The Zizians and the Second Amendment

For the backstory on the Zizians, see Investigations Into 6 Killings Look to a Fringe Group Known as the Zizians (N.Y. Times, Remy Tumin & Kate Christobek), which notes, among other things, that “The group’s goals aren’t completely clear but online writings about their beliefs touch upon veganism, artificial intelligence and gender identity.

From U.S. v. LaSota, decided today by Judge James Bredar (D. Md.); LaSota is Ziz, the Zizians’ apparent leader:

Pending before the Court is Defendant Jack LaSota’s Motion to Dismiss Count One of the Indictment. {The Indictment names Defendant as “Jack LaSota” and the Government uses male pronouns to refer to LaSota in its briefing. However, LaSota states that her name is “Ziz LaSota” and that she is a transgender woman who uses female pronouns. The Court refers to Defendant as “Jack LaSota” here to match the Indictment but will use female pronouns to refer to her, in accordance with her preference.} …

According to the Indictment, LaSota was a fugitive from justice, and while knowing that she was a fugitive from justice, she possessed multiple firearms as well as ammunition. Specifically, she is alleged to have possessed a scoped .50 caliber rifle, a 9×19mm handgun, approximately 420 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition, and approximately 54 rounds of 9×19mm ammunition.

In their briefing, the parties provide several additional background facts. They explain that LaSota was previously charged in state criminal proceedings in California and Pennsylvania. In these cases, LaSota was charged with one felony and multiple misdemeanors. LaSota claims that all of the alleged criminal conduct was nonviolent. The Government explains that LaSota missed court hearings in both cases, so in both of them, bench warrants were issued for her arrest.

Then, in February 2025, LaSota was found with the above-described firearms and ammunition, and she was arrested by Maryland local police. A federal grand jury then charged LaSota with being a fugitive from justice in possession of firearms and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(2). LaSota’s Motion to Dismiss argues that § 922(g)(2) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, both on its face and as applied to her case….

The parties … debate whether fugitives are among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment. As the Government notes, the Fourth Circuit has held that felons are not among “the people” because they are not “law-abiding.” But in several recent cases, the Fourth Circuit has declined to address whether certain other categories of people—felony indictees and domestic violence misdemeanants—are included in “the people.” The Court is attracted to the Government’s argument that fugitives are most akin to felons and are thus not included among “the people” because neither group is “law-abiding.” But given the disagreements on how to define “the people” both at the Fourth Circuit and between the Circuits,and considering that resolution of this specific question is not strictly necessary in order for the Court to rule on the instant Motion, the Court declines to rule on this issue today. Instead, the Court will decide the facial challenge at Bruen step two because it certainly fails at that step….

To determine whether § 922(g)(2) “is consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition,” the Court must “ascertain whether [§ 922(g)(2)] is ‘relevantly similar’ to laws that our tradition is understood to permit.” …

The Fourth Circuit has held multiple times “that our historical tradition of gun regulation allows ‘status-based restrictions to disqualify categories of persons from possessing firearms.'” That is because early state legislatures “could prohibit gun ownership by groups of persons that the legislature deemed ‘potentially violent or dangerous.'” Thus, Congress can now “legislate using proxies for dangerousness.” For instance, in Hunt, the Fourth Circuit upheld Congress’ ability to impose a lifetime ban on felons possessing firearms. And in Jackson, the Fourth Circuit concluded that “although ‘felony indictment’ is a less effective proxy for dangerousness than ‘felony conviction,’ § 922(n)’s temporary and partial disarmament burdens Second Amendment rights far less severely than does § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban.” …

Jackson‘s rationale applies to § 922(g)(2). Fugitives are more dangerous than felony indictees because they have ordinarily been charged with a crime and fled from prosecution. But like felony indictees, they are only temporarily disarmed. Thus, fugitive status is a valid proxy for dangerousness (the “why”) and § 922(g)(2) permissibly requires temporary disarmament (the “how”). Accordingly, LaSota’s facial challenge fails on this basis as well….

The Court now turns to the as-applied challenge. LaSota argues that she only fled from prosecutions for “non-violent offenses, comprised largely of misdemeanors.” Thus, in her view, § 922(g)(2) is unconstitutional as applied to her because she is not a fugitive from prosecution for “serious crimes.” But that is ultimately irrelevant because, as the Fourth Circuit held for § 922(g)(1) (which prohibits felons from possessing firearms), this Court holds that as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(2) are categorically barred.

When Congress passed the Gun Control Act in 1968, it made a categorical judgment that all “fugitives from justice” were dangerous enough to be disarmed. And critically, that included fugitives from prosecutions for misdemeanors and nonviolent crimes…. Just as legislatures 250 years ago determined, for instance, that all non-oath-takers were too dangerous to possess firearms, Congress has now determined that all fugitives from justice—whether they are fleeing felonies, misdemeanors, violent crimes, or nonviolent crimes—are too dangerous to possess firearms.

To be sure, LaSota rejects the notion that someone fleeing prosecution for misdemeanors and nonviolent crimes could be dangerous. But the power to make that determination is entrusted to Congress, not to LaSota and not to this Court. As the Hunt court explained, “the power to determine the content of the criminal law is serious business. But legislatures have always had that power, and it is subject to few constitutional restraints.”

Here, Congress exercised that power to classify all fugitives from justice as dangerous enough to be disarmed. That statute is “relevantly similar” to the numerous Founding-era laws that categorically disarmed “dangerous persons.” And that is precisely the “historical analogue” that Bruen and Rahimi require for a statute to withstand scrutiny under the Second Amendment. Therefore, the Court concludes that “there is no requirement for an individualized determination of dangerousness as to each person” accused of being a fugitive from justice in possession of a firearm under § 922(g)(2).

Jared Beim represents the federal government.