Court Blocks Federal Restriction on “Loud or Unusual Noise” on City Sidewalks Outside Federal Property

From Judge Ann Aiken (D. Ore.) Wednesday in Longworth v. Noem:

Plaintiffs Chloe Longworth and Anna Lardner regularly protest on city-owned sidewalks in front of the federal building in Eugene, Oregon, located between 6th and 7th Avenues and Pearl and High Streets. Plaintiffs protest there at least once per week, and sometimes more frequently.

In June 2025, DHS finalized new rules regarding the protection of federal property…. The new rules expanded the geographic scope of the previous rules to include areas outside federal property. Specifically, the regulation now found at 6 C.F.R. § 139.35(c) prohibits “Creating a loud or unusual noise, noxious odor, or other nuisance.” … This applies to “Federal property or in areas outside Federal property that affects, threatens, or endangers Federal property or persons on Federal property.

The regulations contain applicable definitions at 6 C.F.R. § 139.15, but neither “loud” nor “unusual” is defined. Nuisance is defined as “a condition, activity, or situation, to include a loud noise or foul odor, that interferes with the use or enjoyment of Federal property.” Put together, the Unusual Noice Provision seeks to criminalize creating a loud or unusual noise in areas outside Federal property that affects persons on Federal property and interferes with the use or enjoyment of Federal property.

On November 18, 2025, Ms. Longworth was detained, arrested, and issued a citation for “unusual noise” for using a megaphone on the city-owned sidewalks outside of the federal building. The next day, Ms. Longworth returned to site of the protest, and a federal officer, calling her by name, threatened to arrest her for “yelling.” The citation issued on November 18, 2025, was dismissed by the US Attorney’s office in early December 2025.

On November 25, 2025, Ms. Lardner was approached by a DHS employee and threatened with arrest for “unusual noise” for speaking through a megaphone on the public sidewalk.

Likely unconstitutional, the court held:

The Supreme Court has held that “‘public places’ historically associated with the free exercise of expressive activities, such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, are considered, without more, to be ‘public forums.'” U.S. v. Grace (1983)

Traditional public forum property occupies a special position in terms of First Amendment protection and will not lose its historically recognized character for the reason that it abuts government property that has been dedicated to a use other than as a forum for public expression. Nor may the government transform the character of the property by the expedient of including it within the statutory definition of what might be considered a non-public forum parcel of property.

The Supreme Court has also held that if a law’s prohibitions are not clearly defined, i.e., that they are vague, the law violates due process. A vague law has a chilling effect, as “uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to ‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone[.]'” A law must “give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited.” …

This is not the first court to look at a prohibition on “loud or unusual noise.” See, e.g. United States v. Thomas (D. Ariz. 2013) (loud or unusual noise within VA center); United States v. Wasylyshyn (2d Cir. 2020) (loud or unusual noise within a courthouse). But the phrase “loud or unusual” cannot be divorced from its context…. “The nature of a place, the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the kinds of regulations of time, place, and manner that are reasonable” …. It does not follow that because certain conduct may be prohibited within a courthouse or other facility, the same conduct can be prohibited in a traditional public forum of very different character.

Specifically, content-neutral restrictions are permitted in public forms if they are “narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information, and do not delegate overly broad licensing discretion to a government official[,]” while “restrictions on speech in a nonpublic forum must only be reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and viewpoint neutral.”

Here, not only have Plaintiffs been arrested or threatened with arrest for using a megaphone in a traditional public forum, but Longworth was threatened with arrest for “yelling.” This speaks to another reason for the impermissibility of vague or overbroad enactments: those enactments create the “danger[ ] of arbitrary and discriminatory application.” Here, Plaintiffs are regular protestors who believe they were targeted by government agents for their speech. Whether or not they in fact were targeted, the danger of discriminatory application exists….

On this record, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on the merits or, at the very least, have raised serious questions going to the merits of their First Amendment claims concerning the vagueness and overbreadth of the Unusual Noise Provision as applied to a traditional public forum….

The Court has not been presented, as of yet, with an argument for Defendants’ countervailing interests in enforcing the Unusual Noise Provision. Because the regulation at issue had an original effective date of January 1, 2026, the Court can discern no hardship to Defendants in an injunction enjoining them from enforcing one part of one subsection of only one of those rules, and then only on the public sidewalks abutting the specific federal facility in Eugene at issue in this case….

This injunction shall continue in force and effect for fourteen (14) days from the date and time of this Order. Plaintiffs are ORDERED to promptly serve this Order on Defendants. Following service, the parties are ORDERED to confer on a date and time for a preliminary injunction hearing and on a briefing schedule on the question of a continuing injunction….

Lauren C. Regan and Marianne G. Dugan (Civil Liberties Defense Center) represent plaintiffs.