Grant of Mental Health Pretrial Diversion for Man Accused of Attempted Murder Reversed

From People v. Superior Court (Taylor), decided two weeks ago by the California Court of Appeal (Justice Frances Rothschild, joined by Justices Helen Bendix and Michelle Kim):

Penal Code section 1001.36 authorizes a court to grant pretrial diversion to a defendant with a qualifying mental disorder who agrees to comply with mental health treatment and will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety “if treated in the community.” … Impliedly finding Taylor would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in a community facility, the trial court granted diversion….

The People allege that on the morning of March 3, 2023, [Job Uriah] Taylor, age 25, went on a violent, racially motivated rampage targeting multiple victims in Santa Monica. Taylor approached Christian Hornburg, who is Black, from behind and clubbed him over the head with a metal pipe and then stomped his head while he was on the ground, helpless. Duane Ziegler, a witness who attempted to protect Hornburg, heard Taylor say he was there to “kill that nigger.”

When Jade Carter, who is also Black, tried to intervene, Taylor attacked her with the pipe and hurled racial slurs.

Footage from a police body camera showed Taylor continued his racist rant until he was arrested. Both Hornburg and Carter were transported to the hospital. Hornburg sustained life-altering injuries.

Police learned that earlier that morning, Taylor threatened Michael Okyere, who is Black, with the metal pipe and shouted racial slurs at him. Nearby firefighters intervened and chased him away….

[T]he People charged Taylor with the willful, premeditated, and deliberate attempted murder of Hornburg, with special allegations that Taylor personally inflicted great bodily injury and that the offense constituted a hate crime. The People also charged Taylor with three counts of assault with a deadly weapon on Okyere, Ziegler, and Carter, each count including hate crime allegations. Taylor pleaded not guilty to the charges….

In June 2024, Taylor filed a motion for mental health diversion pursuant to section 1001.36. The motion described Taylor’s abusive and troubling family history and his struggle with mental health issues beginning at the age of 12….

In support of the motion, Taylor offered a psychological evaluation prepared by Robin Rhodes Campbell, PhD., who evaluated him in April 2024 in response to a referral from the alternate public defender’s office…. [Many factual details omitted; see the opinion for more. -EV] Dr. Campbell opined that Taylor suffered from a qualifying, treatable mental health condition which played a significant role in the commission of the offenses.

As to whether Taylor would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the community, Campbell stated: “In my opinion, the defendant would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if his psychiatric symptoms were controlled with treatment. Given that his untreated psychiatric disorder was a significant and proximal cause of his behavior at the time of the alleged offense, if his symptoms are under good control with medication and psychosocial support, he would not present an unreasonable risk. If the defendant abstains from substance use, his risk would be further reduced. [¶] … In my opinion, the defendant would not be at risk of committing any [offenses specified in section 1001.36] if treated in the community and would not present an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” Dr. Campbell reserved the right to alter her opinion upon the receipt of information contradicting the information the alternate public defender had given her….

The trial court requested that Dr. Montgomery, from the Office of Diversion & Reentry (ODR), independently evaluate Taylor. She testified that Taylor was stable while in custody and on medication, and his mental illness would be treatable with medications and other modalities in the ODR program, including long-acting injections administered every four weeks. Dr. Montgomery testified that Taylor agreed to the recommended treatment modalities. She disagreed with the People’s assertion that Taylor had voluntarily stopped taking medications in the past but did not explain the basis for this disagreement.

Dr. Montgomery admitted that the ODR offered no locked program, and although staff would attempt to intervene if Taylor decided to leave an ODR facility, he would not be stopped. ODR would notify the court within 72 hours of any absence. Posing a hypothetical in which Taylor left the ODR program, the People asked Dr. Montgomery if Taylor’s medication might lose efficacy, resulting in more incidents of extreme violence. Dr. Montgomery responded, “In this case, yes. I don’t want to downplay the seriousness of this case. But I don’t know that every manic episode he has will be like that. They can vary.”

Although the People repeatedly asked Dr. Montgomery whether Taylor would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if he left an ODR facility, she declined to offer an opinion on the matter, stating she “[could not] make that prediction.” The trial court discouraged continued inquiry in this line, reasoning Dr. Montgomery could not “predict the future.” …

The D.A. appealed the grant of pretrial diversion, and the court agreed with the D.A.:

[N]o expert nor any other evidence suggested that Taylor would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if granted diversion.

Dr. Campbell concluded only Taylor would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety “if his psychiatric symptoms were controlled with treatment” and “if his symptoms are under good control with medication and psychosocial support.” Dr. Campbell was not asked and did not say that control of Taylor’s psychiatric symptoms was likely.

Nor did Dr. Montgomery, who testified only that Taylor was eligible for ODR services. Dr. Montgomery acknowledged that if Taylor were to leave the unlocked facility and fail to take his medication he would be at risk of engaging in violent behavior.

In contrast to the lack of evidence that Taylor would not pose a risk if granted diversion, substantial evidence either exists or was available that he would pose such a risk. Taylor had a history of departing facilities without completing treatment.

For example, his sister reported that although she and his mother admitted him into mental health facilities in Louisiana as an adult, “he always signed himself out after the first 24 hours.” Taylor also had a history of noncompliance with his psychiatric medication regimen. According to records from the Iberia Medical Center, he refused to take prescribed medication. {Indeed, he was just released from a psychiatric facility when he thereafter failed to take his medications and committed the crimes that are the subject of this appeal.} Taylor admitted to Dr. Campbell that he attempted to get mental health treatment after coming to California but was unsuccessful because he felt that an intake clinician had a “poor attitude,” and further admitted he was released from a hospital shortly before the instant alleged offense but failed to follow treatment recommendations.

In sum, the court made no express finding that Taylor would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if granted diversion—indeed, the court concluded witnesses could not “predict the future”—and no evidence supported any implied finding to this effect. On the other hand, the record supports a reasonable inference that Taylor would abandon aspects of the mental health regimen experts testified were crucial for him not to pose an unreasonable danger to the public, with potentially catastrophic consequences. We therefore conclude that no substantial evidence supports the court’s implied finding that Taylor was suitable for mental health diversion, and its grant of diversion was thus an abuse of discretion….

[O]ur reasoning turns not on the horribleness of Taylor’s alleged actions but on the likelihood he will repeat them if he abandons his newly efficacious mental health regimen…. Although by its express terms section 1001.36 authorizes diversion to a defendant who agrees to treatment, the requirement that the defendant not pose an unreasonable danger to public safety implicitly obligates the court to determine whether the defendant will follow through on this agreement…

Taylor argues that requiring a trial court to determine whether a defendant will follow through on an agreement to be treated in the community would create a new, nonstatutory element to the suitability analysis under section 1001.36. We disagree. The obligation to determine whether a defendant will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to the public if granted diversion necessarily includes determining whether the defendant will abandon treatment.

We recognize the Legislature’s “strong legislative preference for treatment of mental health disorders” and thus the need not to unduly restrict diversion. For example, “if diversion may be denied because a professional conditions their opinion on treatment compliance, it opens the possibility that entire categories of persons who otherwise meet all eligibility and suitability criteria, including expressing a willingness to comply with the recommended treatment, will be denied diversion even without any evidence of prior noncompliance.” But where there is no evidence of prior compliance with treatment, and on the contrary a history of noncompliance, the trial court must take the possibility of future noncompliance into account….

[We direct] the superior court to vacate its order granting petitioner’s motion for mental health diversion and enter a new order denying the motion….

Tracey Whitney, Byron Beck, and Jeffrey Herring, deputy D.A.’s, represent the state.