Eleventh Circuit Reaffirms That Pseudonymity Is Available to Parties Only in “Exceptional Case[s],” Under “Highly Limited Circumstances”

Boe v. Garcia, decided Thursday by Eleventh Circuit Judges Robert Luck, Barbara Lagoa, and Andrew Brasher, upheld a district court’s denial of pseudonymity in a case where plaintiff is alleging police misconduct. The court, reviewing the district court’s denial of pseudonymity for abuse of discretion (the standard of review used by federal courts in such cases), reasoned:

Generally, pleading in federal court must name all the parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). But, under certain, highly limited circumstances, we allow plaintiffs to proceed pseudonymously. Indeed, we have held that “parties may use fictitious name[s] only in exceptional case[s].” “The ultimate test for permitting a plaintiff to proceed anonymously is whether the plaintiff has a substantial privacy right which outweighs the customary and constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.”

To decide whether privacy trumps publicity, a court must first consider “whether the party seeking anonymity (1) is challenging government activity; (2) would be compelled, absent anonymity, to disclose information of utmost intimacy; or (3) would be compelled, absent anonymity, to admit an intent to engage in illegal conduct and thus risk criminal prosecution.” A court must then “carefully review all the circumstances of a given case and then decide whether the customary practice of disclosing the plaintiff’s identity should yield to the plaintiff’s privacy concerns.” “Other factors to consider include [4] whether the party seeking anonymity is a minor or [5] faces a real threat of physical harm absent anonymity” and whether anonymity “[6] poses a unique threat of fundamental unfairness to the defendant.”

In Doe v. Stegall (5th Cir. 1981), the old Fifth Circuit [whose precedents are binding in the Eleventh Circuit] held that a mother and her children were entitled to anonymity in their challenge to the constitutionality of prayer and Bible study in public schools. It noted that “in only a very few cases challenging governmental activity can anonymity be justified” and held that the plaintiffs showed they must disclose intimate information which could lead to harassment and violence against them by a “community hostile to [their] viewpoint[.]” In granting the plaintiffs’ request for anonymity, the Court also held that the plaintiffs’ status as children gave them “special vulnerability.”

In Doe v. Frank (11th Cir. 1992), however, this Court held that a United States Postal Service employee was not entitled to anonymity in his wrongful termination suit against the Postal Service, noting that the fact that the employee was suing a government agency did not necessarily give “more reason to grant a plaintiff’s request for anonymity.” In holding that the plaintiff’s personal embarrassment about his alcoholism did not amount to intimate information or an intent to engage in illegal conduct, this Court distinguished the plaintiff’s case from those involving mental illness, homosexuality, and transsexuality, for which the social stigma was enough to overcome the presumption of openness in court proceedings..

More recently, in Chiquita Brands, we held that plaintiffs suing Chiquita for financing a paramilitary group in Colombia did not require anonymity. We explained that “hundreds of plaintiffs have litigated this case under their true names” and there was no evidence that the plaintiffs faced any reasonable risk of retaliation….

We cannot say, then, that the district court abused its discretion when it denied Boe’s motion to proceed under a pseudonym. It is true that Boe challenges government activity, but this alone does not weigh in favor of granting anonymity. And he does not meet any of the other factors that would warrant anonymity or pseudonymity.

He is an adult, and, outside of vague concerns, he does not show that there is any reasonable “real threat of physical harm absent anonymity.” Further, if he proceeded under his real name, Boe would not be required to disclose intimate information or criminal activity. Finally, the defendants in this section 1983 claim would be unable to respond to Boe’s allegations without knowledge of his identity. As such, and considering the totality of the circumstances, we cannot say that this is an exceptional case in which his privacy outweighs judicial openness….