There Is No Constitutional Right to Possess a Cell Phone in Class

Sound reasoning, I think, from Judge Andrew Hanen (S.D. Tex.) Tuesday in Brown v. Splendora Indep. School Dist. Plus a bit more on other topics, which should offer a flavor of the set of complaints that plaintiff brought:

“On or about March 12, 2025, during a class testing period, Teacher [Name Not Specified in Allegations] removed RB from the classroom and referred him for suspension.” (emphasis added). The reason he was removed, as specified in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, was that RB refused to sit in his assigned seat, was being difficult, and was talking across the room while others were taking the test. RB claimed at the time that he perceived his being sent to the office to be “racial injustice.” To make matters worse, RB then called the teacher a “racist.” Brown admits in his Amended Complaint that RB was mistaken in this notion.

Brown claims that refusal to sit in one’s assigned seat, being difficult, and talking during a test is not enumerated in the Student Code of Conduct and therefore cannot be the basis for discipline. To reach this conclusion, Brown again employs a very selective reading of the Code of Conduct.

The Code of Conduct requires students to demonstrate courtesy. Talking across the classroom, being difficult, and calling the teacher a “racist” while others are trying to take a test certainly violates that tenant.

The Code also requires one to respect the rights of other students and teachers. Again, that conduct violates this provision. Failing to sit where assigned and failing to be quiet during tests certainly qualifies as a failure to follow directives as given by school personnel—yet another violation. Clearly RB’s conduct was disruptive. That is specifically addressed and prohibited in the Code of Conduct. The conduct Browm admits happened clearly violates numerous Code of Conduct provisions. He also admits that he pulled out his phone during the test, another violation of the no phones during testing provision. RB was given a written suspension notice, and allowed to present his own written version of the incident.

He now claims, despite admitting to his own misconduct, that he was suspended without due process, that there was a failure to investigate, a conspiracy to deny fairness, and that he was discriminated against because of gender. The first claims are easily disposed of because RB was clearly given a chance to respond to the allegations. He even obtained another student’s statement to help his defense. Moreover, he admitted there, and admits in his Amended Complaint, his acts of misconduct….

The new claim of gender discrimination is one that RB apparently came to after some reflection. He claims that at least one other female student was being disruptive and talking on the phone, yet she was not punished as he was.

It is well established that “§ 1983 suits based on the Equal Protection Clause are available to plaintiffs alleging unconstitutional gender discrimination in schools.” However, a school district cannot be held liable under § 1983 under a theory of vicarious liability or respondeat superior. Brown must allege that the school district’s policy, practice, or custom constitutes a deprivation of Plaintiff’s equal protection rights. Plaintiff fails to allege facts suggesting a policy, practice, or custom of the like. Furthermore, the fact that one student was punished for misbehaving, but another of a different gender was not, is not sufficient to allege a claim of gender discrimination. Accordingly, he fails to state a claim for any gender discrimination ….