Robertson responded that the Court should defer enforcement of Judge Levy’s orders until it resolves the viability of Evans’s claims.

“The orderly and expeditious administration of justice by the courts requires that an order issued by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and person must be obeyed by the parties until it is reversed by orderly and proper proceedings.” Because of this bedrock principle, Robertson should be sanctioned with a default judgment for her violations of Judge Levy’s orders….

Evans, a Michigan resident, alleges that Robertson engaged in a pervasive campaign of harassment and cyberbullying on her social media platforms and websites from 2022 to 2024. Robertson allegedly posted YouTube videos calling Robertson [perhaps meaning Evans? -EV] “Teddy Bundy” and falsely accusing her of stalking and other crimes. Evans also alleges that Robertson published deepfake pornography using Evans’s likeness. In a YouTube video, Robertson allegedly discussed Evans’s divorce and published documents from those proceedings, and encouraged her followers to likewise post content harassing Evans.

Posing as Evans’s family member, Robertson allegedly made several fraudulent calls to local police to report concerns about Evans’s mental health and animal cruelty. Officers then performed wellness checks on Evans and recorded her on bodycam. Evans claims that Robertson obtained the bodycam footage through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request and published content from the footage to YouTube and her websites.

Evans next alleges that Robertson conspired with an unnamed petitioner to obtain a personal protective order (PPO) against Evans, posted about a hearing on the PPO, and published the PPO on her website. Robertson then allegedly obtained content from the virtual PPO hearing that she published in a YouTube video.

In social media postings, Robertson allegedly accused Evans, a physician assistant, of being found guilty of medical malpractice. Evans claims that Robertson later reported her for professional misconduct to the Michigan’s Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs (LARA). One of the complaints was allegedly made by the PPO petitioner in coordination with Robertson, as Robertson posted about the complaint and published a letter from LARA on YouTube and her website.

Robertson also urged her social media followers to file anonymous complaints against Evans and provided links to the required forms on the LARA website…. And Evans claims that Robertson created a Change.org petition accusing Evans of unethical behavior and seeking to damage her professional reputation…. The unethical behavior Robertson alleged in the petition included stalking, “doxxing,” and cyberbullying. LARA informed Evans that no violations could be substantiated and closed the matters.

Evans has her own YouTube channels, “Unwinewithteddy” and “RunTellThatToo.” Robertson allegedly impersonated others to file hundreds of false copyright and privacy complaints with YouTube, claiming ownership of Evans’s content. YouTube terminated Evans’s accounts but later reinstated some videos after finding the claims invalid. Robertson also allegedly filed multiple copyright infringement claims against Evans with the Copyright Claims Board (CCB).

Three of Evans’s claims survived Robertson’s motion to dismiss:

(1) copyright infringement stemming from the use of Evans’s likeness;

(2) defamation stemming from Robertson’s alleged posts about Evans’s professional misconduct, false reports to police, and posts including bodycam footage; and

(3) cyberbullying and harassment stemming from Robertson’s posts about Evans’s divorce.

In September 2025, the Court considered several motions involving Robertson’s positions that she should be allowed to proceed anonymously and that the action should be dismissed because Evans failed to serve her properly or use her legal name. Finding that Robertson may not use her anonymity “simultaneously as a shield to protect her privacy and as a sword to undermine the litigation,” the Court ordered alternate service on Robertson’s email address and that Robertson disclose her legal name and postal address…. Robertson did not comply and instead moved for reconsideration …. Judge Levy struck Robertson’s motion for reconsideration because it contained a factitious citation and ordered Robertson to disclose her legal name and postal address …. Again, Robertson did not comply….

The court therefore awarded default judgment against Robertson:

[1.] Robertson has stubbornly disobeyed Judge Levy’s orders for her to disclose her identity. And a court order “‘must be obeyed by the parties until it is reversed by orderly and proper proceedings.'” Even if an order is erroneous, the remedy is to appeal unless enforcement of the order is stayed. Judge Levy twice ordered Robertson to disclose her identity, and Robertson defied both orders….

To justify her continued defiance, Robertson repeats her argument from her October 2025 motion to dismiss that the orders to disclose her identity violate the First Amendment protections against “unmasking” anonymous online critics. Robertson is correct that “[a]n author’s decision to remain anonymous is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.” In litigation involving anonymous internet users, courts have weighed the validity of the claims and the plaintiff’s need to uncover the users’ identities against the First Amendment’s protection of anonymous speech.

But Judge Levy’s determination that Robertson must disclose her identity is the law of the case and may not be revisited absent extraordinary circumstances…. And Robertson waived her First Amendment argument “by failing to assert it [i]n any of [her] previously-filed briefs” about the anonymity issue….

Robertson did raise the First Amendment argument in her motion for reconsideration of Judge Levy’s order overruling the objections and directing Robertson to disclose her identity. But Judge Levy struck that motion because Robertson included a factitious citation in support of her First Amendment argument, despite previous sanctions and many warnings that such citations would not be tolerated. Forfeiting her First Amendment argument was a justified consequence of Robertson’s reckless litigation practices.

In the order to show cause, the Court explained that Robertson must follow Judge Levy’s orders even if they are later found erroneous and that Robertson had waived her First Amendment arguments. Still, Robertson has continued to stubbornly violate the orders, relying on her private determinations about what the law requires. Her stubborn disobedience amounts to bad faith….

The Court thus RECOMMENDS that a default judgment be entered against Robertson. “Once default is entered, the defaulting party is deemed to have admitted all of the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint regarding liability, including jurisdictional averments.”

Subsequent proceedings will be necessary to decide the remedies to which Evans is entitled. In her complaint, she requests actual and punitive damages, injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees and costs. An evidentiary hearing should be held to determine the amount of damages. But because no factual issues remain in dispute, an evidentiary hearing is not needed to determine Evans’s entitlement to injunctive relief.

Still, Evans should be required to better outline the injunctive relief that is supported by her factual allegations and by the remaining claims for relief. She asks to Court to prohibit Robertson “and any co-conspirators from engaging in further conspiratorial acts, including fraud, harassment, or defamatory conduct against the plaintiff of her associated entities.” But no conspiracy or fraud claims remain, and her requests for injunctive relief are too broadly written. Thus, Evans should be required to specify the injunctive relief to which she is entitled stemming from her existing claims….