Sam Altman’s Defamation and Abuse of Process Case Against Sister Can Go Forward

From Judge Zachary Bluestone (E.D. Mo.) today in Altman v. Altman, the factual allegations (and of course at this point they are just allegations):

Annie and Sam are biological siblings who once lived together at their family home in Clayton, Missouri. [Annie alleges:] Annie asserts that Sam sexually abused her from 1997 to 2006. The exploitation began when Annie was only 3 years old and Sam was 12. Sam started with forcible touching and oral sex but escalated to acts including battery, molestation, sodomy, and rape. The abuse ended around 2006, when Annie was approximately 12 years old and Sam was an adult ….

[Sam alleges:] For years, Sam and his family have provided Annie with financial support through their late father’s estate, as well as offering to help with medical expenses, housing, and employment. However, due to Annie’s “serious mental health issues” and “harmful behavior,” Sam and his family “have felt the need to be deliberate and thoughtful about the support they provide.” As a result, they have rejected Annie’s demands for financial autonomy.

Annie retaliated by engaging in a smear campaign against her brothers, falsely claiming they sexually abused her. Beginning in 2021, Annie claimed on Twitter that she “experienced sexual, physical emotional, verbal, financial, and technological abuse from my biological siblings, mostly Sam Altman and some from Jack Altman.” Annie then posted “a continuous stream of false sexual abuse allegations against Sam Altman” on various platforms. For example, in March 2023, she said, “I’m not four years old with a 13 year old ‘brother’ climbing into my bed non-consensually anymore. (You’re welcome for helping you figure out your sexuality.).” Annie also wrote that she “experienced every single form of abuse with him—sexual, physical, verbal, pharmacological …, and technological.”

The recriminations continued through 2024, including in a work of poetry. Annie also posted videos on TikTok with accusations that she was “touched by older siblings” and “that ‘an almost tech billionaire’ was ‘terrified of the little sibling’ that he ‘repeatedly molested and physically abused.'”

The court allowed Sam’s defamation claim to go forward:

A defamatory statement must “specifically refer to, or be of and concerning, the plaintiff in some way.” “In order to satisfy this requirement, the plaintiff must effectively plead that the statement at issue either expressly mentions [him] or refers to [him] by reasonable implication.” For reference by reasonable implication, “a defamatory statement … must be capable of being understood to refer to the plaintiff, [and] also must be shown actually to have been so understood by a third party.” … Taking all inferences in [Sam’s] favor, Annie’s statements either explicitly or implicitly refer to him….

Given the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable jury could [also] find that the statements were not substantially true. Although Annie vigorously defends the veracity of her statements, that assertion is not enough to warrant dismissal. It should require no explanation that a jury could conclude that statements accusing Sam of sexual abuse were falsely made to injure his reputation. Though a factfinder might also conclude that Annie’s statements were true, it is not for the Court to make that finding at this juncture. Thus, construing the Counterclaim in a light most favorable to Sam, he has sufficiently pled that the statements were false to survive a motion to dismiss.

Even less compelling is Annie’s related contention that her statements were merely opinion…. “If [a statement] can be proved false, then a statement is not protected as opinion.” … [T]he statements are provable as either true or false. {Annie also asserts that her work of poetry “is entirely protected.” But under California law [which the court held applies here -EV], “a fictional work does not insulate [a defendant] from liability for defamation if all the elements of defamation are otherwise present.” Gaprindashvili v. Netflix (C.D. Cal. 2022) [the Queen’s Gambit case -EV]. That rule makes good sense; otherwise, a would-be defamer could insulate themselves by holding out their statements as art.} Because a reasonable jury could conclude that the statements are false, the Court will not dismiss Sam’s defamation claim….

When a plaintiff to a defamation action is a public figure, the litigant must prove that the defamatory statement was made with “actual malice—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Throughout his Counterclaim, Sam claims Annie made the statement either with knowledge of its falsity or disregard for the truth. Whether he ultimately can prove that contention is another matter. But Sam by no means fails to make “any such allegations” of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.

The court allowed Sam’s abuse of process claim to go forward:

Annie first seeks to dismiss Sam’s counterclaim for abuse of process. Under Missouri law, this claim requires “(1) an illegal, improper, perverted use of process, (2) done for an improper purpose, (3) resulting in damage.” A litigant must establish that “the process has been used to accomplish some unlawful end, or to compel the defendant to do some collateral thing which he could not legally be compelled to do.” … “[I]f one simply pursues an action to its authorized conclusion, an abuse of process does not occur, regardless of evil motive.” But there will be liability in the “rare cases in which the allegedly improper action was instituted to obtain a result which the process was not intended by law to effect.” …

Sam has [adequately] alleged that she filed a baseless lawsuit driven by improper motive. According to the Counterclaim, Annie brought this case to “escalate the pressure against her family [and Sam]” to give in to her demand for financial autonomy. In other words, Sam claims Annie instituted this lawsuit “to obtain a result which the process was not intended by law to effect,” which she agrees is all that is required. And even if that were not enough, Sam alleges another extrajudicial end: to embarrass him and retaliate for his refusal to provide greater support. While Annie may ultimately prove otherwise, Sam has alleged enough facts, when construed in the light most favorable to him, to survive a motion to dismiss.

Annie also suggests that “one of the requisite elements to support an abuse of process claim is that [she] did something after the initiation of her lawsuit that was somehow abusive, or illegal.” She is incorrect. In fact, Annie’s citation to Wells proves just the opposite. As the Wells Court recognized, “if [a] suit is brought for a collateral purpose, there is abuse of process.” Although overlapping with a malicious-prosecution claim, the initiation of a lawsuit can serve as a basis for an abuse-of-process claim.

I believe the result might have been different under the law of other states, where the filing of a lawsuit can lead only to a malicious prosecution claim, not an abuse of process claim; but Missouri law apparently allows abuse of process claims in such situations.

The court also concluded that Annie’s sexual assault claims were time-barred as pleaded, though left open the door for her to amend her complaint:

The Complaint lacks clarity as to the precise contours of Annie’s claims; she couches her allegations under two counts for common-law torts while also invoking Missouri’s CSA [Childhood Sexual Abuse statute] under the header of “General Allegations.” However, her response to Sam’s motion to dismiss makes clear that she views the CSA as a special statute of limitations rather than a stand-alone cause of action. Her confusion is understandable, as it appears the original version of the statute broadly extended the limitations period for claims “[i]n any civil action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse.”

But Missouri revised the CSA in 2004 and, in doing so, restricted the generous limitations period to “an action brought pursuant to this section.” Indeed, the Missouri Supreme Court emphasized this language in concluding both that the 2004 CSA created a new statutory cause of action and that it did not extend the limitations period for related tort claims….

To his credit, Sam appears to acknowledge that all is not lost for Annie. If fact, the Complaint may well state a CSA claim despite formally asserting only tort counts. Nonetheless, Annie sought leave to amended her complaint if the tort claims are untimely, and the Court grants this unopposed request in case she elects to add CSA-specific allegations….

Dane Paul Shikman, Hailyn Jennifer Chen, Xiaonan April Hu, Cordell Brown, Jonathan Kravis (Munger Tolles LLP) and Thomas J. Magee (Hepler Broom LLC) represent Sam Altman.