Trump’s Iran War Continues to Violate the Constitution

In my March 5 Dispatch article on the Iran War and the Constitution, I explained why Donald Trump’s initiation of the war without congressional authorization is unconstitutional. As of today, it is also in violation of the War Powers Act of 1973. Enacted in the wake of the Vietnam War, the WPA requires the president to secure congressional approval within 60 days of entering U.S. troops into “hostilities” or situations “where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.” The president can seek a 30 day extension without additional congressional authorization, but Trump has not done so in this case.

The sixty day deadline expires today. Therefore, Trump is now in violation of the WPA, as well as the Constitution. Yesterday, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth claimed that the WPA clock “stops” because of the ongoing ceasefire with Iran, curently still (tenuously) in effect. But the WPA doesn’t just apply to situations where US forces are in active combat. It also applies “where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.” Such “imminent involvement” is indeed “clearly indicated” now. Most informed observers know the ceasefire could break down at any time. Trump himself repeatedly threatens to restart the fighting. Thus, the WPA clock is still ticking, and Trump is now in violation of that law. This violation is not as grave an issue as his violation of the Constitution. But it is significant nonetheless.

Earlier in the conflict, some defenders of the administration claimed that the WPA authorized Trump to start the war without congressional approval. In my Dispatch article, I explained why this claim is false. The WPA is a limitation on executive power, not a grant:

Many, particularly on social media, argue that Trump’s actions are authorized by the War Powers Act of 1973. But the WPA is a limitation on presidential power, not a grant of it…

The purpose of this requirement is to constrain even small-scale combat deployments that might otherwise not require congressional authorization, because they fall short of being a war. Section 2(C) of the WPA makes clear that the statute does not expand presidential war initiation authority, emphasizing that “[t]he constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.” None of these three preconditions exist in the current situation.

Even if the WPA did, initially, grant Trump authority to wage this war, it now no longer does.

As also discussed in my Dispatch article, I am not completely averse to the idea of waging war against Iran. Replacing the brutally oppressive anti-American government with a better one would be a great gain. But, so far, there is little evidence that The US and Israel are likely to achieve any significant gains that justify the costs. And, as noted in my earlier article, that failure is connected with the failure to secure broad congressional and public support for the conflict, which leaves the administration with little political capital to continue fighting if the going gets tough:

This limitation on presidential power is more than just a technical legal point. The requirement of congressional authorization for the initiation of war is there to ensure that no one person can take the country to war on his own, and that any major military actions have broad public support, which can be essential to ensuring that we have the will and commitment needed to achieve victory against difficult opponents. Trump’s failure to seek and secure that kind of broad public support has ensured that only about 27 percent of Americans approve of this military action, compared to 43 percent who disapprove, according to a Reuters poll. Other surveys show similar results. This is a historically low level of public support at the start of a major military action and bodes ill for U.S. staying power if we suffer reverses or a prolonged conflict results.

Sure enough, after Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz and energy prices greatly increased, Trump agreed to a ceasefire, despite getting few if any Iranian concessions relative to the prewar status quo.

War is dynamic, and it is certainly possible this one will take a different direction, or even reach a more desirable outcome. So far, however, it has achieved little of value.  Certainly nothing substantial enough to justify undermining our constitutional system. Among other things, the radical Islamist regime remains in power, it retains the ability to close the Strait of Hormuz, and it can still continue its nuclear program.

In my earlier article, I explained why congressional authorization is required on originalist grounds, and addressed various pragmatic arguments against enforcing the requirement.