President Trump’s Libel Lawsuit Over Wall Street Journal Article on Epstein’s Birthday Letters Dismissed

From today’s opinion by Judge Darrin Gayles (S.D. Fla.) in Trump v. Dow Jones & Co, Inc.:

On January 15, 2025, Palazzolo emailed White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt advising her that Dow Jones intended to publish an article (the “Article”) about a letter that President Trump purportedly sent to Epstein (the “Letter”). President Trump, through counsel, denied writing the Letter and warned Dow Jones not to publish the story. Two days later, the WSJ online edition published the Article.

The title of the Article—”Jeffrey Epstein’s Friends Sent Him Bawdy Letters for a 50th Birthday Album. One was from Donald Trump”—is in bold print, with a subtitle below reading “[t]he leather-bound book was compiled by Ghislaine Maxwell. The president says the letter ‘is a fake thing.'” …

The Complaint sets forth claims for defamation … alleges that the following statements from the Article are per se defamatory:

The letter bearing Trump’s name, which was reviewed by the Journal, is bawdy—like others in the album. It contains several lines of typewritten text framed by the outline of a naked woman, which appears to be hand-drawn with a heavy marker. A pair of small arcs denotes the woman’s breasts, and the future president’s signature is a squiggly “Donald” below her waist, mimicking pubic hair.

It isn’t clear how the letter with Trump’s signature was prepared. Inside the outline of the naked woman was a typewritten note styled as an imaginary conversation between Trump and Epstein, written in the third person.

Voice Over: There must be more to life than having everything, the note began. Donald: Yes, there is, but I won’t tell you what it is. Jeffrey: Nor will I, since I also know what it is. Donald: We have certain things in common, Jeffrey. Jeffrey: Yes, we do, come to think of it. Donald: Enigmas never age, have you noticed that? Jeffrey: As  a matter of fact, it was clear to me the last time I saw you. Donald: A pal is a wonderful thing. Happy Birthday — and may every day be another wonderful secret.

The Complaint also contends that the following statements from the Article are implicitly defamatory:

Jeffrey Epstein’s Friends Sent Him Bawdy Letters for a 50th Birthday Album. One Was From Donald Trump.

It was Jeffrey Epstein’s 50th birthday, and Ghislaine Maxwell was preparing a special gift to mark the occasion. She turned to Epstein’s family and friends. One of them was Donald Trump.”

The album had poems, photos and greetings from businesspeople, academics, Epstein’s former girlfriends and childhood pals, according to the documents reviewed by the Journal and people familiar with them.

When he turned 50, Epstein was already wealthy from managing Wexner’s fortune and was socializing with Trump, Clinton and other powerful people. He often entertained at his Manhattan townhouse, Palm Beach, Fla., home and private Caribbean island….

On August 25, 2025, after President Trump filed this action, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the United States House of Representatives (the “Committee”) subpoenaed the Epstein Estate for documents (the “Subpoena”). The Subpoena included a request to produce all letters in the album Ghislaine Maxwell compiled for Epstein’s fiftieth birthday (the “Birthday Book”). The Epstein Estate complied with the Subpoena; and on September 8, 2025, the Committee released the produced documents on its official webpage via a press release (the “Press Release”). The production included a copy of the Birthday Book. The Birthday Book includes a page matching the Article’s description of the Letter (the “Produced Letter”). {The Complaint alleges that “no authentic letter or drawing exists,” “the supposed letter is a fake,” and “the letter was fake and nonexistent.” In Response to the Motion to Dismiss, and at the hearing, President Trump’s counsel only argued that the Letter was not written by President Trump and is not authentic.} …

The court dismissed the claim:

Defendants ask the Court to make a factual determination that the statements in the Article are true and a legal determination that they are not defamatory. Because the Court finds that the Complaint fails to adequately allege actual malice, it declines to address these issues at this juncture. Moreover, whether President Trump was the author of the Letter or Epstein’s friend are questions of fact that cannot be determined at this stage of the litigation….

“[T]o plead actual malice, [President Trump] must allege facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference that the false statement was made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” “This is a subjective test, focusing on whether the defendant ‘actually entertained serious doubts as to the veracity of the published account, or was highly aware that the account was probably false.'”

In some circumstances, actual malice can be inferred “where a story is fabricated by the defendant, is the product of his imagination, or is based wholly on an unverified anonymous telephone call[,] … [or] when the publisher’s allegations are so inherently improbable that only a reckless man would have put them in circulation[, or] where there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or accuracy of his reports.” However, “[a]ctual malice requires more than a departure from reasonable journalistic standards … [t]hus, a failure to investigate, standing on its own, does not indicate [its] presence ….”

Here, the Complaint falls short of pleading actual malice. President Trump’s primary allegations relating to malice are that Defendants “knew or should have known” the statements in the Article were false,” and published the Article:

maliciously, with knowledge of the falsity of the statement, and/or with reckless disregard of their truth or falsity [and]

with actual malice, oppression, and fraud in that they were aware of the falsity of the publication and, thus, made said publications in bad faith, out of disdain and ill-will directed towards Plaintiff without any regard for the truth.

These “formulaic recitations of the ‘actual malice’ element” are insufficient to state a claim. President Trump also fails to allege how each Defendant acted with actual malice.

The Complaint also alleges that President Trump told Defendants that the Letter was a fake before they ran the Article. President Trump argues that this allegation shows that Defendants acted with serious doubts about the truth of their reporting and, therefore, with actual malice. The Court disagrees. To establish actual malice, “a plaintiff must show the defendant deliberately avoided investigating the veracity of the statement in order to evade learning the truth.”

The Complaint comes nowhere close to this standard. Quite the opposite. The Article explains that, before running the story, Defendants contacted President Trump, Justice Department officials, and the FBI for comment. President Trump responded with his denial, the Justice Department did not respond at all, and the FBI declined to comment. In short, the Complaint and Article confirm that Defendants attempted to investigate. The Article also states that the WSJ reviewed the Letter. Accordingly, President Trump’s conclusory allegation that Defendants had contradictory evidence and failed to investigate is rebutted by the Article and is insufficient to establish actual malice.

{President Trump argues that Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 692 (1989), supports his position that Defendants’ purported failure to investigate is enough to support an inference of actual malice. However, in Harte-Hanks, the Supreme Court expressly stated that “[a]lthough failure to investigate will not alone support a finding of actual malice, the purposeful avoidance of the truth is in a different category. Here, President Trump has not alleged any facts, beyond conclusory allegations, that support an inference that Defendants purposefully avoided the truth.}

The Article also informed readers that President Trump decried the Letter as a fake and denied writing it. By “allowing readers to decide for themselves what to conclude from the [Article], any allegation of actual malice [is] less plausible.”

Finally, President Trump’s allegation that Defendants acted with ill-will is insufficient to plead actual malice. Aside from being conclusory and without factual support, “ill-will, improper motive or personal animosity plays no role in determining whether a defendant acted with actual malice.”

Because President Trump has not plausibly alleged that Defendants published the Article with actual malice, both Counts must be dismissed. However, “[a] dismissal based on the failure to plead facts giving rise to an inference of actual malice should be without prejudice[,] and the plaintiff should have the opportunity to amend his complaint.” But see Reed v. Chamblee (M.D. Fla. 2025) (dismissing defamation claim with prejudice where plaintiff “had two opportunities to plausibly allege claims for defamation in his lengthy complaints but has failed both times to sufficiently allege any Defendant acted with actual malice.”). Because President Trump has only made one attempt to state his claims, the Court dismisses the Complaint without prejudice….

And the court had this to say about whether Trump would have to pay defendants’ attorneys’ fees:

Defendants request attorneys’ fees and costs arguing that President Trump’s lawsuit lacks merit and that he only brought it because they exercised their right to free speech on a public issue. Florida’s Anti-SLAPP Statute prohibits a person from filing a lawsuit “against another person or entity without merit and primarily because such person or entity has exercised the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue[.]” The statute awards the prevailing party attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in defending such a meritless lawsuit.

Because the Complaint is dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend, the Court denies Defendants’ request for fees and costs without prejudice and with leave to renew. See Barbuto v. Miami Herald Media Co. (S.D. Fla. 2021) (denying without prejudice the defendant’s request for fees and costs under Florida’s Anti-SLAPP statute following dismissal of a plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice because “the Court ha[d] not addressed the merits of [the p]laintiff’s claims nor ha[d] the Court made the finding that [the p]laintiff’s lawsuit as a whole [was] without merit.”).

Amanda B. Levine, Katherine M. Bolger, and Meenakshi Krishnan (Davis Wright Tremaine LLP), Andrew J Levander and Steven A. Engel (Dechert LLP), and Eric Corey Edison, George S. LeMieux, and Timothy John McGinn, Jr. (Gunster Yoakley & Stewart, P.A.) represent defendants.