No Pseudonymity for Man Suing Harvard Alleging Jews Aim “to Exterminate or Enslave All Non-Jews”

From Judge Allison Burroughs’ Feb. 2 decision in Doe v. President & Fellows of Harvard College:

While it is within the Court’s discretion to allow a party to proceed under a pseudonym, “[a]s a general rule, the presumption is that all judicial proceedings remain open to the public.” “The presumption against pseudonymous litigation gives way only in ‘exceptional cases.'” The analysis is as follows: “1) there is a presumption in favor of disclosure; 2) a party may rebut the presumption by showing that a need for confidentiality exists; 3) the court must balance the need for confidentiality against the public interest in disclosure.” Alleged risks of harm that are speculative in nature, generalized, or without corroboration do not justify anonymity.

Having considered Plaintiff’s Motion, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not rebutted the presumption in favor of disclosure. Plaintiff states that the litigation involves sensitive personal information regarding Plaintiff’s ethnic heritage and academic records, and Plaintiff’s identification would risk causing Plaintiff “unusually severe” professional, financial, and physical harm. The alleged risks that Plaintiff sets forth in his motion are without corroboration and do not rise above a level of mere speculation. Further, lawsuits often “implicate substantial amounts of private information,” and if warranted going forward, the Court may employ tools such as redacting or sealing documents to manage privacy concerns that arise during the litigation. In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion, is DENIED.

To be precise, it does seem likely that being publicly known to have made such arguments may cause “professional” and “financial” “harm.” But many plaintiffs face the risk of professional and financial harm from their lawsuits.

Consider, for instance, employment law plaintiffs who might reasonably worry that future employers won’t want to hire them if they’re identified as litigious employees. Or consider plaintiffs who think they were fired based on race, sex, etc., but worry that the defendants will argue that they were instead fired because they acted incompetently or unethically. Or consider libel plaintiffs who worry that public filing will just further amplify the allegations over which they’re suing.

Courts generally conclude that such risks are a normal feature of our open system of civil justice, and can’t themselves justify pseudonymity. (See pp. 1457-60 of The Law of Pseudonymous Litigation for citations to many such cases.) That is likewise so, I think, for this case. Plaintiff filed a motion Friday for reconsideration of this decision; I’ll try to report on the result.