Contempt Proceedings Regarding Tren de Aragua Deportations “Are a Clear Abuse of Discretion”

Some short excerpts from the 35K words of opinions in the very long In re Trump, decided today by the D.C. Circuit; first, the majority by Judge Neomi Rao, joined by Justin Walker:

More than a year ago, the President invoked the Alien Enemies Act against members of Tren de Aragua, a Venezuelan criminal gang and foreign terrorist organization, and ordered that they be detained and removed from the United States. In a series of fast-moving events on March 15, 2025, the government placed a group of alleged gang members, including plaintiffs in this case, on planes to El Salvador. After the planes took off and left the country, the district court ordered the government not to remove the plaintiffs from the United States.

The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s order because it was premised on a legal error and the plaintiffs’ suit was brought in the wrong court. Nonetheless, the district court threatened to hold government officials in criminal contempt unless they complied with the now-vacated order by, for instance, taking back custody of the plaintiffs. We issued a writ of mandamus vacating the court’s first contempt order.

Undeterred, the district court is proceeding with criminal contempt for the government’s decision to transfer the plaintiffs to the custody of El Salvador. To cooperate, the government identified then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem as the official responsible for the transfer decision. The district court previously said this was the only information it required to make a referral for prosecution. But the district court has now expanded its inquest and ordered hearings to extract more information from government counsel about exactly what happened last March. The government petitions for mandamus.

The widening gyre of the district court’s investigation again calls for the extraordinary remedy of mandamus to halt the judicial “impairment of another branch in the performance of its constitutional duties.” The district court proposes to probe high-level Executive Branch deliberations about matters of national security and diplomacy. These proceedings are a clear abuse of discretion, as the district court’s order said nothing about transferring custody of the plaintiffs and therefore lacks the clarity to support criminal contempt based on the transfer of custody. Moreover, the government has already provided the name of the responsible official, so further judicial investigation is unnecessary and therefore improper. In these circumstances, mandamus is appropriate to prevent the district court from assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction that encroaches on the autonomy of the Executive Branch….

From Judge Walker’s concurrence:

In an oral order, the district court limited what the Government could do with certain aliens covered by a recent presidential proclamation. Some of the covered individuals were inside the United States, and others were on planes, in flight, outside U.S. air space. Less than an hour after the oral order, the district court issued a written order that prohibited the removal of certain aliens currently in the United States. But unlike the oral order, the written order did not protect anyone already removed from U.S. territory. It prohibited only future removals and said nothing about those already removed.

After the written order, the Government took actions that the oral order had arguably prohibited (and that the written order did not prohibit). So if the effect of the (broader) oral order survived the (narrower) written order, the Government’s conduct would raise a host of difficult questions. But before issuing its oral order, the district court said, “I will issue a minute order memorializing this so you don’t have to race to write it down.”

In my view, the district court’s “you don’t have to … write it down” line simplifies this otherwise complicated case because it made the written order supersede the oral order. The Government did not violate the oral order while it was in effect. And at no point did the Government violate the written order that superseded it.

I join Judge Rao’s opinion in full. However, I write separately to emphasize just one point: the importance of the district court’s “you don’t have to … write it down” line….

Much of the ink spilled over this case concerns a question I have not yet addressed because the question is completely irrelevant to whether the Government can be prosecuted for contempt: What did the Government do to the people who were on the planes when the district court issued the oral and written orders?

At the time of the oral order — and later at the time of the written order — they were on planes, beyond U.S. airspace, in U.S. custody, and heading to Central America. When their planes reached El Salvador, after the written order, the Government transferred them to Salvadoran custody.

Why do I say that is irrelevant? Because they had already been removed when the written order was issued. Which means the written order didn’t cover them. Which in turn means their transfer to Salvadoran custody didn’t violate the written order (which, again, had superseded the oral order).

If the written order had been violated — or perhaps even if the oral order had been violated before it was superseded by the written order — the Government’s conduct would raise a host of important questions. Those questions and others have been ably discussed by the district court, the Government, the plaintiffs, enough amici to field a football team, everyone on last year’s panel, several judges concurring or dissenting from the denial of en banc review, the author of today’s majority opinion, and our dissenting colleague.

Many of those questions, however, are not properly presented. That’s because the Government did “not [dis]embark[ ] anyone on [a] plane” while the oral order was in effect. Nor has it “remov[ed] members of [the] class (not otherwise subject to removal) pursuant to the Proclamation” since the written order was issued….

And from Judge J. Michelle Childs’ dissent:

Contempt of court is a public offense, and the fate of our democratic republic will depend on whether we treat it as such. In the many forms in which it can be committed, contempt degrades the power that the People, through their Constitution and Congress, gave the federal courts. Without the contempt power, the rule of law is an illusion, a theory that stands upon shifting sands. For contempt offends not only the authority of whichever judge has been subjected to such incursions, but it also offends our system of governance. Addressing contempt is, therefore, a responsibility that is part and parcel of the court’s duty to interpret and apply the laws of the governed.

And yet, a court’s inquiry into contempt is a responsibility that can be just as difficult as it is sacred. The complexity of this task explains why, for some contempt proceedings, factfinding is required for a trial court to fairly identify contemnors, their contumacious acts, and then hold them accountable. Thus, we cannot judge the early actions of a trial court in such a proceeding heavy-handedly, for contempt of court is not addressed for the district court’s vanity; it is done to preserve and enforce our law. As a court of review, we preserve the sanctity of these proceedings by reviewing judgments of contempt with an eye towards vindicating the dignity and authority of the courts while simultaneously respecting the individual liberties and rights of contemnors. Here, unfortunately, we have overstepped in adjudicating this balance of interests.

Today, we are not reviewing a judgment of contempt made by the trial court, nor are we even reviewing a referral for a contempt prosecution. Instead, we examine an interlocutory order from a district court that, irrespective of its rulings in the underlying case, is just trying to understand the events of a single weekend in March, including the actions which may have led to the willful violation of one of its orders. This is important because the district court’s earlier attempt to identify potential contemnors, make findings of fact, and address alleged contumacious behavior was rejected by an earlier panel of this court. In obedience to that earlier panel’s writ of mandamus—which vacated its probable cause order and factual findings—the district court dutifully and carefully started on a clean slate, calling a hearing for testimony about the actions of the alleged contemnors. Unsurprisingly, testimony is a hallmark of the factual inquiry that judges of this court had identified as a proper step before initiating criminal contempt proceedings.

Instead of properly rejecting the current petition to end the district court’s factual inquiry, the majority has determined that no further facts are needed because, as a matter of law, the alleged contemnors just cannot have committed contempt. In so doing, the majority has stymied the district court’s inherent and statutory powers and done so in a way that will affect not only these contempt proceedings but will also echo in future proceedings against all litigants. Now, any litigant can argue, based on their preferred interpretation of a court’s order, that they did not commit contempt before contempt findings are even made. And now, in any challenge where one may wave the wand of separation of powers, the Government knows it can petition this court for mandamus to relieve it from such proceedings. I cannot agree with an approach that sets such precedent….

Brett A. Shumate, Yaakov M. Roth, and Tiberius T. Davis represent the government.