Court Allows House Arrest Pending Appeal for Man Convicted of Planning to Bomb Philadelphia Pride Parade; Appellate Court Reverses

From last month’s Pennsylvania appellate decision in Commonwealth v. Abdul-Rahman, written by Judge Anne Lazarus, joined by Judge John Bender and Judge Megan McCarthy King:

[T]he Commonwealth of Pennsylvania … [is] seeking review of the September, 29, 2025 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which granted Defendant Muhyyee-Ud-Din Abdul-Rahman’s petition to modify bail pending sentencing, reducing his bail to sign on bond, and placing him on “Strict Conditions of House Arrest on Electronic Monitoring.” Upon careful review, we reverse the trial court’s order modifying bail pending sentence and reinstate Defendant’s original bail….

Defendant, who was 16 years old at the time, was arrested on August 11, 2023, and charged with multiple offenses, including attempting to build weapons of mass destruction that he planned to use to bomb the Philadelphia Pride Parade, before fleeing the country to join a terrorist organization in Syria. Specifically, as the Commonwealth recites in its Petition, the evidence established that Defendant: “(1) attempted to manufacture “TATP” (a potent explosive known as “The Mother of Satan”) using a recipe he found online; (2) practiced bomb-ignition using 12 to 20 ignition devices; (3) conducted a series of online searches, including what the punishment was for homosexuality under Sharia law, what the route was for the Philly Pride Parade, where to find trash cans along that route, and how to build pressure cooker bombs (i.e., the same device used in the Boston Marathon bombing); and (4) communicated online with two state-designated terrorist groups (KTJ and HTS) in Syria, where he planned to flee[,] … all while living at his family’s house and without their knowledge.”

On August 12, 2023, Defendant additionally was charged with criminal conspiracy, attempting to build weapons of mass destruction, arson, causing/risking catastrophe, criminal mischief, possession of an instrument of crime, and recklessly endangering another person (REAP). In September 2024, the trial court set monetary bail at $5,000,000.00 (at 10%), which remained through trial.

Following a jury trial, on September 17, 2025, Defendant was found guilty of attempting to build weapons of mass destruction (F-2), possessing explosive materials (F-3), risking a catastrophe (F-3), and REAP (M-2). After the jury rendered its guilty verdicts, the Commonwealth filed a motion to revoke Defendant’s bail or, in the alternative, maintain bail at $5,000,000.00, and the Defendant filed a motion to modify bail to house arrest…. [T]he trial judge …. entered an order granting Defendant’s motion for modification of bail, modifying bail … “… to $5,000,000.00 Sign Own Bond with Strict Conditions of House Arrest on Electronic Monitoring.” …

The right to bail, with certain exceptions, is enshrined in Article I, Section 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which provides in pertinent part:

All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses or for offenses for which the maximum sentence is life imprisonment or unless no condition or combination of conditions other than imprisonment will reasonably assure the safety of any person and the community when the proof is evident or presumption great[.]

However, following a verdict of guilt, a defendant has no state or federal constitutional right to bail….

Based upon our review of the record, including the bail hearing transcript and the parties’ submissions, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in modifying Defendant’s bail to house arrest. Instantly, the trial judge acknowledged that “there are indications of [Defendant having] mental health issues [that she] would like to know more about” and also noted that she was not convinced about whether Defendant had become “de[ ]radicalzied” as it’s “a complicated area [that involves] a lot of thought and research [and t]here are factors that can go in either direction.” Notably, Agent Cunningham testified that, in order to deradicalize, an individual would not only need disengagement in the form of incarceration, but also need to voluntarily accept the fact that they need some form of therapy. Instantly, there was no evidence that Defendant had voluntarily engaged in any therapy or any form of rehabilitation while incarcerated to indicate he was even attempting to deradicalize since his arrest in 2023.

While there is a constitutional right to bail, prisoners shall not receive bail when “no condition or combination of conditions other than imprisonment will reasonably assure the safety of any person and the community when the proof is evident or presumption great[.]”… [E]ven pre-trial, where a defendant has the presumption of the right to bail, a trial court may deny bail when, among other factors, the accused “presents a danger to any person and the community, which cannot be abated using any available bail conditions.” …

Assessing the Commonwealth’s testimony from the bail hearing, and the fact that this modification occurred post-verdict, we conclude that the trial court’s decision to place Defendant on house arrest is not supported by the law. Instantly, Commonwealth witnesses testified that: there was no evidence Defendant had seen a therapist or undergone any measures to deprogram or deradicalize in the 25 months he spent in prison awaiting trial; they had not seen any evidence to indicate that the “dangerousness of Defendant” was any different from when he had been arrested and charged back in August 2023; the staff at the electronic monitoring center does not have the ability to monitor individuals on house arrest using GPS technology or ensure that a defendant on house arrest does not have access to a cell phone; the electronic monitoring and field unit workers do not go to the house arrestee’s residence “for anything,” but only monitor the arrestee’s bracelet and box, sending notices to a supervising officer. Moreover, Pretrial Services Supervisor Lewin testified that once an arrestee violates house arrest, it could take hours before authorities would begin searching for them.

While the trial judge may have believed that it was reasonable to place Defendant on house arrest under the circumstances, practically the court’s decision flies in the face of reality. Moreover, the trial judge effectively treats this case as though it were a pre-verdict modification of bail request instead of one made after a jury has returned a guilty verdict—when a defendant no longer has a state or federal constitutional right to bail.

Here, we have a case involving an individual, characterized by the trial judge as someone who has “an appetite for violent nature,” that has been convicted of several felonies rooted in religious extremism and radicalization. The evidence presented by the Commonwealth supports the fact that Defendant will not be able to be appropriately monitored on house arrest, no matter the conditions, in order to ensure the safety of the community.

Although the trial court attempted to impose “strict” conditions on Defendant’s house arrest, the Commonwealth’s “proof is evident” that “no condition or combination of conditions other than imprisonment [of Defendant] will reasonably assure the safety of any person and the community[.]” Likewise, the Commonwealth’s evidence “tends to show that th[e house arrest] conditions [set by the trial judge] would be inadequate to ensure the protection of any person or the community.”

You can read the trial judge’s full explanation for the house arrest decision at pp. 12-17 of the opinion; an excerpt:

The factors that suggest he’s not a flight risk: [h]is cooperation, his character evidence. And that was extensive. I [have] never seen this level of letters of support, of people in the courtroom, eloquent, full of very detailed—and several of them from people who have no reason to support him[—t]eachers, staff members from juvenile custody. And those were quite persuasive.

The resources that the defense team has brought to bear on figuring out a plan for him[.] Coming up with resources, doing a report, lining up people who may be able to help him, if and when he’s released.

I certainly have concerns about [Defendant’s] parents, in that they apparently were blind or not sufficiently attentive to what was going on with him. That happens with parents sometimes, but he does have relatives and family who are supportive. Who are willing to put effort in and who, undisputedly, are not aligned with the kind of radical position or radical views that he was e[s]pou[sing], at the time.

He had no infractions in juvenile custody. He was a model prisoner. He has no infractions in adult custody. He’s been in solitary confinement for a year. That shows—and he may not have been able to comply with the rules and restrictions, at some point, but he has shown that he is recently, that he’s able to comply.

He has no criminal record. No history of violence. He has limitations. One relative described it in here. He has an IEP. He was diagnosed with ADHD, he does struggle in school, and he is a rather naïve person, in terms of getting around in the wor[l]d. That’s just not a great capacity, to put things into effect….

Another factor is, the fact that house arrest is an option, and it could be very strict house arrest. House arrest can have a lot of conditions….

I take into account that he was a juvenile when this happened, and that juveniles change. And they do make stupid decisions and do stupid things.

I took into account that there are indications of mental health issues. The mental health evaluation found some indications of that. I would like to know more about that….