“We Do Not Know Why Attorney Cole Feels Compelled to Rush out Obviously Flawed Filings, but This Must Stop” + $15K Sanction

A key paragraph from Tuesday’s opinion in Scott v. Ill. Hum. Rts. Comm’n, decided by Justice Rena Van Tine, joined by Justices David Ellis and Debra Walker:

In his response, attorney Cole says that he “want[s] to completely avoid legalese and speak directly to this Court.” We will speak directly to him: this is unacceptable. Attorney Cole’s response should have included scrupulously accurate and precise citations. Instead, it is yet another sloppy filing that misstates the law and creates more work for this court. We do not know why attorney Cole feels compelled to rush out obviously flawed filings, but this must stop. This type of lawyering is harming attorney Cole’s clients, his own professional reputation, and this court’s workflow….

And more details:

[P]etitioner misquotes inapplicable statutes and fabricates statutory language…. Petitioner’s briefs also contain false case citations…. Finally, petitioner cites cases that do not support the propositions of law for which petitioner cites them. [Details omitted. -EV] …

Citations of fictitious legal authority do not automatically justify striking a brief and dismissing an appeal. Accordingly, we deny respondents’ request to strike petitioner’s brief and dismiss this appeal. However, we must address petitioner’s attorney’s pattern of presenting multiple fabricated quotes of statutory language and case citations….

On June 30, 2026, we ordered petitioner’s attorney Mason Cole to file a response explaining the false quotations and citations in his briefs by July 14, 2026. Attorney Cole filed his response on July 2, 2026, 12 days early. His response concedes that all the quotations and citations set out above are false for the reasons we have explained. Attorney Cole states that he “frequently use[s] a premier corporate subscription of ChatGPT” to “synthesize complex matters,” including this case.

Attorney Cole claims that he “cross-referenced” every citation in his briefs “with Lexis-Nexis to avoid hallucinations.” However, he “overlooked” that several of those citations either do not exist, like Harris, or do not stand for the propositions of law for which he cited them, like Abrahamson and Gusciara. Attorney Cole states that his “inability to properly verify the cites is a result of [his] inexperience in appellate court.” He proposes that we fine him $1,000 for the nonexistent “citation” of Harris and “$500 for each of the misquoted and mis-stated propositions” of law….

Frustratingly, attorney Cole’s response itself contains misstatements of law. Footnote 1 claims that “under 775 ILCS 5/7A-102(D)(2)(a), if the Director determines there is a lack of substantial evidence, the Department will dismiss the charge.” The applicable version of section 7A-102 has no subsection (D)(2)(a). The legislature removed subsection (D)(2)(a) as of January 1, 2008. Pub. Act 95-243 (eff. Jan. 1, 2008) (amending 775 ILCS 5/7A-102). Moreover, the “substantial evidence” language attorney Cole purports to quote appears in subsection (D)(3), not (D)(2). And it addresses a scenario in which “the Director determines that there is no substantial evidence,” not one in which “the Director determines there is a lack of substantial evidence,” as attorney Cole claims.

So, in this one citation, attorney Cole cites a statutory subsection that no longer exists, attributes a quote to the wrong subsection, and then misquotes that subsection. Also in footnote 1, attorney Cole claims that section 7A-102(D)(2) includes the phrase “questions of credibility.” It does not. That language last appeared in a version of the statute effective until July 25, 2005….

Finally, our June 30, 2026, order provided that, “[i]f attorney Cole contends that any of the case citations are accurate, he must include a pin cite to the page or paragraph where the proposition of law or quotation appears.” A pin cite directs the reader to the exact location of quoted language or a cited principle of law. Without a pin cite, we must search through an opinion to find the language or proposition cited. Attorney Cole did not follow this order. Six citations in his response have no pin cite….

In his response, attorney Cole says that he “want[s] to completely avoid legalese and speak directly to this Court.” We will speak directly to him: this is unacceptable. Attorney Cole’s response should have included scrupulously accurate and precise citations. Instead, it is yet another sloppy filing that misstates the law and creates more work for this court. We do not know why attorney Cole feels compelled to rush out obviously flawed filings, but this must stop. This type of lawyering is harming attorney Cole’s clients, his own professional reputation, and this court’s workflow….

The court sanctioned Cole $15,000:

Attorney Cole’s briefs contain a total of 10 false citations: 4 false statutory quotations, 1 nonexistent case, and 5 cases that exist but do not contain the cited principle or quoted language. This sanction reflects a $1,500 fine for each false citation and quotation.

We recognize that this rate is somewhat higher than what courts have imposed in the past. See, e.g., Couvrette (fining attorney $1,000 per fabricated quotation and $500 per nonexistent case). But we set a rate of $1,500 per misstatement of law for two reasons.

First, there is no meaningful difference between the various types of false citations and quotations. A fabricated quote, a nonexistent case, and a case that does not say what counsel claims it says are all misstatements of law. They all require opposing counsel and this court to expend unnecessary time and effort addressing those misstatements of law.

The fact that AI hallucinated these citations does not mitigate their falsehood. AI-hallucinated citations are no different than false citations an attorney could create from his own imagination. Therefore, the sanctions rate for all types of false citations and quotations should be the same, as the attorney, not AI, retains ultimate responsibility for what he or she submits to the court.

Attorney Cole’s response states that he uses a “premier corporate subscription of ChatGPT” (which is presumably a paid subscription) to draft filings. This case illustrates that, no matter how much one pays for “premier” or “corporate” versions of AI products, it does not negate an attorney’s obligation to verify all citations of authority.

Second, as the cases set out above show, AI-hallucinated citations are an increasingly persistent problem in courts nationwide. This indicates that the fines courts are imposing are not enough to deter improper AI use among attorneys. In fact, the prospect of sanctions in this case did not deter attorney Cole from submitting outdated statutory citations and disobeying this court’s order to include pin cites in his response. Courts have no choice but to increase fines for AI-hallucinated citations until those fines have a significant deterrent effect.

In addition, the clerk of the Appellate Court, First District, shall send a copy of this opinion to the ARDC [Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission]. The Code of Judicial Conduct requires us to “inform the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission” if “a lawyer has committed a violation of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct of 2010 that raises a substantial question regarding the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.”

Here, attorney Cole repeatedly misrepresented the law to this court even after his opponent identified his misstatements to this court and even after being warned that the court was considering sanctions. Moreover, in his response, attorney Cole claims that his “inability to properly verify the cites is a result of [his] inexperience in appellate court.” But attorneys verify citations the same way in every court, so this claim raises questions about attorney Cole’s fitness to practice law generally….